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INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”

—George Washington

“Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.”

—Holy Scripture


INSTITUTES
OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY

BY
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PREFACE

THIS treatise owes its origin to a deep recoil from that science and philosophy of morals which makes no recognition, or only incidental recognition, of God. The attempt to divorce moral science from sacred Scripture, theology, and religion, has given us a science with no principle of unity, a philosophy without ultimate truth or final cause, and a code of morals without obligation —a solar system with no central sun or bond of gravitation. Till a better philosophy shall prevail, practical morals must decay.

Because the supreme Moral Ruler of the universe must needs be the central fact in any true system of moral science, this treatise gives briefly the grounds of a rational belief in the divine existence.

Because the primary conceptions and ultimate truths with which moral science has to do are the intuitions of the moral faculty, it has seemed needful to discuss somewhat carefully the action and functions of conscience.

Right and wrong in conduct, and all moral character or moral distinctions, postulate a real power of choice between moral alternatives ; therefore there must needs be a discussion of the true doctrine of the will.

Among the sources of moral science the holy Scriptures stand chief and cannot be ignored without infinite loss—therefore a brief outline argument is given show-

ing the historic trustworthiness and the inspiration of the Scriptures.

The Divine Will is counted the ultimate rule of right; but not will conceived as unrelated to the nature of man, fickle or arbitrary in the bad sense,—for there is no such divine will,—but the Divine Will as expressed in man's moral nature, and in the nature of matter, and in the constitution of the universe. A change in the Divine Will would involve a corresponding change in the whole creation.

It is taught that the distinction of right and wrong is grounded in the nature of God, in the nature of man, and in the nature of things—in the primal facts and verities of real existence.

The second part, which treats of practical morals, is not designed to be merely a manual of duties. It undertakes to show the application of moral principles to the chief forms of conduct, and to ground duties in ultimate truth.

To adapt this treatise to classroom use, each numbered paragraph is made to contain one distinct thought more or less amplified as seemed needful.

With the revival of Bible study in schools of the higher grades, the author believes that there is more than ever before a place and a demand for the study of moral philosophy, and such a study as shall recognize not only man's social and civic relationships, but also the full breadth and scope of his nature and destiny. If this work shall stimulate and help the reverent study of right and duty the author will be content.

L. B. T.

RICHMOND, January, 1899.

INTRODUCTION

ALL philosophy, science, or thought, presupposes a certain basis or starting point of accepted truth. Knowledge is grounded in postulates, truths accepted without proof, incapable of proof and needing none. They need no proof because no healthy mind can disbelieve them. They are incapable of proof because there is nothing more fundamental and certain upon which to establish them. From the nature of the case there must be somewhere a beginning of knowledge. In physics and in metaphysics the beginning is the same.

First postulate. The testimony of consciousness is final and conclusive.

In this postulate it is understood that the consciousness is the consciousness of a sane mind. In proportion as mind becomes unbalanced and diseased, all mental processes become chimerical. In the application of this principle care must be taken that the real dictum of consciousness be rightly apprehended, that an inference be not mistaken for the direct testimony of consciousness. For example, consciousness affirms as a fact that we see and hear, but consciousness is silent touching the process of seeing and hearing.

Second postulate. The knowledge which comes to us through our perceptive faculties is real knowledge.

This signifies the reality of the non-ego, the world of matter and of things, and the reality of our knowledge

of the qualities of matter. This does not mean, however, that our knowledge of matter is complete or that our senses give us at all the ground of the qualities which they reveal. So far as our knowledge extends, it is real ; it is not a mere subjective modification with no corresponding objective reality. It gives a solid basis for thought and action in working out our destiny for time and for eternity.

Third postulate. Our normal and necessary mental processes are valid.

This signifies that mental processes valid in human thought are also valid in the mind of God, and correspond to the realities of actual existence. The intuitions of the mind are the direct beholding of that which is real and true. For example, the conception of time is the idea of a reality. The affirmation that every change must have a cause adequate to produce the change, represents a universal and necessary fact in the universe, as true to the mind of God as to the mind of man. That which is logical in thought is that which corresponds to the realities of actual existence.

AXIOMATIC PRINCIPLES

First. The validity of moral distinctions, as grounded in the nature of God, and in the nature of all beings made in the likeness of God. Moral distinctions are necessary concepts of the human mind, co-ordinate with ideas of time, of space, and of causation.

Second. The freedom of the will, as a faculty which originates moral choices and determines the moral attitudes of spiritual beings. This is axiomatic as being an ultimate testimony of consciousness.

Third. The reality of moral obligation, of good and ill desert, of sin and guilt. This is axiomatic as being the affirmation of conscience, the faculty of moral intuitions.

Fourth. The duty of obedience to the supreme authority, to the being whom the intellect certifies as the *supreme* being. This is axiomatic as being the primary and the primal dictum of conscience.

These postulates and axiomatic principles furnish a foundation for moral science as sure as the basis of mathematics. Pure mathematics has this advantage—dealing with conceptions only, it maintains the same certainty to the end. Moral science must deal with facts as they exist, and these facts may be more or less perfectly apprehended.

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PART I
PRINCIPLES

INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS

1. Definition of Moral Philosophy.

Moral philosophy is that department of mental and metaphysical science which treats of the moral law and of its relationships and applications to human conduct and character. It has to do with ideas and principles expressed by such words as *right* and *wrong*; *ought*, *obligation*, and *duty*; *righteousness* and *sin*; *reward* and *penalty*. It inquires what *ought to be* and why.

2. Distinction in Terms—Ethics.

The term ethics denotes properly the rules of practical morality. This is indicated by such expressions as these: The ethics of trade; the ethics of the street; political, social, medical ethics. This use of the word is agreeable to its derivation from *ethos* ($\epsilon\thetao\varsigma$), meaning habit, manner, custom.

3. Moral Science.

Moral science is the rational unfolding of the principles which underlie practical morals and the systematic arrangement of duties according to those principles.

4. Moral Philosophy.

Moral philosophy includes moral science, but it goes farther and investigates the grounds and validity of the moral principles themselves. It not only answers the questions, What? and How? but also explains the reason why. But the terms moral science and moral philosophy are often used interchangeably, as if nearly or quite synonymous.

5. Moral Philosophy and Other Sciences—Mathematics.

The science of mathematics treats of numbers, and of extension which can be represented by numbers. The conceptions and processes of mathematics enter largely into all the natural sciences. The universe of things is framed on mathematical principles. But the conceptions of moral science cannot be represented by numbers nor can they be reduced to mathematical formulae. Duty is not equal to pleasure nor a multiple of pleasure; right is not a plus quantity and wrong a minus quantity; two wrongs do not equal a right.

6. Natural Science.

The natural sciences treat of the phenomena and forces of matter. The characteristic of all phenomena of matter is unintelligent, unconscious uniformity. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, investigates the moral activities of spiritual beings, the characteristic of which is intelligent, conscious freedom. The forms of thought, therefore, which befit physical science cannot be transferred to moral philosophy. The attempt to do this is the death of moral science.

7. Psychology.

Psychology investigates the activities of man's mental faculties and the general phenomena of mind ; but psychology raises no question touching the moral quality of the mental phenomena which it investigates. But moral philosophy treads upon the edge of psychology, for in moral science the functions of conscience and will are fundamental factors. Moral science "inquires what a moral agent is in his constitution in order to determine how he ought to choose and feel and act."

8. Will and Conscience to be Investigated.

Moral philosophy cannot afford not to investigate the faculties of conscience and will. The action of these faculties is fundamental in all moral concerns. Apart from the will, with its power of choice, moral conduct and responsibility are impossible. Without conscience there could be no sense of obligation or of right. It surely belongs to moral science to investigate for itself the action of those faculties and the origin and value of those ideas upon which its very existence depends.

9. Contrary Opinions.

The right of moral science to examine for itself the activities of conscience and will is by some stoutly denied. Dr. Laurens P. Hickok says, "Moral science must be preceded by mental science," and therefore in his treatise on moral science he leaves conscience and will entirely without treatment. Dr. Joseph Haven says, "Many of our most popular works on moral philosophy treat of topics which properly belong to psychology, *e. g.*,

the nature of conscience, the sensibilities, and the will" ; and he in like manner gives these faculties little consideration. The more recent writers, however, count the activities of conscience and will as belonging to the domain of moral science not less than to psychology.

10. Theology.

Theology and moral philosophy are closely related. Theology, signifying primarily the science of God, embraces not only that which may be known of God, but also man's relationship to him and man's conduct and character so far at least as they concern his final destiny. Moral philosophy in turn overlaps theology. The moral law is from God, and the ultimate grounds of obligation and right can be found nowhere except in the being of God. Moral science cannot afford to ignore the sacred Scriptures. The moral elements of a man's life in this world cannot be duly estimated apart from immortality and final destiny.

11. The Sciences not Separate.

The attempt to draw severe lines of separation between departments of knowledge is both artificial and futile. Fact and truth everywhere are so related that it is impossible to sunder them. Ideas of number pervade the universe ; mathematical processes are the very soul of astronomy and pervade all natural science ; physics and chemistry mingle everywhere in geology ; psychology counts it needful to overrun the domains of physiology and biology. In like manner the student of ethics must make incursions into the territory of psychology and theology, and wherever it can find good material.

12. A Moral Philosophy Without God or Conscience.

There are moralists, indeed, who so apprehend their science that they feel no need of reference to the Divine Being, and have no occasion to touch the hem of theology. They who count right and duty as only refined forms of selfishness and self-gratification, have no need to investigate the action of conscience. If man is nothing more than a "more highly evolved" beast, the faculty of choice needs no attention. But such views are the death of moral conceptions, and leave no place for a real moral philosophy. Holding fast to imperative moral obligation we have need of conscience and of God. And the presence of God in moral philosophy brings it into relationship with all truth, fact, and science.

13. Obligation the Primary Idea in Moral Philosophy.

The primary conception in moral philosophy is obligation—not right, but *obligation*. *Ought* expresses a simple, primary, undefinable idea. It is important to hold this fact well in mind, for otherwise the action of conscience cannot be well understood. The idea of obligation rises in the mind of the child before the idea of right. The notion of obligation is universal and uniform with men of every kind, but notions of what is right are various and incongruous to the last degree.

14. Obligation Implies Two Parties.

Obligation implies relationship, and relationship implies the existence of two or more persons. A being existing alone in the universe could not be under obligation. In the mind of a being so existing the idea of duty could not arise. Conduct might be pleasant or

unpleasant, injurious or otherwise, but nothing could be conceived as duty, for there would be no being to whom he could be morally obligated.

15. Obligation to Self not a Reality.

That form of speech which represents a man as owing this or that to himself, covers a lurking fallacy of thought; it conceives the indivisible unit of personality as at once debtor and creditor in the same transaction. If the expression be at all admissible in scientific discussion, it must be taken as a figure of speech in which a right or privilege is spoken of as a duty. A better form of speech would be: I have the right to claim this for myself; my honor or my happiness cannot be secured except by doing this. But a privilege or a right for myself may be my duty to my friends or to God.

16. What Two Parties?

The two parties always present in every transaction having moral quality, and always to be taken account of in moral philosophy, are, first, the responsible human being who is under obligation, and secondly, the Creator to whom every human being is supremely obligated. Were there but one human being on the earth, this primary obligation would exist in full force and there would be no second. From this primary obligation all other obligations spring. In this comprehensive obligation all other obligations are involved.

17. A Triangle of Relationships.

Moral obligation implies at the least two related persons, but moral science in its simplest form must take

account of more than two. There must needs be a triangle of relationships. No human being can exist unrelated to God, and not, except temporarily and abnormally, unrelated to other members of the human family. These relationships may become exceedingly complex and intricate, but in their simplest form they must needs include a triangle of persons and relations.

18. Two Classes of Obligations.

From the triangle of parties and relationships set forth in the preceding paragraph, arise two generic classes of duties; first, duties owed directly and solely to the Divine Being; secondly, springing from the first and finely interwoven with them, duties owed to men, our fellow-creatures. Obligations of the first class are in their nature simple and easily understood; obligations of the second class are complex and tangled beyond the possibility of complete analysis or full comprehension.

19. Law.

The term "law" is important, and the student of moral science must learn to distinguish carefully its various senses. Under an ill-defined and uncertain use of this word lurk many false conceptions and dangerous fallacies.

20. Law as a Rule of Conduct.

Law signifies primarily a *rule of conduct* to which obedience is required. This rule may issue from a father, from a sovereign, from a legislature, from an unwritten consensus of public opinion, from a council of nations, or from the Creator of the universe. In this sense law has one essential characteristic, it is a rule

which has for its object the control of free beings by their voluntary submission to its requirements. With this obedience force, as force is understood in physics, can have nothing whatever to do. Where physical force as a cause begins, obedience ends. From this primary sense of law the secondary uses are easily derived.

21. Law as Uniformity of Operation.

Because obedience to law as a rule of conduct secures regularity of conduct, therefore any principle or method of uniformity of operation is called a law. We speak of "the law of our being," "the law of hereditary descent," "the law of falling bodies." The law of one's being is that uniform method of development or action which is normal to a being so constituted. The law of heredity is that uniformity in the transmission of qualities from parents to offspring, by which species, races, and families preserve their characteristics through successive generations. Illustrations of this use of the term law might be given without limit.

22. Moral Philosophy and Law as Uniformity of Operation.

This second sense of law as signifying uniformity of operation, is not excluded from moral philosophy. We may rightly speak of the law of the conscience, the law of the will, but we must bear in mind that these expressions do not signify a rule of conduct issuing from these faculties, but their special, normal mode of action.

23. Law as a Fixed Order of Sequence.

In natural science, the term law is often used to mean a fixed order in the sequence of phenomena. This, like

the preceding, is uniformity of operation. A law of nature, as the phrase is commonly used, is the fixed order in which the phenomena of matter follow each other. Here again appears a half-unconscious personification of nature as a sovereign giving laws in the primary sense, to which every atom of matter gives strict obedience.

24. Natural Law in Moral Science.

The use of the term, law, as signifying a fixed order of sequence is not excluded from moral science. It is a law that suffering follows sinning, and that virtue is followed by happiness. But this is not the moral law. This is natural law in the moral world. To confound this natural law with the moral law, introduces dire confusion into moral philosophy.

25. Law as Signifying a Force.

A uniformly acting force, tendency, or instinct, which produces regularity of operation is sometimes called a law. The planets move obedient to the "law of gravitation." There is the "law of self-preservation," the "law of love," the "law of life," the "law of sin." These ever-acting forces are conceived as ruling the phenomena of motion and conduct. This use of the term law by Paul indicates its applicability to moral questions. But it must be remembered that this is not the moral law.

26. Law, as the Moral Law.

In the definition of moral philosophy, law is used in its primary sense, a rule of conduct for the control of

free beings through their voluntary submission to its requirements. The *moral law* is God's will revealed in many ways for the government of men, and administered by the moral agency of reward and penalty. With this agrees Webster's definition : "The will of God as the rule for the disposition and conduct of all responsible beings toward him and toward each other." In this definition every element must be emphasized.

The moral law is not uniformity of operation or regularity in the sequence of phenomena ; it is a rule of conduct to which conformity is due, but to which disobedience is possible. The moral law is not the expression of impersonal nature, but the will of the living God. The moral law is not a code of principles deduced from an experience of consequences ; it is a rule of conduct intended to guide men previous to experience and to save them from disastrous experiences. The moral law is not mere advice, however urgent ; it is a law proclaimed by a sovereign, enforced by rewards and penalties, administered through the agencies of nature and of special providences, and maintained by the infinite energies of the divine personality.

27. The Revelation of the Moral Law Multiform.

It is easy to see that the moral law is not limited, and is not to be limited, to one brief code, as the Decalogue, or to one method of revelation. The law is outlined in the Decalogue, but the revelation of it is broader than the Decalogue. The law is revealed in the sacred Scriptures, but the revelation of the law is not confined to the Scriptures. That revelation which is the foundation of all, and is presupposed by every other, is found

in man's own moral nature. Also for us who live so late in the course of time, the will of God has been revealed by a long experience of every kind of conduct, and by deep research into the nature of things. Wherever and however the mind of God touching the moral conduct of men is indicated, there and thus is seen a revelation of the moral law.

28. Scope of the Moral Law.

As has been shown in the triangle of necessary relationships, the moral law has a duplex code. It defines, first, man's dispositions and duties toward God, and secondly, the due conduct and temper of mind between fellow-members of the human race. Also, preliminary to its fuller discussion in its place, it should be noted that the moral law covers not only the outward conduct of action and speech, but also the inward life of thought, appetite, sensibility, love, purpose, and character. The inward life is primary and chief. "Out of the good treasure of the heart" or "out of the evil treasure" proceeds the outward life of men.

29. Man's Relationship to Things.

Man's relationship to the world of non-sentient things is indirectly, but only indirectly, a question of morals. What men shall do or how they shall feel toward mountain or sea, cloud or tree, is not directly the subject of moral commandment. A man may stand spellbound with awe in the presence of Mont Blanc or Niagara, and gaze with rapture upon the Bay of Naples by moonlight or upon the Golden Horn, or he may be slightly moved by scenes of grandeur and beauty, and

moral character may receive neither gain nor detriment by the one or the other. Whether a man shall feed on wheat or on rice, on beef or on mutton, is not directly a question of right or wrong ; if he does the one he is no better, or if he does the other he is no worse.

30. The Use of Things Indirectly Right or Wrong.

While it is true that moral obligation cannot subsist toward things, that wrong and injustice cannot be done to things, that man's relationship to things is not directly a moral relationship, it is nevertheless true that he may so use things as to bring that use under the purview of the moral law. If men subject grains and fruits to fermentation and drink the intoxicating products of organic decay, this use of things comes within the scope of the moral commandment, because by this they throw both their inward life and outward conduct out of harmony with ethical requirement, and render themselves unable to meet their obligations either toward God or toward men. The use of things for any kind of vicious self-indulgence comes under this principle. In this manner man's use of nature, in almost every form of use, comes indirectly and more or less remotely within the domain of right and wrong. Food and health, dress and style of living, come thus within the sphere of morals.

31. Righteousness and Hygiene.

Our relationship to the world of things may, as has been shown, become an element of right and duty ; but they greatly err who count food and health, or any other right adjustment of ourselves to the physical world, as moral concerns of equal grade with "the weightier

matters of the law—judgment, mercy, and faith.” Sickness is not always sin. To ignore hygiene and to sacrifice the welfare of the body may become the dictate of supreme right. The law of love and self-sacrifice is higher than the law of self-preservation. Heroism forgets personal well-being. Many moral emergencies justly tread hygiene under foot.

32. Excessive Exaltation of Nature.

The practical effect of accounting virtue as consisting too much in the right adjustment of man to nature, is not so much to exalt the real value of that adjustment, as to degrade the real and essential righteousness. It not seldom happens that as nature is exalted, the Creator of nature is depressed. Moral philosophy must count our obligation to God as primary and chief; our obligations to men as secondary, but immeasurably important; our relations with nature as moral, incidentally and indirectly. The first and great commandment is, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart”; the second is like unto it, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”

33. Criticisms.

For the purpose of comparison and criticism it may be well to consider certain other characteristic definitions of moral philosophy. These will show in what fundamental conceptions diverse or antagonistic ethical systems find their point of departure.

34. Dr. Hickok's Definition.

Dr. Laurens P. Hickok¹ defines moral science as

¹ “A System of Moral Science,” p. 55.

"the systematic application of the ultimate rule of right to all conceptions of moral conduct." The germinal idea in this definition is found in "the ultimate rule of right." This ultimate rule of right Dr. Hickok declares to be "that all voluntary action should be held in subjection to the dignity of the rational spirit." He recognizes no standard of right except suitableness to the dignity of such a being as man. And a man must be his own judge of that suitableness. From this germinal thought Dr. Hickok evolves a system of morals which finds¹ its "ethical grounds and validity independently of the considerations of God's being."

35. Herbert Spencer's Definition.

Herbert Spencer² says : "Acts are called good or bad according as they are well or ill adjusted to ends." The end of all activities he explains as being, first, the preservation and personal welfare of the individual, the lowest grade in the evolution of conduct ; the preservation of the species, the second grade of evolution ; and third, the accomplishment of these ends on the part of each individual in such a way as to be a help and not a hindrance to other individuals, the highest grade in the evolution of conduct. To sum it all up, he says : "No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness." Starting with definitions from which every trace of moral obligation is rigidly excluded, Mr. Spencer carefully frames a system of ethics which makes self-pleasing the highest aim and the highest good, and self-denial an impossibility.

¹ "A System of Moral Science," p. 295. ² "Data of Ethics," Chap. III.

36. Professor Haven's Definitions.

Prof. Joseph Haven¹ defines moral philosophy as "the science which treats of morals, the science of right." Right he declares to be a quality of actions "inherent in the nature of things," independent of God, to which God himself is subject, so that no man is more or less under obligation to do a thing or not to do it by reason of any divine command or prohibition. The law of God is only a guide in understanding what is that right which exists independent of God.² Here we have a system of ethics which denies utterly any standard of right outside of a man's own intuitions, and finds for God an incidental place as a magistrate, but no place for him as a sovereign.

37. Dr. Wayland's Point of Departure.

Dr. Francis Wayland³ defines moral science as "the science of moral law." Law in this definition he explains as signifying "an order of sequence," and the moral law as "a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral qualities of actions and their results." He conceives the moral law as a law of nature in moral concerns, the fixed sequence of good or ill to certain courses of conduct. This order of sequence in morals he declares to be as fixed and inevitable as sequences in physics. Still further⁴ he says : "The happiness or misery of which we speak affects men simply in consequence of the action and without any regard to the innocence or guilt of the actor." This conception of the moral law pursues and entangles

¹ "Moral Philosophy," p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, Div. I., Chap. II., III.

³ "Elements of Moral Science," pp. 25, 26, 27.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

the author, and leaves no place for law as a rule of conduct. The ultimate standard of right he nowhere considers. His high religious faith saves him from following his definitions to their logical issue.

38. Moral Law Not an Order of Sequence.

That suffering follows sinning, that right-doing brings happiness, and that these results are brought to pass in some degree by an automatic agency through the nature of matter and spirit is surely true. But this is natural law. To show that the moral law is not an order of sequence but a rule of conduct we need only point to that great epitome of the moral code, the Decalogue. The Ten Commandments enjoin duties rather than make a declaration of consequences.

39. A Suggestive Defect.

A noteworthy and suggestive defect in Dr. Wayland's definition is seen in this, that an order of sequence is not a thing to be obeyed or disobeyed. An order of sequence cannot be broken by man. To break an order of sequence is to tear asunder the chain of causation. The very conception of this is self-contradictory, for that force which should break the chain would merely constitute an accessory cause, bringing, of necessity, a modified result. If the moral law is an order of sequence, the only possible law-breaker is he who has power to forgive sins, for nothing else than forgiveness can disturb the order of sequence between the moral qualities of actions and their results.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

40. **The Moral Standard, a Being with Moral Attributes.**

Moral rightness is conformity to a standard of morals. Between objects compared there must be a likeness in respect to that element which is the point of comparison. The dimensions of a body must be measured by a standard which itself has extension. Moral qualities can be compared with nothing except moral qualities. The standard of measure for a moral being, like man, must needs be a perfect being of like moral nature. Is there such a being, the supreme standard of moral perfection for all men? It belongs to moral science to answer this question.

41. **Unity of Moral Obligation.**

Moral science is the science of obligation. Is such a science possible? If duty is not a tangled skein of competing obligations, but a unity capable of scientific treatment, that unity must be found in some supreme obligation, of which all other obligations are only unfoldings and ramifications. If there is one supreme obligation, it must be found in man's obligation to his Creator. It can be found nowhere else. Is there a supreme being to whom man is under supreme obligation, an obligation in which is found the unity of all duty? Moral science must answer this question. Till this question is answered there can be no *science* of morals.

42. Obligation not Possible Except toward Moral Beings.

Moral obligation cannot subsist except toward a being, and a being of moral attributes. Duty is not a mere abstraction. Obligation cannot subsist toward things. It may subsist in respect to them, but not to them. Obligation subsists between one personal being and another personal being, or else it has no existence. Is there a supreme being, the center of supreme obligation for all men? It belongs to moral science to give reply to this question.

43. God's Existence a Question for Moral Science.

In moral science, if anywhere, the inquiry concerning the existence of a Supreme Being is appropriate. Moral science does not presuppose previous theological study, and moreover, if at all the existence of God is to be accepted without investigation, that acceptance would best be found in theology itself. This inquiry becomes imperative when we consider the general effort to develop a philosophy of morals apart from the idea of a Supreme Ruler. Any system so constructed must, as a philosophy, be shallow; as a science, it must be false to the facts of spiritual existence; as an ethical system, it must be lacking in grip of moral obligation. It is reasonable to demand the grounds of our belief in the existence of that Being who can be recognized by no bodily sense.

44. First Proof—the Universe as it Is.

The first proof that there is a Creator and Supreme Ruler is derived from the organized and working universe. The world as it stands before us, with its countless marks of mind, intelligence, and purpose, its matching of

element to element and part to part, with its adaptation of means for the accomplishment of ends—marks which meet us everywhere—renders any hypothesis except that the universe is the product of an intelligent Creator an absurdity. It is possible to deny this in words; but a rational account of the universe, upon any other supposition, is impossible. Apart from the idea of a Creator science can give no account of the origin of life. Assuming the existence of matter with all its properties and forces, and assuming the existence of life, the most that science attempts to do is to show possible modes of change.

45. Illustrative Marks of Intelligence.

As illustrations of the finger-prints of intelligence seen in the world as it exists, we may note the adaptations between light and the eyes of living creatures; between sound vibrations and the ear; between the properties of matter and all the senses of the inhabitants of the earth; between heat and cold and the world of vegetable and animal life. We may consider water, its specific heat and its latent heat; its solid, liquid, and gaseous forms, with all their wonderful relationships. We may take note of oxygen, with its active, eager affinities, and of nitrogen, with its singular inertness. Study the structure of the solar system with its balanced forces and automatic take-ups and compensations. Study the structure of man himself, complicated and subtle in contrivance and function beyond conception. Investigate the qualities of matter by which this organic universe is rendered a possibility, and the relationships of this material world to the intellectual development and moral discipline of man. Put all these things together, and

more without limit, and say whether it is possible to give a rational account of the universe as it exists, except upon the hypothesis that it is in some way the work of an intelligent Creator.

46. Intelligence not in Matter.

The world bears the imprint of intelligence. The impress of thought pervades the universe. The supposition that it is the workmanship of God sufficiently explains its origin and structure. No other supposition meets the case. The one alternative hypothesis imputes these infinite adaptations to matter itself. This is nothing else than "begging the question." It is imputing to matter the qualities of mind. It is, in effect, a denial of the distinction between matter and spirit. And this the new materialism admits. Matter is said to have two faces; on the one side it shows the qualities of extension, weight and inertia; on the other, the psychic attributes of intelligence and sensibility; matter has an unconscious will and purpose. This may show a fine fancy, but nothing can be more unscientific than to impute attributes the most diverse in kind to the same substance. With better reason we might count oxygen, with its furious attractions, and nitrogen, with its feeble affinities, one and the same substance. The universe bears the marks of intelligence and mind, and upon the testimony of consciousness and clear thought we must hold that matter and mind are not one.

47. The Impress of whose Intelligence?

When once it is seen that the universe is the workmanship of an intelligent being, the minds of men do

not hesitate to ascribe it to that infinite being whom we name God. The infinitude of the universe forbids its ascription to any inferior intelligence. And when the idea of God is accepted, clear thought will not hesitate to impute the creation of the universe to the Divine Being of the holy Scriptures.

48. Second Proof—the Origin of Life.

So far as science can read the autobiography of the earth and of the universe, it declares that a time was when organized things did not exist. The astronomer, gazing into the infinite past, thinks he sees worlds and systems fade out and dissipate into gaseous nebulae. The geologist believes that the hieroglyphics of his science declare that once this earth was a glowing sphere of molten rock, and earlier still, a whirling mass of fiery vapor. It is conceded and affirmed by all that there was a time when animal or vegetable life could not exist on this globe. Organized matter was an impossibility. Touching the origin of life the last word of science, and its only word, is this, that "life proceeds from life and from nothing else." The most solicitous experiments have not been able to throw the slightest doubt upon this scientific dictum. Clear thought can give no account of the origin of life except to ascribe it to the creative act of God.

49. The Argument from the Life of Man.

The above proof of the divine existence, the origin of life, acquires immensely increased force when we consider the life of man. The life of men is very much more than that undefinable force which is able out of dead

material to build up a living organism and to propagate and perpetuate its own existence. Man is a self-conscious and rational being, endowed with conscience and will and with aspirations for immortality. If dead matter cannot of itself begin to stir and to organize itself with the life of a tree, how much less can it rise to the life of a beast animate with the intelligence of instinct! And if dead matter cannot spontaneously assume the low life of instinct, how shall it rise to the high rational and spiritual life of man? Man's life can have no origin lower than itself.

50. The Third Proof—the Moral Faculty in Man.

The faculty of conscience in man postulates the existence of God as the necessary ground of its moral affirmations. Conscience is the faculty which stands correlative to moral authority. As the eye stands correlative to light, and its structure and functions postulate the existence of light, so does conscience in the human soul postulate the moral authority of God. Take from conscience the idea of supreme authority, and its action becomes exceedingly feeble; take from it all idea of authority, and its action as conscience ceases. Conscience recognizes the authority—the supreme authority—of some being. Conscience speaks of conformity to some rule of right—a rule of right emanating from some being. Conscience presses upon men the idea and sense of obligation—obligation to some being. Conscience throws the minds of men into a state of expectancy, a looking for reward or penalty corresponding to moral desert—a reward or penalty administered by some being. That being whose presence in the minds of men gives law

and potency to conscience, is intuitively recognized as supreme.

51. Apart from God, Conscience False.

The full and perfect action of conscience requires the idea of a supreme personal ruler, as positively demands this as perfect seeing requires light and the notion of space. If there is no God, the intuitions and ultimate *dicta* of conscience are nothing other than falsehoods. The “categorical imperative” of conscience and its ominous forebodings must then be counted as irrational babblings. But intuitive conceptions and beliefs are the basis of all knowledge, not of one kind only, but of all kinds. They are in themselves the surest knowledge. It is no more unscientific to deny the principle of cause and effect or the reality of time and space than to deny the affirmations of conscience. Conscience postulates the existence of a Supreme Moral Ruler as the condition of its own perfect action.

52. Fourth Proof—God’s Manifestation of Himself.

God has not left his existence to be inferred by reasoning processes, or to be searched out by curious investigations, or to be beheld dimly by more or less blurred intuitions ; he has manifested himself. For the chief record of the divine self-manifestations we go to the sacred Scriptures. We count the historic testimony of the Scriptures sufficient. The evidences of this will be briefly examined in due time. In numerous personal manifestations to antediluvian fathers from Adam to Noah ; in the Jehovah-angel to Abraham and the patriarchs ; in the burning bush to Moses ; in the miraculous

plagues to Pharaoh ; in thunders, lightnings, and voices from Sinai to the Hebrew tribes ; in sign and wonders wrought by judges and prophets to confound the worshipers of idols ; in miracles of mercy and blessing wrought by Christ and his apostles, by many manifestations of his Spirit since the unseen God has compelled his existence to be felt and recognized by men. The spiritual renovation wrought upon sinful human nature through belief in the gospel of Christ is a perpetual declaration of God's existence. As historic events no facts are better attested than these. The denial of them withdraws a factor from human history, without which the course of events and the development of the race cannot be explained. These manifestations carried conviction to the minds of the men to whom they were made, and the record itself has a wonderfully convincing power over those who thoughtfully read it.

53. Is Belief in the Existence of God an Intuition ?

Dr. A. H. Strong¹ holds that belief in the divine existence is strictly a rational intuition. He affirms that this belief has the three characteristics of a truth of direct intuition, that it is universal, necessary, and presupposed by all other knowledge—universal, in the sense that all men by language and by life show that belief in the existence of God is present in their minds ; necessary, in the sense that under suitable conditions this belief necessarily arises ; presupposed in all knowledge, in that only upon the supposition that our faculties are the creation of a God of truth have we any assurance that our knowledge is real.

¹ "Systematic Theology."

54. Criticism of the Argument from Intuition.

The claim that belief in the divine existence is a direct rational intuition seems somewhat too strong. It seems to count belief in the existence of invisible spiritual beings, demons, or fairies, as identical with belief in the existence of God. The conditions under which belief in the divine existence must necessarily arise are not such as naturally obtain, but such as are brought about by a supernatural revelation. In respect to the claim that belief in the existence of God is a postulate of all knowledge, it must be said that the major part of the human race trust their faculties and feel no need of accounting to themselves for that confidence in any manner whatsoever. It does not occur to them to doubt their senses. This however we must hold, that belief in God is so normal to man's moral nature that when once the idea of God is clearly presented it satisfies both reason and conscience, and only a strongly perverse moral bias can prevent its acceptance. The sacred Scriptures powerfully present the fact of God's existence, and the minds of men promptly respond to that presentation. The reality of the divine existence is so well established that moral philosophy must needs recognize it and build upon it as upon a chief corner-stone.

55. Résumé of Proofs.

These proofs do not undertake to exhaust the subject, but they are conclusive as to the facts which they are adduced to establish. They render it impossible for rational thought to deny that there is a God, and that he is intelligent and supreme over nature; but many things concerning the attributes of this Supreme Being

it remains for the holy Scriptures to show. The argument from the organic universe as the expression of intelligence and purpose can be impugned only by imputing to matter those attributes which consciousness reveals as the faculties of spiritual beings. This denies the reality of mind by clothing all matter with the attributes of mind, and denies an intelligent Creator by imputing to wind, water, and dust an infinite intelligence. But consciousness will never cease to affirm the distinction between the thinking self and dead matter. The argument from the beginning of life cannot be weakened until science shall indicate the possibility of life issuing from burning chaos, or that vegetable and animal life can spring spontaneously from lifeless dust. So long as science continues to repeat that life proceeds from life and from nothing else, we must believe in a living source of terrestrial life. And while the consciences of men continue to speak of right and wrong, of sin and guilt, and to warn men of a judgment to come; while the holy Scriptures continue to chant the record of God's revelations of himself; while the preaching of the gospel is followed by the spiritual renovation of those who believe, and while in every extreme crisis of life, when heart and flesh fail, human weakness is made strong and men are lifted above themselves by a help which they know to be not of themselves, so long the belief of men in a living God, who is not nature but above nature, will not fail.

56. Note—Animal Instincts.

The argument from intelligence as manifest in nature finds countless curious and interesting illustrations in the

instincts of animal life. This instinct is wise in adapting means to ends. No cunning hunter after long experience prepares nets and traps for his prey more shrewdly than does the spider without experience. This instinct is sometimes mathematical and architectural, as in the bee and the beaver. The hornet sides and shingles his house with tissue paper, but no master builder can construct a roof to shed rain more securely. This instinct knows healthful food from poisonous before testing it. And, most wonderful of all, this instinct is prophetic. Prescient of the coming winter, the migratory bird flies from a cold it has never felt to a country of perennial summer which it has never seen, the direction of which it has never been told. The squirrel lays up in store for a time of need which it has never experienced. The mother bird prepares a nest for the young of which she has felt no quickening. The caterpillar weaves a cocoon for her coming sleep and change, and makes provision for her exit when her awakening shall come. The mud wasp builds her cells of mud, lays her eggs, and in the same cells seals up living spiders—living, because otherwise they would spoil—against the time when her young shall issue from the egg and require food. The intelligence manifest in these animal instincts is superhuman; it is wise antecedent to experience. When we crush a spider or a worm we destroy a life of higher than human attributes, an intelligence more far-seeing than man's, a creature of prophetic gifts, an angel in disguise, unless indeed the intelligence and the prevision belong to the Creator of the insect and not to the insect itself.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

57. Importance of this Inquiry.

In any science the certainty and the worth of the conclusions reached depend upon its materials as well as upon its methods. Pure mathematics, having to do with ideas only, with abstract conceptions of quantity and number, and handling those conceptions in equations, has in it no element of error or uncertainty. Applied mathematics, using the same processes, but handling concrete values, shows instantly an element of uncertainty. The difference lies in the material used. Given the exact parallax of the sun, and the distance of the sun can be easily found with an error less than any assignable quantity. The only element of uncertainty lies in the data of the problem. The sciences of geology and of medicine, on the other hand, are notably uncertain in their conclusions; their material is hard to be understood as facts merely, and the relations of those imperfectly comprehended facts are so complex and intricate, that their causes and consequences are traced with difficulty. In moral science, therefore, we must have regard to facts as well as to logical processes. We must scrutinize the sources of our knowledge. The work of the moralist is not to construct a system to suit his pleasure, but to comprehend the facts, principles, and methods of God's government of men. In moral philosophy the facts are

as rigid as the facts of physics, and as comprehensible as the facts of psychology.

58. Intuition the First Source of Moral Science.

The primary source of moral science must be the intuitions of man's own spiritual being. The conscious activities of will and of conscience give those fundamental ideas and truths upon which the entire superstructure must rest. If the primary moral affirmations which the spirit of man makes to itself be true,—absolutely and eternally true,—the science and the philosophy of morals have a firm foundation, but other foundations they cannot have.

59. Illustrative Rational Intuitions.

In preparation for understanding the moral intuitions of will and of conscience, we may glance at certain other intuitions of the mind.

As a necessary condition of all knowledge, consciousness gives us the idea of the *ego* as distinguished from the *non-ego*. This distinction comes to us as an ultimate and absolute truth.

From the intuitive faculty spring the ideas of time and of space. We cannot put these ideas away from us ; we cannot conceive them to be other than true and valid. We may conceive ourselves as becoming unconscious of the lapse of time ; we may conceive the flow of time as unmarked by horologic periods, unvexed by change, transition, or epoch ; but we cannot put away the conception of time as forever passing, whether men or gods are conscious or unconscious of its flow. With the cognition of motion and change, and the consciousness of

exertion, there come the ideas of force and of cause and effect. These ideas are more than mere notions or forms of thought,—they are intuitions,—the clear and direct beholding of that which is objectively true and real. These intuitions are the basis of all knowledge. These intuitive truths may illustrate the certainty of the intuitions of the moral faculties.

60. Moral Intuitions.

In morals, as well as in pure reason, there are ultimate affirmations and certainties of thought and knowledge, no more to be denied or doubted than the principles of force and change. These ideas are the basis of all moral conduct and character. Without them a man could not be a responsible being. At this stage of study it can only be said that from this source come the idea and conviction of moral freedom and of obligation, the conception of right and wrong, and the sense of good and ill desert. In respect to these primary elements of moral science, there is the same certainty as in mathematics. The intuition of obligation toward God is as sure as that three times two are six. That sin brings guilt is no less certain than that matter has extension, or that duration is a property of all existence. The conviction of moral freedom is as ineradicable as the belief that motion and change are product of force.

61. The Denial of Moral Intuitions.

The reality of moral obligation and the validity of moral distinctions, are sometimes denied, and so also is the world of things. When the affirmations of the senses are denied, it is not surprising that the moral intuitions

should receive the same treatment. Sometimes this denial is made as a logical ground for trampling upon moral precepts. Evolutionists of a certain grade, in explaining a hypothetical development of moral ideas along with the supposed physical development of man, are compelled to do the same. A certain blatant blasphemer said, "We have yet to learn that there is a valid distinction between right and wrong. Satan is as holy as God; the floor of hell is as high as the jeweled floor of heaven." These denials are not science or philosophy, but the destruction of both.

62. Second Source of Moral Science—the Holy Scriptures.

The second source of moral science we find in the holy Scriptures. The Scriptures are second, of necessity, in logical order, and only secondary in importance. They presuppose moral intuitions in man, and they confidently address those intuitions. If man were not endowed with moral faculties, the Scriptures could find no response in their addresses to the human soul. Light did not create the eye, and neither the Scriptures nor any external cultus can create a conscience in man.

63. The Claims of Holy Scripture.

The Scriptures claim to be a revelation of God and a message from God, an authoritative declaration of God's will and of man's duty. If this claim is valid, their importance in moral science cannot be overstated.

64. The Holy Scriptures not to be Ignored.

The claim of the holy Scriptures to be the word of God to men is a proper subject of investigation by

moral science. It would be unscientific to accept the claims of Scripture without convincing evidence; it would be equally unscientific to reject such claims without examination.

65. The Scriptures not a Source of Theology Only.

Shall the sacred Scriptures be counted exclusively a source of theology and therefore be left out of account in moral science? Shall they be admitted only incidentally to show that the ethics of the Christian religion are not at variance with the conclusions of moral philosophy? From such a course both philosophy and practical morals suffer deeply. Without the authority of God and without supernatural sanctions, morals become flabby and flimsy. The life of man has outlooks beyond nature, and that philosophy which shuts the windows which open toward the spiritual world, must be false by the very fact of its narrowness. Moral philosophy ought to be broader with Christian men than with Socrates, Cato, — and Seneca.

66. The First Step of Argument—the Bible Trustworthy History.

Apart from its claim to be the word of God, the Bible stands chief among historic works. The most laborious investigations, whether by friend or foe, are showing ever more conclusively that as an epitome of the most ancient history the Bible has no peer. It holds this place not because its friends are unlearned or uncritical, nor because its enemies are forbearing, but because the most scholarly historic criticism sustains its claim to truthfulness. A library of books would be required to show the

amplitude of the historic evidence with which the holy Scriptures are buttressed.

67. Second Step of Argument—the Character of the Writers.

The writers of the Bible were manifestly men of sincerity and integrity. Their love of truth shines unobscured through the unadored simplicity of their style. Their histories were largely their personal testimonies touching facts which they knew and events in which they themselves were conspicuous actors. They nowhere strain after effect. They do not paint character. They make no comments upon the conduct of men. Men and events pass before the reader as before the eyes of a spectator, and are left to make their own impression. The faults of good men are not skipped, or glazed, or excused. The writers do not omit or cover up their own sins. The severe sincerity of these writers impresses the reader more than in any other book in the world. The thoughtful reading of the Bible commonly convinces the reader of its truth.

68. Third Step of Argument—the Mental Characteristics of the Writers.

The Bible writers were bright, sound, practical men from every walk in life, not visionary theorists, not addle-brained speculators, but men of affairs, quick to observe, trained to alertness by business, danger, and war, able to distinguish between appearance and reality, and to record what they saw and knew. Moses was a scholar, a statesman, a warrior, a great leader of men, a man of books and of the world. Joshua, Samuel, and David were great leaders and rulers. The prophets were not merely

students and poets ; they were the chiefs of their times. The apostles were called from the keen struggle to win bread to the sharper collision with the minds of critical or hostile men. If any men in the world could give trustworthy testimony these were the men.

69. Fourth Step of Argument—Harmony of Testimony.

The Bible is not one book but many. Like the great republic it is "*E pluribus unum.*" The Scripture writings span a period of fifteen hundred years. During these centuries their theme, though multiform, was essentially one. They declared one and the same God ; they taught one religion, one system of religious truth, one code of morals. Writing under so diverse circumstances, with so various interests and with such remoteness in their lives, in their harmony they have the authority of independent witnesses. This is often the case in respect to historic events, and oftener in respect to religious and ethical teaching. The variations and agreements are such as arise from the free and independent statement of the same facts and truths as apprehended by different minds. More likeness might be a less convincing harmony.

70. The Harmony of Organic Unity.

The harmony of the Scripture writers is much more than a mere formal agreement of statement, like that between the three synoptical Gospels. It is also a harmony of parts as in an organic unity, a harmony as between the roots, the trunk, and the branches of a tree ; a harmony as between the flower and the fruit. The holy Scriptures are essentially one book, with one plan

followed through the centuries. The God of the Old Testament is the God of the New Testament ; Judaism is the bud and Christianity the blossom ; prophecies and prophetic symbols are given, and as the ages pass away the fulfillments find their record. There is the harmony of statement, as the many blossoms upon the fruit tree are alike ; there is the harmony of correspondence and adaptation, as the stem is in harmony with the root, the leaves in harmony with the woody trunk, and the fruit in harmony with the blossom.

71. Significance of Concurrent Testimony.

It is a sure principle that “The testimony of two men is true,” not that two witnesses, or ten, may not bear false testimony ; but independent falsehood cannot agree in details, and if it is not independent it is not the testimony of two but of one. Harmonious testimony in details must of necessity be true testimony, or else concerted falsehood. Independent, agreeing testimony must be true, whatever the character of the witnesses. The sacred Scriptures in respect alike to history, revelations, religion, and ethical code have the character of concurrent testimony in the highest sense.

72. Fifth Step of Argument—Concurrent Secular Records.

Archæological researches have accumulated an immense mass of material which at many points and in many ways justify the biblical records. There are historic writings, monumental and numismatic inscriptions, and mural paintings ; there are remains of ancient cities, with their architecture, art, and handicraft, and there are the historic lands themselves, with their characteristic

features and their people cherishing still their ancient customs. These all by countless coincidences bear testimony that the Bible is true.

73. First Preliminary Conclusion—the Bible is Good History.

From the considerations adduced above, without reference to inspiration or to any supernatural origin, we must count the facts recorded in the sacred Scriptures as supported by the best of human testimony. The writings themselves, by their own coincidences and their coincidences with the ancient world at numberless tangential points, are shown to be altogether trustworthy.

74. Sixth Step of Argument—the Claims Made by the Scriptures Themselves.

The writers of the Bible, sincere lovers of truth, bright, practical men, men of experienced sagacity, men of affairs, professed to be inspired of God. They affirm that they received special revelations from God, and that they were charged with imperative messages to men. These professions are either true or false. If true, the Scriptures are final authority in those concerns of which they speak; if false, then were the writers themselves as false as were their pretensions, or else sheer fanatics who lived on the border-land of insanity. But if they were either false or fanatical, we must revise the conclusion already reached in regard to the historic character of the Bible. But when we review our former inquiries we come again to the same conclusion, namely, that the Scriptures have the highest historic character and that the writers were endowed with rare candor and practical sense. It is not possible to count them fanatical

deceivers. Their claim to inspiration must therefore be counted as having great weight. The claim is made by themselves, but it is not thereby discredited, for from the nature of the case it could not be made by another.

75. Seventh Step of Argument—Miracles.

The Scripture writers, prophets, apostles, and Jesus Christ, wrought many miracles. The reality of those miracles cannot be denied except by invalidating utterly the historic character of the records. But however often we examine the records we find their historic character impregnable. Apart from the question of inspiration the miracles stand as undeniable historic transactions. Chief among these supernatural wonders stands the resurrection of Christ. Gilbert West and Lord Littleton, acute English infidels, agreed together to criticise and expose the biblical imposture of miracles. West chose the resurrection of Christ as his point of attack ; Littleton took the conversion of Paul. They studied the records to expose their weakness, but the Scriptures were victorious. Both were converted to the Christian faith, and each wrote a treatise in defense of the miracle which he had undertaken to assail. Miracles sustain the claim to inspiration. They were the letters patent of the Lord's messengers. This is the reasonable and necessary conclusion in the case,—“We know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man can do these miracles which thou doest except God be with him.”

76. Eighth Step of Argument—Prophecy.

The sacred Scriptures carry within themselves the enduring miracle of a train of prophecy reaching

through a period of fifteen hundred years. A miracle of power is seen once by those who chance to be present when and where the miracle is wrought. Ever afterward it lives only in memory and in the record. But prophecies are for all men and for all generations. They grow more impressive as the ages pass and the fulfillment becomes more complete. It must be admitted that foretelling future events is not possible for human intelligence. Real prophecy is a miracle of knowledge. The prophecy of Moses concerning the Jews ; of Isaiah concerning Christ ; of Jeremiah concerning Babylon ; of Ezekiel concerning Tyre ; of Daniel concerning the great kingdoms ; of Christ concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, may be cited as illustrative examples. These prophecies certify the inspiration of the prophets. They are for all generations what the miracles were for those who beheld them.

77. Second Preliminary Conclusion—Inspiration.

No other explanation of biblical miracles and prophecies is possible except that they are manifestations of divine power and knowledge. We must count them vouchers given to assure the world that prophets and apostles were God's special messengers, and in certifying the messenger they certify the message also—that is, they prove inspiration.

78. Ninth Step of Argument—Explains the Life of the Race.

The question of questions to-day for scientific answer concerns the origin of the human race. Whence came man? Is man a creation of God, or an "evolution" from brutish life, which in turn was evolved from some

lower and still lower life? Is the human family one race, or many? Is the savage state a fall from original perfection, or a stage and a step in man's ascent from the life of his brutish ancestors? A phase of recent thought affirms the evolution of man from lower and the lowest forms of life, and puts this forward as its hypothetical explanation of man's origin and condition. This explanation stands to this time as a mere hypothesis supported by no crucial facts and in absolute contradiction to what have been counted established principles in science. The sacred Scriptures present an account of the origin, fortunes, and condition of the race, not as hypothesis, but as history. According to this biblical history the race of man is one, a creation and not an evolution, God's perfect work, bearing the image of the Creator; man's present abject condition the result of his abuse of moral freedom, and man's progress toward real perfection the result of supernatural influences and agencies acting through the Christian religion. Place side by side these competing explanations of man's origin and condition—on the one side an evolution from brutish life, on the other the creative act of God; on the one side the savage state as a stage in the slow, unconscious ascent from the brutes, on the other the savagery and sin as a fall from a state of primal uprightness; on the one side a brutish ancestry and a hard and slow emergence from bestial instincts, on the other the dignity of a being made in the likeness of God and thinking God's thoughts; on the one side a death which ends all in extinction of being, on the other an immortality which may be made a sharing of the Creator's blessedness—which account presents the more rational and adequate explanation of man's exist-

ence and present condition? If the biblical account is the more adequate, it is scientific to accept it as true. But the acceptance of the biblical account of man carries with it the essential truth and the essential inspiration of the Bible, for this explanation is chiefly a revelation.

79. Tenth Step of Argument—the Origin of the Christian Religion.

The religion of the Bible, in its two periods of development, the Judaistic and the Christian, is a reality and a fact running through the entire period of human history. It is the supreme fact of history. It is potently and intimately connected with the fortunes of the race. This great fact did not arise without a cause. The Scriptures give an account of its genesis and development. To place the religion of the Bible, with its God of burning holiness and its requirement of holiness in man, in the same class with the unclean pagan religions and to ascribe them all alike to the blind yearning and groping of human nature, is to impute the most diverse consequences to the same causes; it is gathering good fruit and bad from the same tree; it is drawing sweet water and bitter from the same fountain; it is bringing forth a clean thing out of an unclean. Whatever else may be said of this, it is to the last degree unscientific. But if the biblical account of the Christian religion be true, it carries with it the inspiration of the holy Scriptures.

80. Eleventh Step of Argument—the Scriptures a Mirror of Man's Inward Life.

The Scriptures unfold the deepest psychological aspects of human nature. The Bible reveals men to themselves. Prevision is the test of true science. The

astronomer predicts the movements of the heavenly bodies ; the chemist foretells the action of elements and molecular forces ; the Scriptures foretell the experiences, inward and outward, of men and nations that believe the doctrines of the holy Scriptures. Inspired or uninspired, the psychology of the Bible is deep and true, and it bears the crucial test of true science, the test of prevision.

81. Twelfth Step of Argument—the Moral Code.

The Christian Scriptures embody an ethical code which commends itself to the intellect and conscience of man as supremely good. Pagan writers have expressed, here and there, many fine moral sentiments and true principles, but surely no man would think of putting any heathen writing in the place of the Bible as a source of moral light to the world. The moral code of holy Scripture could not spring from human nature. Human nature is deeply selfish, but the biblical code is summed up in the requirement of self-abnegation and perfect love. Human nature is deeply and essentially unclean, but the Scriptures demand holiness of heart. In the mythologies, whether of savage or of civilized nations, gigantic men and women stalk to and fro upon a superhuman stage, or perhaps dwarfs and brutes with superhuman powers, magnified and grotesque projections of humanity with all its moral weaknesses, and these are their ideals of moral conduct and character. The Bible presents one God, a God of infinite attributes, of spotless holiness, of perfect love. It is scientific to refer such conceptions and principles to a source higher than human nature.

82. Thirteenth Step of Argument—the Influence of the Sacred Scriptures.

The work which the Christian Scriptures have done and are doing, in lifting up the nations and saving men from wickedness, a work done by no other system of religious doctrine, is an unanswerable argument for their truth, otherwise an organized system of falsehood works out a higher good for men than all the world of truth beside. With belief in the holy Scriptures there comes to men the power of a new moral life. Wicked men are led to repentance; profane and defiant men become reverent and gentle; unclean men become pure; the weak become strong with a strange and supernatural endurance; the despairing and the dying are inspired with wonderful hopes. There is no civilization which is worthy of the name, no civilization which extirpates the natural savagery of man and nurtures righteousness and love, which does not owe its uplifting power to the Bible.

83. Final Conclusion.

From these considerations, here stated very briefly or only suggested, we must conclude that the sacred Scriptures are the inspired word of God to men, having authority to bind the conscience and to give a final judgment in many a matter where reason fails. This gives the Bible a pre-eminent rank as a source of moral science. To ignore the Scriptures is a willing shutting out of the sunlight in order to practise groping at noonday.

84. Characteristics of this Second Source of Moral Science.

The holy Scriptures are rich in every kind of material for moral philosophy. They supplement the indefinite-

ness and weakness of man's moral intuitions. They are suited to the need of beings whose moral sight and sensibilities have become dim and dull. In respect to God and his government, the Scriptures reveal many things which could not otherwise be known. The moral law is announced with clearness and authority. Certain devotees of physical science who arrogate to themselves the sole right to be counted scientific, drift strongly toward a denial of the real existence of anything which cannot be weighed. Were it not for the sacred Scriptures, these worshipers of the crucible and the scales would laugh to scorn belief in spirit or immortality. But the Scriptures boldly declare man's spiritual nature, appeal to his spiritual consciousness, proclaim immortality, and summon the consciences of men to action under the stimulus of the final judgment. If we ask for precepts or principles, motives or grounds of obligation, we find them in the Scriptures.

85. Third Source of Moral Science—the Normal Action of the Human Faculties.

Light is thrown upon moral questions by considering the normal functions of our own faculties. This is true alike of mental and of bodily faculties. In fact, the spiritual and the physical act so largely in co-operation that it is not easy to separate their action and to estimate the share of each in the entire activity.

86. Normal Activities Right.

In the light of clear reason we must hold that the normal activity of every human faculty is right, otherwise we must impute inconsistency and self-contradiction

to man's Creator. To illustrate the application of this principle we may refer to monastic asceticism with its wanton cramping of man's life, and its infliction of needless suffering. It is manifest that man was made for the free development of his faculties in association with his fellows and in domestic life. The body was made for worthy use and not for contempt and abuse. When once we have ascertained what is the normal function of a faculty, without excess or abuse, we have learned what is right in its action.

87. Distinction between Moral Action and Action Instinctive or Automatic.

Moral science must distinguish between voluntary activity and that which is merely instinctive or automatic, and hence without moral quality. It must draw a line between the action of will and conscience on the one side and the operation of faculties which are only co-operative with these on the other. It must show the relationship of the sensibilities and the faculty of volition, the relationship antecedent to choice and the subsequent relation. A true psychology of the faculties of conscience, will, and sensibility is a necessary condition of a true moral philosophy. Otherwise an error of judgment may be treated as a wicked choice, and the automatic action of the body may be counted sin.

88. Fourth Source of Moral Science—the Study of Consequences.

A fourth source of moral science is the study of the consequences of conduct. This may signify the consequences of spiritual acts and attitudes upon the spirit itself, or it may have reference to the external conse-

quences of moral conduct. But whether we have to do with consequences physical or spiritual, this study of consequences brings us into the realm of natural law. Natural law represents an automatic agency by which certain consequences follow certain antecedents with the certainty of necessity. This fixed and necessary order of sequence represents the nature of things, and the nature of things represents the will of the Creator. From their natural consequences we understand that some courses of conduct are morally wrong and that certain other conduct is good and right.

89. Illustrations in the Spiritual Realm.

The law of consequences is as rigid in the nature of spirit as in matter. An evil choice is followed by a depraved condition of the sensibilities. Choices tend to repetition and to fixedness. Certain courses of conduct are surely followed by disquietude of spirit, by dissatisfaction, disgust, and unhappiness. Other conduct is followed by peace and joyfulness. Doubt has its own necessary consequences, and these are very unlike the consequences of faith. The law of consequences cannot be broken. This is not a question of freedom in volition. Man is free in choosing, but in respect to the consequences of the choice there is no option. We cannot stop the stream of cause and effect, nor turn its course. The law of consequences in the realm of spirit is a rich mine of material in moral philosophy.

90. Illustrations in Man's Physical Life.

In man's nature matter is tangential with spirit. The consequences of moral conduct show themselves there-

fore in man's material nature and in the world of things. In this relationship with spirit matter seems to show the two faces of the moral law, blessing for the good and wrath for the evil. Righteousness seems graven upon the very atoms. The forces of matter, blind though they are said to be, see with the eyes of God. Vicious, sensual self-indulgence by the automatic operations of matter are pierced through with pains and smitten with the loathsomeness of decay. Few sins fail to become somehow and somewhere tangential with matter, and to be caught and ground in the enginery of natural forces. A life full of high moral intent and holy feeling shows physical consequences very unlike those which follow a life devoted to selfish purposes and base pleasures.

91. Fifth Source of Moral Science—History.

The last source of moral philosophy is history, the history of individuals and of nations. This is the study of natural law and of divine providence in the life of man. For this moral purpose history must be interpreted with a fine ethical temper and a spiritual faith. An eye that discerns no spiritual element in the life of man, and finds in the development of the race no agencies except food and climate, will of course find little ethical instruction in human experience. In the convention which framed the constitution of the great republic, Benjamin Franklin arose and said: "I have lived, sir, a long time, and the longer I live the more convincing proof I see of this truth, that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been assured, sir, in the sacred writings

that, ‘Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it.’ I firmly believe this.” This providence in history is the combined working of all natural and spiritual agencies in their sweep through the centuries, now responding to the prayer of a child, now lifting up a great leader to the crest of the billows, who seems for a time to rule the waves which bear him up, and anon undermining an empire and grinding to powder the institutions of ancient nations. Moral causes sure and resistless may be slow in reaching their results. “Providence moves through time as the gods of Homer through space ; a step is taken and a century has passed away.” Or, as says the well-worn proverb, “The mills of God grind slowly.” False principles have long periods of incubation, but at length the disease breaks out and hastens to its issue. There is a “power that makes for righteousness” and repays wrong with ruin. There is an “inferno of the nations,” and no unjust and corrupt nation has been able to escape it. The more deeply the study of history penetrates beneath the mere appearances of things and ponders the realities of life the more instructive does it become. For such use history must needs be written by men of conscience and spiritual discernment, men not afraid to recognize spiritual forces in human affairs. So studied, history becomes a fruitful field of investigation for moral philosophy.

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING THE SUPREME RULER

92. Our Conception of the Supreme Ruler Important.

Moral philosophy cannot leave out of account the existence of God, and no more can it afford to ignore the attributes of that Supreme Ruler of the universe.

- As well might one discuss the government of the British Empire with no reference to the crown, that "fountain of law," and with no reference to the prerogatives of the crown. The position assigned to God in a system of moral philosophy must largely determine the character of that system. It is easy to see that a philosophy which ignores the existence of the Divine Being must be radically unlike that philosophy which makes him the primary element, the center alike of theoretical and of practical ethics. If there is a God who concerns himself with the affairs of men, it is certain that he cannot, in actuality, hold a secondary place.

93. The Divine Being a Person.

Concerning God it must be said, in the first place, that he is a personal being. He is a person in distinction from any personification of natural forces ; in distinction from any pantheistic conception of the Deity as identical with the universe or as immanent in nature and undistinguishable from it ; in distinction from any Stoic conception of the Deity as emotionless and unconscious. God is a personal being in the same sense in which the

reader or the writer is a person. To deny the personality of God is equivalent to a denial of his existence, for pantheism accords to God no more than a name.

94. Origin of the Idea of Personality.

The idea of personality is derived from the first source of moral science, the consciousness of our own spiritual being. In the consciousness of every man there arises the conception of himself as an intelligent being distinct from other like beings and distinct from the world around him. This conception of himself every man transfers to other beings like himself in form and action. We spontaneously impute to other men those attributes of being of which we are conscious as existent in ourselves. We cannot do otherwise.

95. Contents of the Idea of Personality.

What elements are contained in the idea of personality? What is a person? From the consciousness of our own nature the answer must come. A person is a being of intelligence, thought, and reason; he is a being of sensibility, susceptible of pleasure and of pain, of joy and of sorrow; he is a being endowed with conscience, making moral distinctions and knowing good and evil; he is a free being, choosing for himself his own spiritual attitudes and activities. From this conception we can eliminate no element, neither rational intelligence, sensibility, conscience, nor will.

96. Conception of the Divine Personality.

That conception which consciousness gives of our own form of being by a necessity of thought we apply to

other men and to the Divine Being. We have the right to do this. We have the right to do it because by a necessity of thought we cannot do otherwise. It is possible for a man to deny God's existence; it is possible to apply the name God to a generalized idea of the forces of nature; it is possible to empty the name of all distinct meaning; but counting God a real being, the intelligent Maker and Ruler of the universe, we cannot do otherwise than impute to him the essential elements of our own personality. By an effort of imagination we may maim and dismember this conception of personality; but we ourselves can see that we have formed a notion of a being imperfect, deformed, or it may be, grotesque.

97. Man Made in the Divine Likeness.

In transferring to God that conception of personality which comes to us through the consciousness of our own personality, we do that which is authorized and required by the second source of moral philosophy. God said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." "So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him." By the testimony of sacred Scripture the nature of man is a finite copy of the infinite personality of the Creator. And those who see in our Lord Jesus Christ a personal union of God and man must needs find the possibility of that union in the likeness of the two personalities, for diverse personalities could hardly enter into union.

98. The Personality of God in Scripture.

In the second source of moral philosophy, the sacred Scriptures, the personality of God is assumed. The first

sentence of Scripture denies every form of pantheistic conception of the Divine Being. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." The Creator existed before his works ; he is separate from his works ; by his will the heavens and the earth exist ; whatever properties, forces, or possibilities belong to matter are of his appointment. The personality of God stands written as distinctly in sacred history as the personality of man in secular history.

99. Consequences of the Personality of God.

The importance of this conception of God as a personal being cannot be stated too strongly. Our ethical ideas must all be conformed to this radical conception. We are under obligation to a person, not to a force or principle. Obedience is due to a person. The sanctions of the moral law are administered by a person. The agencies of nature are means by which the personal sovereign makes known and administers his will. The penitence of the wrong-doer is directed toward a person, and forgiveness is not the slow wearing out of consequences, but the remission of guilt by a merciful Father. Because God is a person, and the personal being in whose likeness man was made, his law is suited to man's nature, and his character and will are the standard of right for man.

100. The Absoluteness of the Supreme Ruler.

We must conceive the supreme personal ruler as not himself under law, but as the "fountain of law." It is impossible that the Creator of all things should be otherwise than absolute. "All things were made by him and

for him, and he is before all things, and by him all things consist." "Of him, and through him, and to him are all things." It is impossible that the Creator should be dependent upon the thing made, or limited by it except as he is limited by his own choice. There is no nature of things apart from the creative will. That the Creator of all things should be under law, apart from his own nature, is from the nature of the case impossible.

101. Limitations of the Divine Absoluteness.

The limitations of the Creator's absoluteness are the limits which he has pleased to set to himself. A watchmaker will treat a watch according to its mechanism which he himself has planned. He might perhaps have made it otherwise, but in making it as it is he fixed the law of its management. In the making of it he set to himself the law of its treatment. So far he limited himself. Having made man in his own likeness, God will govern him by methods and agencies in harmony with the moral nature which he gave. He will do man's free nature no violence. His law will be in harmony with reason. We may thus look upon the act of creation as so far an act of self-limitation of the Creator's absoluteness.

102. Consequences of the Divine Absoluteness.

The consequences of this divine absoluteness and autocracy, like the consequences of the divine personality, are very important. We see at once that all moral distinctions must have their ground and measure in the nature of God. Also the moral law, however ex-

pressed, in the final analysis must be the expression or declaration of the divine will and nature. Whether the law of right be found in man's own being, or in the nature of things, or in utility, or in the Decalogue, all these, so far as there is truth in them, are the product and expression of God's will. It is not philosophic to stop at that which is partial and fragmentary. Moral philosophy can find no resting-place till it trace moral distinctions to God's own eternal being and the moral law to God's will.

103. Objections to the Divine Absoluteness.

In anticipation of coming discussions, we may glance at the common objection to divine absoluteness, as that absoluteness has been here presented. It is said that if moral distinctions have their ground in God, and if the moral law be the expression of the divine will, then it is possible that right and wrong should in a moment and by a word be reversed. This objection forgets that the will of God created all things, the nature of moral beings and the nature of matter, and all things in harmony with himself and in harmony with one another. It fails to consider that the divine will is the one element of stability and certainty in the universe. A change of the will of God is not the change of a word merely ; it is a reversal of the moral nature of man ; it is a change in the ultimate elements of the universe, a change in the essence of spirit and of matter. The notion that the Creator's will for the government of men can be contrary to his will expressed in their creation is a setting of his will against his will. They make his will self-contradictory.

104. God a Holy Being.

God's government of men cannot be comprehended apart from his holiness. Eliminate the idea of holiness from the divine judgments in the earth and the Creator's terrible doings become an utter stumbling-block to man's moral sensibilities. Apart from holiness, penalty becomes revenge and the expression of hatred. The holiness of God is perfect righteousness and purity of nature and of will, and purity of sensibility in harmony with purity of nature. One phase of holiness is hatred of impurity, that is, hatred of sin. In holiness the elements of love and of revulsion or wrath, like action and reaction in matter, are equal. "Our God is a consuming fire." He dwells in "light unapproachable." If we would understand either God's government of men or the constitution of the world we must emphasize his holiness.

105. Man's Moral Nature Responsive to Holiness.

Every source of moral science testifies that God's government of the world is administered in the interest of holiness. Conscience enthrones right, obligation, holiness, not pleasure or enjoyment. The idea of pleasure is foreign to the moral faculty. Conscience gives no sense of obligation to follow pleasure.

106. Holiness Exalted by the Sacred Scriptures.

The second source of moral science very greatly emphasizes holiness. The Old Testament refrain is, God is one and God is holy. The inspired history from Eden to the New Jerusalem is an account of God's enforcement of respect for his holiness. The character of

Christ is summed up in the words, "Holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners." The celestial song reiterates forever the refrain, "Holy, holy, holy."

107. Holiness Testified to by Natural Law.

With no supernatural intervention the very elements of matter conspire to afflict and destroy the men who love pleasure and disregard holiness, but they that forget pleasure and love holiness with all the heart make peace with all nature. Wickedness is punished without a miracle. The heavens are silent, the sun rises and sets, the seasons come and go, the centuries roll away, and unrighteous and unclean families and nations fall into decay and disappear. What means this automatic agency which works for holiness and punishes sin? Nature proclaims the holiness of the Creator.

108. Psychology and Holiness.

The fourth source of moral science testifies of the Creator's holiness in the government of moral beings. Every human faculty finds its normal and perfect action in the love of holiness, and every faculty deteriorates somewhat when perverted to a lower aim. When selfishness and pleasure usurp the place of righteousness, little by little a blight falls upon every faculty. Even "the counsel of Ahithophel," when perverted to base ends, becomes infected with an element of folly. By low aims the sensibilities become utterly debauched and corrupted.

109. History and Holiness.

The verdict of history is that "Righteousness exalteth

a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." The virtues which have in them the element of self-denial, somewhat of severity, that is, the strenuous pursuit of right and obligation, are elements of strength and endurance. On the other hand, the pursuit of delights is weakness and the precursor of decay. A pleasure-loving age indicates the approaching end.

II. Divine Love.

In human government sovereignty has been so generally an assertion of supreme selfishness, that the word sovereignty suggests at once the idea of despotism. The autocracy of God is a sovereignty of love. It is the essential nature of love to be self-imparting and self-sacrificing. A sovereignty of selfishness is to be feared ; a sovereignty of hate is to be abhorred ; a sovereignty of love is to be rejoiced in.

III. Is God a God of Love?

Man's own nature gives testimony that God is love. We accept the word of Scripture that human nature has the likeness of the divine. The noblest element in the noblest human character is love. All truest, tenderest, noblest love, self-devotion, self-sacrifice, is an element of God's image in man. The self-sacrificing love of Jesus Christ is presented to us as an expression of the divine character. The great world as it stands shows the divine care and solicitude for the welfare of man ; it shows also God's terrible wrath against wickedness. So in God's character love and wrath exist together. Wrath ought not to be counted a form of love, but the revulsion from evil emphasizes love.

112. Is God Merciful?

Toward evil-doers the divine love becomes mercy. The divine government admits the reconciliation of offenders, and makes provision for their repentance and restoration to favor and welfare. It belongs to moral philosophy to consider mercy, repentance, and forgiveness, no less than justice, the consequences of wrong-doing, and penalty. Moral philosophy must find a place and a way for the recovery of the fallen. It is not true that the natural consequences of sinning must take their inevitable course to the end. Divine forgiveness modifies the psychological action of conscience. It would be a most imperfect human character that embraced no element of mercy. Here we only note that the Creator is merciful and that he finds a place for mercy in his moral government.

113. The Right Conception of Mercy.

Mercy must not be conceived as the opposite of justice. Mercy does not signify a feeble hatred of evil, a slight recoil of the divine nature from moral pollution. In the highest human character, the one that is holiest is most pitiful and gracious. The mercies of the Lord show that his justice is not revenge, and his mercy is shown to be mercy indeed, and not indifference to evil, by the fact that he will not clear the impenitent guilty.

114. Resumé.

Theology would call for a consideration of other divine attributes, and for a fuller discussion of these which have here been named. For the purposes of moral philosophy it is enough to note that there is a living God; that

he is a person after the mode of our own personality ; that he created the world of things according to his own pleasure ; that he created man in his own likeness ; that the Creator of all things must needs be absolute over all ; and that he exercises that autocracy in holiness, in love, and in mercy. In the work of creation there is involved all of power and of infinitude which the mind of man can conceive. The wisdom of Him who planned the universe is sufficiently manifest without discussion.

Such is the God who governs the world and stands as the supreme, central element in moral philosophy.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING MAN ; SENSIBILITIES, CONSCIENCE

115. The Second Element in Moral Science.

The second element in moral science is man, and for each student of the science this second element may be counted the student himself. The primary source of our knowledge of man is consciousness. The holy Scriptures are rich in instruction concerning the origin, nature, and moral condition of the race. History has man for its theme, and shows in concrete life the attributes of human nature. Every man finds in himself a sample of all the rest. Next to the right idea of the Creator, the right conception of man is most important.

116. Correlation of Human Nature to the Divine.

Man is a personal being endowed with faculties of thought, sensibility, conscience, and will. From the holy Scriptures we learn that our personality is a likeness of the divine. This signifies a correspondence in form of spiritual being, a similarity in mental and moral constitution. But the relationships of the Creator and the creature indicate that this correspondence in form of spiritual being consists in a correlation of attributes rather than in absolute sameness. God is the Creator, man is a creature ; God is self-existent and absolute, man is dependent—in him we live and move and have our being ; God is sovereign, man is subject ; God imparts and does not receive, man receives from God and cannot give in

return. This correlation of faculty carries with it as a necessary principle that man's moral facultes find their normal functions in this correlation, and not in independence.

117. Correlation of Conscience and Will to God.

The principle that man's moral faculties must find their normal functions in their correlation to the Creator, has important applications. All moral distinctions have their ground in the nature of God. He is the fountain of law. Conscience cannot, then, be a law unto itself, but must find its normal action in its relation to the divine will. The will of man is imperial in its functions, but the will is freest and most imperial when it accepts most fully its subordinate relationship to the divine will. This correlation of the human faculties to the divine is a fundamental principle in moral philosophy. The physics of the earth cannot be understood except by due recognition of the earth's relationship to the sun; no more can the moral nature of man be rightly treated except in its subordinate relation to God.

118. The Knowing Faculties.

The knowing faculties we notice incidentally in passing, partly to distinguish them from the moral faculty and partly to note the validity of our knowledge in its relation to moral science. In the group of knowing faculties we find consciousness, by which we know ourselves and our mental modifications; the perceptive faculties, which acting through the bodily senses give us knowledge of the phenomena of matter; the faculty of intuition, which gives such forms of thought as ideas

of time, of space, and of causation ; the faculty of reason, by which we combine in logical relationships—that is, in relationships corresponding to objective reality—the conceptions given by other faculties ; the faculty of taste, by which we perceive those properties of form, motion, and color, and analogous properties of mental conceptions, which we call beauty.

119. Certainty of Our Knowledge.

The chief need of referring at all to man's intellectual faculties, as distinguished from the moral, is to estimate the value of that knowledge which comes through their action. This knowledge is doubtless incomplete. How much more might be known if we had other senses and other faculties we cannot even conjecture. To man's perceptions there inheres a certain subjective element. But so far as our knowledge extends it must be counted real knowledge and not falsehood. This principle is fundamental. Whether this conviction be based upon a universal belief in a faithful Creator, or whether it be a bare instinct, with no reason behind it save the absence of any reason for doubting, to impugn the veracity of human faculties is contrary to the principles of science and of common sense. Here we simply note that our knowledge, from whatever source it come, is no less valid for moral science than for physical science.

120. The Sensibilities.

Man is endowed with faculties of feeling, emotion, or sensibility. When certain facts and conceptions are presented to the mind, at once there arise spontaneously certain corresponding emotions. The quality of these

emotions depends on the one side upon the nature of the conceptions which are their occasion, and on the other side upon the qualities of our own personal being. Vice awakens in some persons a feeling of pleasure; in others it awakens deep disgust. Cruel men find delight in that, the mere thought of which to tender hearts would bring distress. Faith finds enjoyment in that which is offensive to unbelief. By their sensibilities men show their characteristic moral qualities.

121. Moral Philosophy and the Sensibilities.

Moral philosophy cannot ignore the sensibilities. What is the relation of sensibility to moral choices? Do the sensibilities dominate the will? Is there such a relationship between will and sensibility that the choice must needs be according to the most eager appetite? Or is the will no distinct faculty at all, but merely the combined action, the resultant, of all the appetencies? The answers to these questions must come in their place.

122. The Conscience.

Man is endowed with a moral faculty commonly called conscience, a faculty too little understood in theory and too much abused in practice. The functions of this faculty and the mode of its activity hold an important place in moral philosophy. He who fails in the psychology of conscience must needs fail in many another point in theoretical, if not in practical, ethics.

123. What is Conscience?

Conscience is that intuitive faculty of man's spiritual nature which gives the idea and conviction of moral

obligation ; the idea of right and wrong, and of good or ill desert, with sensibilities corresponding to these ideas and convictions.

124. The Existence of a Moral Faculty.

That man is endowed with a moral faculty, the activities of which pertain specifically to moral concerns, is just as manifest as that there are faculties of reason and imagination. In every race of man, civilized or barbarous, and in every individual not lacking in common intelligence, there is found a conviction of moral obligation. This idea appears in many forms : duty toward parents, duty to fulfill promises, duty to the chief or king, duty to respond to kindness, duty toward the gods. When selfishness has completely overmastered this sense of duty as a principle of action toward others, men still show the existence of this faculty by demanding from others the fulfillment of their obligations. With this idea of obligation we find the idea of right and of wrong, the idea that, according to some standard or other, some things are morally right and the contrary are morally wrong. There may be, and there is, the greatest possible difference touching what is to be counted right ; but the validity of moral distinctions is not on this account to be called in question. Among all people are found the ideas of good and of ill desert. These ideas of duty, right, and moral desert are as clearly marked among pagan as among Christian peoples. The methods of measuring time are many ; the idea of time is one. The standards of duty are many and diverse ; the idea of obligation is one and universal.

125. Is Conscience a Distinct Faculty?

Is conscience a faculty distinct from all other faculties, as distinct as any faculty can be, or is that which is called conscience merely the general judgment and reason occupying themselves with moral concerns? Dr. A. H. Strong says: "Conscience is not a separate faculty, like intellect, sensibility, and will, but rather a mode in which the faculties act." "Conscience is a knowing of self in connection with a moral standard or law." Pres. Noah Porter says: "Conscience should not be used as an appellation for a separate or special moral faculty, for the reason that there is no such faculty." He uses the term conscience as meaning "the intellect and the sensibility in those judgments and feelings which are concerned in the acts and states of the will." Pres. E. G. Robinson says: "Conscience is the whole rational power of a person pronouncing moral judgments and awaking moral emotions." "The difference in the emotions attendant upon the moral judgments and on the purely intellectual judgments is due, not to any difference in the faculties pronouncing the judgments, but to differences in the objects judged, and in susceptibilities of our nature to which the objects stand related." Dr. Joseph Haven says: "Conscience is simply the intellect perceiving and judging moral truth, together with certain corresponding excitement of the sensibilities, in view of the objects thus contemplated." "Psychologically viewed it is not so much a distinct faculty of the mind co-ordinate with perception, memory, imagination, etc., as a distinct exercise, or department of action, of the general faculty of judgment, and of the power of feeling, as em-

ployed with reference to one particular class of truth, viz, moral."

126. Conscience is a Distinct Faculty.

From the estimate of conscience given in the preceding paragraph we must strongly dissent and must assert the contrary. Conscience is a distinct faculty, as distinct as any faculty can be, as distinct as perception, memory, or imagination.

127. The Criterion of Distinctness of Faculty.

The one sole criterion of distinctness of faculty is such uniqueness of action that the action of one faculty cannot be analyzed and reduced to some form of the activity of another faculty. This test rightly applied indicates that conscience has the characteristic quality of a distinct faculty. The full proof of this must be found in the complete analysis and discussion of conscience.

128. Genesis of the Denial that Conscience is a Faculty.

The reason for the opinions quoted in paragraph No. 125, that conscience is not a faculty but the general intellect occupying itself with moral concerns, may be found in the wide range of functions attributed to conscience. Activities are referred to conscience with which conscience has nothing to do. Conscience does not reason or judge in any sphère. To determine what is the moral law does not belong to the moral faculty. To determine whether conduct agrees or disagrees with the moral law is not a function of conscience. Conscience does not discuss questions of casuistry. When the unique action of conscience is clearly apprehended

it becomes at once apparent that conscience has the characteristic of a distinct faculty.

129. The Function of Conscience.

Give to the intellect the idea of the one God and Creator, supreme over all, and at once conscience gives the idea and the conviction of obligation to obey this supreme being. This is an intuition, the clear beholding of that which the general intellect has no eyes to see. This obligation is not a quality of things, of actions, or of beings ; it is a bond, a moral bond, a bond of duty binding one being to another, and beyond this undefinable. This intuition is absolutely unique and has no affinity with the intuitions of the general intellect pertaining to time and things. Given a law apprehended by the intellect as the will of the Creator and conscience responds with the idea that voluntary conformity to this supreme standard is morally right. The question whether choice and conduct do agree with the law of right comes under the purview of the general intellect. Beyond the question of formal agreement comes the element of *moral* rightness. This moral rightness of the intentional agreement with the moral law is an idea given by conscience, and with this the general intellect has nothing to do. The same must be said of the ideas of good and of ill desert. They are right who say that man has not two intellects, for conscience is a faculty of intuition and does not reason and judge.

130. Obligation and Right Emptied of Their Meaning.

Another method by which conscience is reduced to a specialized activity of the general intellect is by empty-

ing obligation and right of their true and characteristic meaning. If right signify "utility," or "fitness," or "adaptability to promote happiness," or "dignity of spiritual being," and if moral conceptions mean no more than this, then conscience may be counted the activity of the general intellect, and with little need of *specialized* action. But the time has not yet come for counting obligation and right, in their highest sense, as the mere *exuviae* of moral philosophy.

131. A Typical Case for Analysis.

For the purpose of analysis we must take an operation of conscience in which all the elements are present in their simplest form. No better historic illustration can be found than the account of man's primal sin. To Adam in Eden the Creator said, "Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat, for the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Under the impulse of Satanic temptation Adam disobeyed the divine mandate, and suffered the penalty. For the use now to be made of this fragment of inspired history, questions of interpretation do not concern us. It is the historic fact we are after.

132. Essential Elements in the Typical Case.

In this typical transaction we find three elements which seem essential : first, the Creator exercising authority ; secondly, Adam, the creature, the subject of authority ; thirdly, a rule of conduct proclaiming and defining the authority of the one and the duty of the other. Seeing that we are not discussing choice but conscience, the

agency of the tempter is not an essential element. A careful analysis of this fateful transaction will show what parts fall within the sphere of conscience and what belong to other faculties.

133. The Cognition of the Lawgiver and of the Law.

The recognition of the Lawgiver and the understanding of the law, does not belong to the action of conscience. The Creator manifested himself and gave the command, "Thou shalt not eat." Whether the Creator came visibly as a majestic man and gave the solemn precept in audible words, or whether the transaction was subjective, a revelation to the consciousness of Adam, matters nothing. Adam recognized his Lord and understood the law, but this involved no movement of conscience. This belonged to the general intellect. And this is true of the bare cognition of the lawgiver and the law anywhere.

134. The Primary Movement of Conscience.

Following the recognition of the Creator and the cognition of his command, at once there arose in the mind of Adam two associated ideas, the idea of obligation toward the person and the idea of rightness with respect to the law. These ideas arose responsive to authority, correlative to the idea of authority, not the idea of power or coercive force, but of that undefinable reality and fact, moral authority. These are intuitive ideas, necessary and ultimate, as necessary in morals as the idea of causation in general thought. This is the primary movement of conscience, the intuitive beholding of obligation and of moral rightness.

135. Conscience Responsive to Authority.

This intuition of obligation and of right arose at the cognition of the lawgiver and of his law addressed to a being conscious of freedom. The joint cognition of the two is necessary. The bare beholding of conduct apart from a rule of conduct, gives no occasion for conscience to act. The eye cannot see unless there is light as well as an object to be seen ; so must there be not only conduct having intrinsic moral quality, but also the light of moral precept in which to behold it. Apart from a rule of right, right has no meaning. And apart from the personality of the lawgiver whose authority awakens the sense of obligation, the words of the precept have no power to move conscience to activity.

136. The Temptation, Outside of Conscience.

After the command and the primary response of conscience next came the temptation, presented perhaps through the perceptive faculties, and then the movement of sensibility, a glow of feeling at the thought of possible pleasure. Then followed the great choice of the will, a choice in sheer opposition to those ideas of obligation and of right presented by the moral faculty. The temptation, the moving of sensibility, and the choice are plainly outside of conscience.

137. Good or Ill Desert.

Following close upon the disobedience there appeared the idea and sense of guilt, a painful sense of ill desert, joined with the expectancy of the divine displeasure. When the presence of the Lord was again announced Adam hid himself in dread of expected disapprobation.

If Adam had chosen obedience, conscience would have spoken words of approval and breathed a prophecy of blessing. This idea and sense of good or ill desert, of merit or of guilt, and this expectancy of reward or of penalty, are given by no other faculty than conscience. These are intuitions of the moral faculty.

138. Conscience not a Faculty of Comparing and Judging.

Previous to the self-approval, or the self-condemnation, there must needs be a comparison of the conduct with the rule of right, and a judgment that the conduct is in harmony with the rule or that it is not in harmony. This comparison and judgment cannot be made by conscience. The intention of obedience or of disobedience is known by consciousness. The objective and actual agreement or disagreement of conduct with the rule of right is known through consciousness and the general intellect. The intellect holds the two conceptions, the conception of the law and of the conduct, and laying them side by side notes the points of harmony and of variance. When the comparison has been made and the judgment rendered, then conscience comes forward with its contribution of moral intuition and moral sensibility.

139. Résumé.

We find then that the distinctive functions of conscience are four in number: 1. As a faculty correlative to the divine authority it gives the idea of authority and of obligation; it affirms the duty of obedience to the divine will and to all authority which represents the divine authority. 2. Conscience gives the ideas of right and of wrong; it discerns the moral quality of voluntary con-

formity or non-conformity to the rule of right. It declares the supremacy of moral obligation. It discerns and affirms, but does not create. 3. Conscience gives the ideas of good and of ill desert ; the feeling of moral complacency, self-respect, and moral worth, or the sense of shame, guilt, and degradation which follows evil doing. 4. From conscience springs the expectancy of reward or of penalty ; the anticipation of favor and blessing or the dread of impending retribution.

140. This Analysis Just.

The proof that the analysis given above is just is seen in this, that the activities which have been referred to conscience are universal and invariable, while other elements are variable and hence not essential. Among all men we find the idea of duty, and the conviction of duty to obey the supreme authority ; we find the idea of right and of wrong according to some standard or principle of conduct ; we find also the idea of good and of ill desert and the expectancy of retribution. These ideas of right and duty are flouted in pagan and in Christian lands alike, but nevertheless they are never absent from the minds of men. In respect to the standard of right and the corresponding moral judgments there is no uniformity, but in respect to the moral intuitions there is universal agreement.

141. Obligation the Primary Dictum of Conscience.

Among the intuitions of conscience the obligation to obey the supreme authority must be counted the primary dictum. This is the "categorical imperative." The earliest movement of conscience in children is the recog-

nition of parental authority and of the duty of obedience. There is no thought of abstract right; there is no notion of a general principle; there is the simple concrete duty of obeying another being, a superior being, who stands invested with authority. When the one living God is recognized, conscience affirms with single and potent voice the duty of obedience to him. The moral character of the supreme authority, as judged by Christian standards, makes little difference in this sense of obligation. The moral codes of pagan religions are base and revolting, but the conscience of Christian and of pagan alike gives the sense of duty to obey. The duty of submission to authority is the primary intuition of the moral faculty.

142. Other Faculties Co-operative with Conscience.

From previous discussions it is manifest that other faculties are normally co-operative with conscience. In the unity of the mind each faculty brings its own contribution of activity and service, and every faculty cooperates with every other. For whatever purpose the knowledge of facts and their relations is wanted the general intellect brings it forward. Through the perceptive faculties comes the knowledge of external phenomena; consciousness presents the subjective phenomena; the intuitive faculty takes the individual phenomena and sets them in the framework of time and space, pours through them the idea of force and binds them together with the chain of causation; then conscience throws upon them the light of its moral intuitions. Thus the faculties work in harmony. Conscience cannot do the work of other faculties, nor can it supervise and correct their work.

143. The Dicta of Conscience Infallible.

The proper dicta of conscience are infallible. But in what sense is this true? Conscience affirms always and everywhere the distinction between right and wrong, and this distinction is always true. Conscience affirms the supremacy of the ultimate rule of right and the obligation to obey the supreme authority. This also is true without exception. If a man with intention transgress the supreme rule, conscience declares him guilty and bids him expect merited penalty. In this field of moral intuitions conscience makes no mistakes. For the facts in the case conscience depends, and must needs depend, upon other faculties.

144. Conditions Requisite for the Action of Conscience.

Touching this matter some considerations have already been presented. To awaken conscience to action these conditions are requisite : (1) the recognition of personal authority; (2) a law or rule of conduct, expressing the personal authority on the one side, and on the other defining the subordination which is required; (3) the consciousness of freedom in ourselves, or the idea of freedom in others. If either of these is lacking, conscience is silent. And conscience does not of itself furnish either the law or the authority.

145. Testimony of Dr. Baird.

The principle laid down above is affirmed by the most careful students of the phenomena of conscience. Dr. Samuel J. Baird says : "Every element in the phenomena of conscience supposes subordination recognized to a rightful and supreme lawgiver." In a world without

sovereignty and without law "we should find," he says, "intelligence without a conscience, without a conception of the duty of rectitude, or the crime of wrong-doing and sin."

146. Testimony of Dr. McCosh.

Dr. James McCosh unfolds and affirms the same principles. He says: "Our moral nature reveals a law which is, first, independent of it; secondly, binding upon it; thirdly, binding upon all intelligent beings. The conscience declares that it has not created the law; it feels that the law has been impressed upon it. It feels that it is merely the interpreter of a law binding independently of the recognition or the non-recognition of it by any individual. It declares regarding itself that its function is not to assume authority over the law, but to bow to the law as having authority over it."

147. Dr. Strong's Testimony.

Dr. A. H. Strong says: "Conscience must judge according to the law given to it." It follows of necessity that if no law is given to it conscience cannot act.

148. A World Without Authority or Law.

Let us imagine that which practically could not be, that a boy be suffered to grow to maturity without control, with no command, human or divine, ever suggested to his mind. The idea of authority has no place in his mind. His conscience would lie as undeveloped as an infant's. He would have no notion of right or duty. Selfish, vengeful passions he might have, or kindly impulses, but not virtues or sins. As a child would be, left

thus without ideas of obligation, so our race would be if left without a moral law, a race in moral infancy forever. Let now the lawgiver and the moral law come in ; ideas of duty and of right spring to life ; the will is compelled to make moral choices ; the moral affinities of the soul show themselves ; moral capacities are developed and matured into moral forces and moral character.

149. Sentiments Mistaken for Conscience.

Care must be taken to distinguish between conscience and sentiment. Not every high and good impulse is the imperial word of conscience. Pity responsive to helplessness and beauty may move the heart when conscience is silent. Self-love is put for obligation, and stubbornness stands for conscientiousness. Because "honesty is the best policy," politic men count themselves honest. Because virtue brings happiness, seeking for happiness is analyzed into the love of virtue.

150. Obscure Movements of Conscience.

The analysis of a movement of conscience so simple as in the primal transgression, seems clear and sure. The majestic personality of the Creator is the lawgiver ; the rule of right is a direct command ; after the offense there is quick calling of the offender to account. But often the activities of conscience are complex and obscure. The presence of authority is not apparent ; the supreme lawgiver is not recognized ; other voices mingle with the moral law ; self-love clamors to be heard, until conscience becomes confused, uncertain, and feeble in its movements. This obscure action of conscience ought to be carefully noted.

151. Apparent Absence of Authority.

It must be admitted that sometimes the idea of authority and of law does not seem to be distinctly present in the mind, and yet conscience seems to operate. Does conscience act apart from an authoritative rule of right? Or is there a moral law somewhere and somehow present, though unrecognized, latent, yet operative? A moral law to whose force, though unconsciously to the actor, the action is due?

152. A Law Present, Though not Apparent.

Wherever the action of conscience is seen, an authoritative rule of conduct is never altogether lacking. Something stands in the mind as a kind of law. Take an extreme illustration. A man denies the existence of God, denies the life to come, and mocks at all religious obligation, and yet in his mind there may be a certain inferior action of conscience. How is this possible? He constructs for himself out of his own sentiments, or from his experience of the consequences of actions, or from the elements which make up the welfare of society, or from some other source, a rule of conduct which he counts binding upon men. To this rule he imputes authority. It is evident that this rule stands in his mind as authoritative, for he enforces it as a rule of conduct for others.

153. Methods of Constructing Ethical Codes.

The methods of constructing these authoritative moral codes which recognize no authority above man, are curious. One man is a "reformer," a reformer in hygiene, in dress, in social science, in law, and his notions of what

would be beneficial to men constitute his moral law. Another makes "personal development" his rule; whatever seems to him to promote his own development he counts right. A third mocks at "the higher law," but counts the civil law supreme. A fourth constructs a law out of popular sentiment, and generalizing society into a personality, he imputes to it authority. Wherever the one supreme moral law is not recognized this process of law-making goes on. By this means a feeble action of conscience is maintained.

154. Fragments of the Real Moral Law.

The various rules of conduct which men construct for themselves are commonly fragments, more or less disjointed, of the real and comprehensive moral law. For this reason they have some relation to the moral nature of man and a certain measure of value. Hygienic rules express the Creator's will touching man's physical life. That which conduces to real development of the individual is good, for a perfect human nature is in itself a partial declaration of the moral law. A true social science expresses the mind of the Creator, for God created man for social life. Civil law has its measure of authority to bind the conscience, for "the powers that be are ordained of God." The moral sentiments which men project from themselves and then label "the nature of things," may be elements of the divine likeness in man. These fragments of the moral law are often distorted, and are always false in the sense of being partial; but as elements of the moral law, they have some authority and some power to stir conscience to action.

155. Personal Authority not Absent.

Even in that inferior action of conscience under the stimulus of disjointed fragments of the moral law, the element of personal authority is not wholly absent. Rules of conduct stand in the minds of men as representing a consensus of sentiment. Back of that consensus of opinion stands a numerous personality, greater than any one man, and mightier to enforce its will. By a kind of generalization society becomes a person vested with authority not to be lightly disregarded. States and nations are great corporate persons enforcing their will even unto death. Some men even personify nature and seem to have regard for natural law as representing an obscure personality. But where the idea of personality is entirely absent from the rule of right, conscience is dormant and the idea of obligation is not found

156. Without the Idea of God, Conscience Weak.

In proportion as the idea of the one living God drops out of belief or out of mind, the action of conscience becomes weak. If hygiene furnish the law of right, the allurements of pleasure easily triumph. The conscience of Joseph was dominant because he feared God. If the welfare of society stand for the moral law, his own personal advantage will seem to every man the most important matter. Right "in the nature of things," without God to administer the law, holds nobody back from transgression. But in the presence of the living God, the sense of right and duty becomes clear and strong; conscience makes her voice to be respected; or if men disregard her monitions her wrath breaks out like the thunders and lightnings of Sinai. If a man will strengthen his

conscience, let him clarify and vivify his sense of God and his law. That unfaithfulness in positions of trust, which seems to be ominously increasing, is to be accounted for by a decaying sense of the divine authority. ✓

157. Degrees of Energy in the Action of Conscience.

With conscience, as with other faculties, there may be various degrees of energy. Its action may be normal, but yet feeble. The causes of these differences lie close at hand and are easily found.

158. Degrees of Depravity Affecting Conscience.

The depravity of human nature shows itself in no small degree in the conscience ; indeed, since depravity is a moral deterioration, it must needs show itself primarily in the moral faculties. This disturbance in the moral nature manifests itself with varying energy in different persons. The blurring of the moral sight and senses may be more or less complete.

159. Abuse of Conscience a Cause of Weakness.

The voice of conscience is often disregarded and its monitions flouted, till it almost ceases to speak. Spurned and despised, it retires into silence till the day of retribution shall come. It is a law of the activity of conscience that the strength and delicacy of its movements can be enjoyed only by faithfully and lovingly following its monitions.

160. Vagueness of Ideas a Source of Weakness.

Indistinct and uncertain conceptions of things, as apprehended by the general intellect, leave the con-

science to feebleness ; they furnish no sufficient stimulus to vigorous action. Knowledge is too meagre and vague ; there is no worthy ideal of excellence in the mind ; the character of God is not apprehended ; the requirements of the moral law are not understood ; all mental operations are ineffectual gropings, and the activities of conscience are correspondingly feeble.

161. Some Doctrines Enervate Conscience.

The belief of some certain doctrines, religious or philosophic, cannot do otherwise than weaken the action of conscience. The denial of final retribution tends to enfeeble the action of this faculty, for in this life the punishment of wickedness is notoriously uncertain and inadequate ; and if future punishment be denied, the prophecy of conscience touching retribution is flouted as being false. If God does not punish wrong-doing, why should conscience weary itself in uttering ineffectual protests ? The doctrine of pantheism, by its denial of a personal deity, takes away the most potent stimulus of conscience. The doctrine of materialism, by degrading the choices of free beings to the level of molecular affinities and vibrations, takes away all ground for moral distinctions. The denial of revealed religion, by the doubt which it throws upon all spiritual verities, leaves conscience unsupported, for in this matter, as in everything else, doubt is weakness. These are given merely as illustrations of the influence upon conscience exerted by some beliefs.

162. Conscience under Wicked Law.

Light may be thrown upon the normal action of conscience by noting its working under wicked authority

and vicious law. Wicked laws are sometimes laid upon conscience, laws which outrage and lacerate human nature. It is possible for the intellect to accept the fiendish will of a demon in place of the beneficent will of the Creator. In such a case a man is divided against himself; conscience is set against the moral nature of man and the nature of things. To obey the voice of conscience is moral ruin; not to obey is to suffer the pangs of guilt and fear. The true rule of right is agreeable to reason; it is in harmony with all high sentiment and generous sensibility; it is the ideal of perfect manhood. Obedience leads to perfection of being and perfect happiness; it brings a man first into harmony with the Creator, and then into harmony with the world of things which God has made. A wicked law works the opposite of all this; it is contrary to reason; it condemns the best sensibilities of a good heart; it requires that against which the moral nature of man rebels; it breaks down the ideal of perfection, and as far as possible recreates a man in the likeness of a fiend.

163. Illustrations.

The moral law requires temperance and sobriety, and the nature of man requires the same. If Bacchus be followed, the constitution of a man is shattered and wrecked. The moral law commands purity, and purity promotes health and happiness. But if Venus be worshiped, the springs of life are poisoned at the fountain, and disease and decay trail down through the generations. On the other side, for the completest example of an evil law laid upon conscience, we may cite the ethical code of the Jesuits, a code which enthrones falsehood

in the place of truth, puts perfidy in the place of fidelity, roots kindness and pity out of the heart, divorces conscience from intelligence and reason, and swears the will to blind and limitless submission to the authority of a man. A blind sense of obligation is made the sole virtue.

164. The Authority of Conscience.

It is common to speak of the authority of conscience, and to assert its supremacy among the faculties. Dr. Francis Wayland declares conscience to be "the most authoritative impulse to which we find ourselves susceptible." As a popular expression "the authority of conscience" may not be extremely objectionable, but as a scientific statement, the language of Dr. Wayland betrays a lack of clear thought. Authority, from its very nature, is objective, *ab extra*. A subjective impulse cannot be authoritative. Conscience may furnish an impulse for choice or effort, but this impulse cannot have the nature of authority.

165. Conscience Echoes the Voice of the Lawgiver.

The authority of conscience is nothing else than the authority of the lawgiver whom the moral faculty recognizes. Conscience affirms the duty of obedience, but obedience to what, or to whom? To itself? Not to itself at all, but to the lawgiver. If conscience takes its law from Jehovah, then the authority of conscience is the authority of God. If the supreme rule of right is deduced from utility, then the authority of conscience is merely that measure of influence which arises from the idea of advantage.

166. Authority Emanates from Will.

As we have already seen, obligation cannot exist except toward a personal being. In like manner authority has its ground in personality, and cannot issue except from a person. And still further, authority is an attribute of will. Obedience is the correlative of authority, and obedience is the voluntary acceptance of the will of another as our own will ; it is the choice of one will freely conforming itself to another will. Hence an authoritative law implies, of necessity, the will of a personal being behind the law as the ground of its authority. Civil law in a republic expresses the resultant authority of many wills. The unwritten law of public opinion is in like manner a consensus of will. The authority of conscience is, then, not the urgency of a subjective impulse, but the objective authority of him who gives law to conscience. It is the force of a personality rather than the influence of a principle

167. Conscience not Coercive.

Whatever authority conscience may exercise, or whatever urgency of impulse may be found in the action of conscience, the will is not dominated by conscience. We know that the will can act contrary to the monitions of conscience, because it does so act. Nor does this indicate feebleness in the action of conscience. Conscience may thunder and lighten in the soul, and the will may yet entirely disregard its voice. As Paul reasoned before Felix touching "righteousness, temperance, and the judgment to come," the king trembled, but he went on in his evil way all the same.

168: The Discernment of What is Right.

Before leaving the subject of conscience, we must consider in what manner the mind discerns what is right and what is wrong : that is, what is the moral law and what its contents. Conscience does not of itself know what is right. The utterly various and contradictory notions of men concerning the rule of right, prove that ideas of right are not direct intuitions. The answer to this inquiry has been already suggested, but a fuller consideration is needful.

169. Conscience Deals with Moral Principles Only.

In determining what is right, the action of conscience is analogous to the operation of the general intuitive faculty. Intuition affirms the principle of cause and effect as necessary and universal, but when the question comes, What is the cause of this particular effect? or, What effect must follow that particular cause? other faculties than intuition must give the answer. In like manner conscience affirms the distinction between right and wrong, and the imperative obligation to obey the supreme authority, but the general intellect must investigate the rule of right and determine what authority is supreme. Whether Jupiter or Jehovah be the true God ; whether the Decalogue be the will of God or the will of Moses ; whether Jesus be "the Lord of life and glory," or only a pretender to the Jewish Messiahship ; whether the holy Scriptures are inspired, and what is their meaning ; whether king or congress, federal or confederate officers exercise the powers of legitimate government ; whether this man's duty be to till the soil, sail the sea, or to preach the gospel, these are questions belonging to

the general intellect, and not at all to conscience. But when the intellect has done its work, conscience comes in promptly with its intuition of obligation. Give to the intellect the conception of an idol god, or a demon deity, and along with this the biblical conception of Jehovah ; the intellect, comparing the attributes of each, declares the being who made the heavens and the earth to be the true God, and rejects the idol and the demon. And conscience acts upon this decision of the intellect. When the Scriptures have instructed the intellect and clarified its operations, the application of this principle is easy. But when the Scriptures are not known, the process is more difficult of analysis.

170. Discerning Right by the Light of Nature.

The discernment of the rule of right without a special revelation is attended with great difficulties, and for the crude thought and base sensibilities of savage men it is especially difficult. Traditional notions of right and wrong doubtless follow men in their lowest degradation. Aside from this we may follow the working of the intellect something as follows. Everywhere there come, of necessity, to the minds of men, contrasted ideas, as of truth and falsehood, kindness and cruelty, justice and robbery, obedience and disobedience. The intellect discerns the superiority of the one set of ideas ; they are in harmony with all the better elements of his nature ; by experience they are found to work out good. Take, for illustration, the question between truth and falsehood. It is the function of the intellect to discern between that which is true and real, and that which is false and only apparent; truth satisfies the intellect, while falsehood

offends it. Truth works out good ; truth is seen to be the only basis of profitable or pleasant association among men ; it agrees with the instinctive disposition to trust men till they show themselves false. Truth is seen to be a higher and better principle of action than deception ; that it is in harmony with the realities of things. Then conscience comes in and clothes with the attributes of right and duty that which the intellect has declared to be true and practically good. Falsehood comes in as a disturbing element, as something out of harmony with that which is real. It outrages the intellect, putting that which is not, in place of that which is ; it disappoints trust ; it works trouble everywhere. In like manner theft violates the sense of ownership ; it deprives men of the means of comfort ; it is easily seen by all men to be practically injurious. And almost every kind of wrong-doing is seen to come somehow and somewhere into collision with the nature and welfare of man. These conclusions of the intellect furnish a basis for a feeble action of conscience.

171. A Positive Moral Law Needed.

The crude notions of the moral law which are found among savage tribes, emphasize the need of a positive moral code and a clearly recognized supreme authority. When the revelation of God and his will comes, it commands assent, not only by the force of objective evidence, but also by the power of subjective correspondence, and by meeting a deep subjective need. The Scriptures clarify man's natural notions of right, supplement that which is lacking, and by superior definiteness and higher authority in a measure supersede those ideas.

172. Conscientiousness not Identical with Right.

From discussions already had, it is manifest that conscientiousness gives no certainty that a man's conduct is actually in harmony with the moral law. Conscientiousness indicates a sincere intention to do right, and this gives a certain measure of probability that one has made due effort to ascertain what is right. But a conscientious man may make grave mistakes in practical morals.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING THE POWER OF CHOICE.

173. Importance of the Subject.

Man is endowed with that regnant faculty called the *will*. This faculty, like conscience, requires careful study and exact statement. A false psychology of the will can hardly fail to show itself in a false philosophy of morals. A theory of the faculty of choice may be so radically wrong as to leave no basis for a moral element in human conduct and character.

174. Definition of the Will.

The will is that imperial faculty which makes choices and decisions; which determines to what ends man's energies shall be directed, and gives character and limit to the sensibilities; it gives the word of command for the execution of its chosen purposes, and by these sovereign acts fixes the moral attitude and determines the moral character of the spiritual being. "Will is the soul's power to choose between motives and to direct its subsequent activity according to the motive thus chosen—in other words, the soul's power to choose both an end and the means to attain it."¹

175. The Will, *Sui Generis*.

Concerning the will it must be said, first of all, that it is a faculty entirely *sui generis*, like itself and like nothing

¹ Dr. A. H. Strong.

else. In its nature and mode of action it is unlike every other faculty of the spiritual being. Will is knowable by consciousness only. It cannot be explained through forms of thought furnished by any other faculty. This is true, indeed, in its measure, of every radically distinct faculty. But this is pre-eminently true of the will. This may seem nothing else than a truism, yet nothing is more common in discussion touching the will, than the attempt to explain its mode of operation by forms of thought furnished by the causal faculty, and to reduce its function to the principle of cause and effect. It is necessary therefore to emphasize the thought that will cannot be understood otherwise than by the clear consciousness of its own activity.

176. Will a Distinct Faculty.

We must emphasize the fact that will is a distinct faculty. The action of will cannot be resolved into something else, and we do well to challenge every process of analysis by which this is attempted.

177. Will is not Reason.

Will is not reason, and cannot be resolved into functions of reason. The activities of the reasoning faculty represent reality, truth, and its relationships. Anything contrary to truth and reality is contrary to the normal conceptions and processes of reason. But the action of will is not an intuition or a logical process. The determinations of will are often contrary to known truth, unreasonable, illogical, and foolish. Will often tramples upon every dictate of common sense. It is characteristic of wrong-doing that it is so unreasonable that the evi-

doer, confronted with his sin, stands confounded and speechless. To give a good reason for an evil choice is to justify it.

178. Will not Conscience.

The movements of will cannot be resolved into the monitions of conscience. Men are constantly acting contrary to the monitions of the moral faculty. A characteristic quality of remorse is the consciousness of having acted contrary to the strong conviction of right and duty.

179. Will not Sensibility.

Will is not an impulse of emotion, a wave of sensibility, neither some single emotion, nor the resultant of many. On the other hand, will is that faculty whose function is to hold sensibility and passion in subjection. When Quintus Mucius Scævola thrust his hand into the altar flame and held it there till consumed, was it emotion which dominated the physical anguish? Was it the gratification of the stronger sensibility? When the aged Polycarp refused to curse his Lord and gave his body to the flames, was it some overmastering sensibility that made the great decision? In the stillness of every other emotion, the will is able to deny gratification to the most clamorous passion. The whole soul may be tremulous and distressed with the conflict of contending appetencies and sensibilities; the will denies which it pleases, or denies them all. And when will has made its decision and declared it final, it refuses to reopen the case for further consideration; against the fixed purpose, as waves against a cliff, raging passion beats in vain,

and the will abides in imperial peace. Herein lies the stability of high moral character.

180. Will not the Strongest Motive.

Current language touching motives is misleading. Will is not the strongest motive, nor is it determined by the strongest motive. It sits as arbiter between rival appetencies, and weighs them, not according to their urgency, and gives supremacy to which it pleases ; and the standard by which it measures motives is of the will's own choosing.

181. President Edwards' Argument.

The famous argument of President Jonathan Edwards, by which he seems to reduce the action of the will to links in a chain of necessary causation, and by which, it has been said, he shut up every opponent to a bare protest against his conclusion, may be briefly stated as follows : The will chooses, and cannot do otherwise, according to the strongest motive ; by the strongest motive is meant that motive which under the circumstances seems to the mind most agreeable ; that which is the most agreeable, namely, the strongest motive, determines the action of the will, for if it were not the most agreeable, something else would be chosen. The prevailing motive is shown to be the strongest by the fact that it prevails. Thus it is made to appear that motives rule the will, and rule it by their pleasurableness. The choices of the will are resolved into movements of sensibility.

182. Edwards' Argument an Identical Equation.

Unconsciously, it would seem, President Edwards reduced his argument to the form of an identical equa-

tion, $x=x$, a proposition equally true and nugatory. "The will," he says, "is always as the greatest apparent good." "The greatest apparent good," he carefully explains as having "the same import as agreeable." Then he says that "an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring or choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct"; that "a man's choosing, liking best, or being pleased with a thing, are the same with his willing that thing." In this unperceived shifting of terms lies the strength of Edwards' argument. It all amounts to this, that the will chooses according to its choice.

183. What is a Motive?

The word motive properly signifies something which has been chosen, something which by being chosen becomes a stimulus to effort to attain, possess, or enjoy it. To one man money is a motive; to another, pleasure; a third says, My motive is to do good. They have chosen these things as objects for which to labor and spend life. They are motives, but not motives to the will, for the choice has already been made, but motives to the executive faculties to gain and possess them.

184. Anticipative Sense of Motive.

That which has not been chosen, but which is presented to the mind as an object of possible choice, is sometimes by anticipation called a motive. To rouse his sluggish boy to exertion, the father pictures to him the benefits which he may win by hard study, the excellency of knowledge, and the personal power to which he may attain, in the hope that the boy may choose

these things as his motives. In this sense, doubtless, Edwards thought of motives when he affirmed that the strongest motive determines the action of the will. But his argument plays back and forth between the two senses. But in respect to this anticipative sense of motive there is a false conception which demands notice.

185. Motives Inert.

Motives seem often to be looked upon as things of positive energy, as having an attractive force of their own, by which they get a pull upon the will. In this lies a fertile source of fallacies in discussions concerning the will. A motive, as an object external to the mind, is in itself utterly inert and powerless. A motive is entirely passive ; it cannot compel or incite, persuade or influence. The energy and the appetency are in the spiritual being who makes the election. There is no mutual attraction or interaction ; the action and the attraction are all upon the side of the mind.

186. Relation of Motives to the Mind.

A motive, as an object external to the mind, first becomes a subject of knowledge. It has no potency beyond the physical properties by which it makes an impression upon our bodily senses, equally inert, whether it be a clod of earth or a nugget of gold. Next in order, the mental conception of this external something—let it be a discovered nugget of gold—awakens in the mind a train of associated conceptions : other deposits of gold close at hand ; the possibility of getting possession of this gold ; the wealth, position, and power which the possession of the gold may bring ; enjoyments extending

through years to come ; the same great things for children and children's children ; a series of associated ideas extending without limit. These conceptions give rise to certain emotions ; a warm glow of excited sensibility ensues. If the object of knowledge be a clod of earth, the associated ideas are different, and the sensibility is slight. But as external objects, both are equally passive and inert. They can neither determine, nor persuade, nor influence the will. As external motives, neither of them can be said to be either stronger or weaker.

187. Conception of Freedom.

It is common to assert freedom as an attribute of the will, and the denial of freedom is seldom heard except when made for a purpose. The popular mind resents the denial of freedom. But this consensus of opinion in favor of freedom is joined with the greatest possible difference in the conception of that freedom. With some writers, freedom of will means the impossibility of compelling choices, in a causal way, by external physical force. With others, freedom signifies inward spontaneity of action, the choices of the will being the true expression of a man's own dispositions and appetencies. Some can conceive no real freedom except the absence of all inward bias, a condition of complete indifference toward all objects of choice. The agreement, therefore, in affirming freedom, is by no means an agreement touching the doctrine of freedom of the will.

188. Difficulty of Conceiving Freedom.

The difficulty of conceiving and defining freedom of will is psychological and metaphysical. There is the

supposed necessity of harmonizing the intuition of causation and the consciousness of freedom. This is an attempt to impose upon the consciousness of freedom a form of thought given by another faculty. There is also the difficulty of conceiving the absolute beginning of anything. Choice as a link in a chain of causation, the causal faculty easily apprehends; but a cause which is not a link in a chain, a cause which has no antecedent, which is a fountain and not a mere conduit of causal energy, the causal faculty does not understand. That which is simply outside or beyond the apprehension of the causal faculty is often accounted contrary to it. The faculty of choice is understood by the consciousness of its operation, and by that only.

189. Proposed Definitions of the Idea of Freedom.

The following definitions of the idea of free will are submitted :

First, the will is free in the sense that it represents the spontaneous activity of the personal, rational being.

Secondly, the will is free in the sense that no outward influence or force has, or can have, any coercive or causal relation to its action. The external world comes into causal relations with the bodies of men, but it has no causal connection with the faculty of choice. There is no tangential point between physical force and will.

Thirdly, the will is free in the sense that its choices are not dominated or determined by the action of other faculties, whether reason, conscience, or sensibility. Will does not act apart from other faculties, but its action is not dominated by any. The will may flout reason and conscience, and deny the entreaties of sensibility.

Fourthly, the will is free in the sense that its choices are not determined by the existing state of the being at the moment of choosing, but by its action will can modify and reverse that state. If this be not so, no being created in purity and uprightness has ever fallen into sin.

Fifthly, the will is free in the sense that its choices are not links in a chain of necessary causation. As the creative acts of God must be conceived as absolute beginnings and not links in a chain of cause and effect, so, in their limited sphere and significance, the generic choices of the will are beginnings which may stand in causal relations to consequents, but have no causal relation with antecedents. As God created all things, so the will originates its own moral attitudes. In this creative faculty lies the profoundest element of likeness between man and his Maker. The conception of this absolute origination of moral choices, is no more difficult than the conception of any act of creation.

190. The Conflict of Ages.

The conflict of ages touching the will concerns this question, whether the will does truly originate moral attitudes, or whether generic choices spring of necessity from antecedent conditions and forces. The child begins his existence with a personality determined in no respect or degree by his own volition ; he is environed also by conditions not of his own making. The EGO which he did not make or choose, and the NON-EGO which is beyond his control, constitute the universe. Either the totality of his life and destiny is the product of the interaction of these two elements, or else there is the absolute origination of something new, something

outside of the chain of cause and effect. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground.

191. Will Makes and Changes Moral States.

We must hold that it is the function of will to originate generic moral choices and states ; to modify and reverse existing moral attitudes ; with temptation, or without temptation to turn the soul from good to evil ; with the touch and impulse of God's Spirit to turn the soul from evil to good ; that the will is, in its highest moral action, a first cause.

192. Historic Proofs.

The inspired history affirms as a fact that God created our first parents morally upright and good, and that under the impulse of temptation they disobeyed the law of their Creator, and by this choice reversed their moral condition. The same history briefly and significantly indicates that certain spiritual beings had passed through this experience before the creation of man. Certain "angels kept not their first estate," and this primal fall must have been without a tempter. These facts demonstrate the possibility of such facts.

193. Proof from Spiritual Regeneration.

According to Christian doctrine and according to frequent experience, the will, out of antecedent unbelief and sin, through the stimulus and uplifting of divine grace, reverses the moral attitude and chooses faith and righteousness. Divine grace does not work abnormally with respect to the faculties of the soul ; the normal operation of the will is not disturbed, but rather helped ;

under the divine impulse, the will working according to its own proper function turns from evil, reversing thus its previous moral state. This indicates again that it belongs to the nature of will to originate generic moral choices.

194. The Testimony of Consciousness.

Touching the action of the will, consciousness is the final authority. Consciousness testifies to the simple, ultimate fact of a generic choice, and gives no hint of antecedent causes. It is the essential nature of choice that it is an election between two alternatives. In affirming the fact of choice, consciousness affirms the ability to accept either alternative, and to accept it under existing conditions, otherwise there is no choice. This testimony is so positive that we may count it the universal conviction of the human soul.

195. The Testimony of Conscience.

Conscience declares unequivocally the duty of choosing the good and the right, not under other more favorable conditions, but under present conditions, whatever they may be ; and if the will chooses known evil, conscience proclaims the man guilty, whatever his conditions. Upon what ground can conscience affirm obligation, and good or ill desert, except upon the ground of ability to place the soul in the right moral attitude ?

196. Ability to Choose, and Penalty.

God and men inflict punishment upon evildoers. The loving father as well as the stern executioner counts this just. These penalties imply positive ill desert.

Only upon the ground of ability to originate moral attitudes can we justify the judgments of righteous rulers or of God.

197. Classes of Choices.

The action of the will must in all cases have the quality of a true choice, that is, there must be an election between real alternatives. Nevertheless, there are differences in choices. The relationship of acts of choice to other mental operations is not in all cases the same. We may therefore classify choices, and thus better understand the action of will.

198. General and Particular, Generic and Executive Volitions.

Choice may be either general or particular, the choice of a motive, or executive volitions for doing or attaining that which has been chosen. A man chooses the attainment of rank in office as his aim and end in life. This election is made once for all and is not reconsidered. It is a general choice, a generic choice, the choice of a motive. Then follow numberless executive volitions for the accomplishment of the all-embracing purpose. In these executive volitions there is a choice between real alternatives: a choice between means, between times and seasons, between doing instantly and waiting; but in these subsidiary choices the action of other faculties seems especially prominent. The will seems to say to the intellect, I have chosen my end; do you search out the best method of accomplishing my chosen object, and I will command the doing. And the intellect applies itself with equal alacrity to devising means for robbing a bank, for undermining the virtue of the innocent, for

building a hospital, or for preaching the gospel to the world. It is manifest that the paramount action of the will is found in the generic choices, the election of motives.

199. Choices with no Moral Element.

Movements of the will may be classified again with reference to the moral element involved in them. There is presented to me a dish containing a variety of fruits, apples, pears, peaches, grapes, all equally healthful for me. In taking one in preference to another, there must be a choice, but a choice with no moral element. In the numberless volitions by which the course of life is carried on, many choices are of this neutral kind, and many more have a moral quality in a secondary, indirect way only, by virtue of their relation to true generic choices.

200. The Moral Element in Generic Choices.

In the great generic choices the moral element is primary and supreme. To every man there comes the great question of loyalty to God, as against all lower motives in life. The choice must be made ; it cannot be evaded. It is a generic choice ; it involves a lifetime of executive volitions in harmony with it. To every man in business there comes the question of truth, honesty, and honor in all his dealings, or of tricks and deceptions for the increase of profits. This choice is moral and generic ; it is the choice of a motive. Moral philosophy concerns itself chiefly with these radical choices in which the will elects a supreme moral motive. In these great choices there confront men such alternatives as these ; a

life dominated by God's will or by self-will ; benevolence and love or selfishness ; truth and sincerity or falseness and pretense. Subsidiary choices are comparatively unimportant. Love to God and love to men, truth and righteousness, may be expressed in a hundred ways, all equally good and right in their place.

201. Choice Involves Real Alternatives.

Real choice requires that objects of choice be presented which are real alternatives. This signifies that the objects shall be such that if one be chosen, by that same choice the other must be rejected. By a generic choice a man makes gain rather than honesty his motive. He is ready to sell his vote for a bribe. On the one side a bribe of ten dollars is offered, on the other side twenty dollars. Here is no alternative ; in accepting the twenty he accepts the ten twice over. For a man whose motive is gold, there is no alternative between ten thousand pieces and a hundred thousand pieces. For one whose motive is to do good, there is no alternative between a little good and a great good.

202. The Nature of Real Alternatives.

Let the nature of real alternatives be fixed well in mind. Alternatives are mutually exclusive. In making choice between alternatives, the action of the will shows a two-fold attitude, an attitude of acceptance and an attitude of rejection. But in choosing the greater gain there is no element of rejection ; the less is chosen plus their difference. Thus it appears that in many apparent choices there is no real choice. The real choice was made in the previous election of a motive.

203. Fixedness of Choice.

No conception of the will can be adequate which does not recognize its tendency toward fixedness and permanence of moral choices. A generic choice is very much more than a purpose to perform an individual moral act. It is the election of a permanent motive. It puts the spiritual being into a moral condition or attitude. A repetition of the choice is a ratification of the previous action. The soul determines to stand by the position already taken. There is an increase of moral momentum. The ratification is made with less of conscious agitation than the original choice, but with greater fixedness. It belongs to the nature of high moral choices that they are intended to stand forever. To choose the doing of the divine will as the supreme motive, with the proviso that the choice is a temporary measure, is impossible. To assume to do this, shows that something else than the divine will is the real object of choice. To choose an evil motive is to take a wrong moral attitude, and this evil state must needs continue till it is reversed. The will having made its choice of a motive and of a moral state, and having confirmed and ratified the choice, there crystallize around it all the energies and activities of the spiritual being. Corresponding appetencies urge it on ; the sensibilities rally around it to strengthen it ; the intellect devotes all its resources to its service. Thus the choice becomes final—final, not by the loss of volitional power, but because the will has taken its stand, has spoken the fateful word, and refuses to reconsider its decision, or to reopen the case. On the side of virtue this fixedness of choice signifies maturity of moral character.

204. "Facilis descensus Averno."

The power to change a moral state from good to evil, to corrupt a nature previously pure, does not imply the power to restore the former moral state by a reverse choice. Men have found by sad experience that descent into evil is easy, but that return to right-doing is difficult exceedingly. The first man could choose evil and destroy his original righteousness; but that former moral state is recovered, not without a reverse choice indeed, but only by the special grace of God. Young people, especially, should bear in mind that the drift of human nature is toward evil, and that it is easy to go down, but hard to rise again.

205. Consequences of Choices.

In the world of things actions have consequences. Consequences spread and ramify. Given the antecedent cause, and the consequences are certain and necessary. In the moral world and in spiritual beings there is in like manner a law of cause and effect. The generic choices of the will are causes; the consequences are sure to follow. *E.g.*, when an evil motive has been chosen, evil thoughts spring up in the mind, as if the soil had been sown with vile seeds; vicious sensibilities begin to burn in the soul; that wickedness which formerly awakened aversion and disgust, now awakens a feeling of pleasure; the appetencies of the soul reach out after base objects, and clamor to be appeased by unworthy indulgences. The causal bond between the evil choice and this consequent depravation of being is sure; wrong generic choices generate evil sensibilities. In depraved sensibilities is written the record of evil choices.

206. Consequences not Under the Control of the Will.

In the world of material things the law of cause and effect cannot be averted or modified by man. That which is done cannot be undone, nor can its consequences be stayed. The same is true touching moral choices. The generic choice is optional ; the consequences follow by virtue of man's nature ; they are not optional ; they cannot be hindered. Some of the consequences of evil choices were indicated in the preceding paragraph. We can set no limit to the extent or the duration of these consequences ; they trail through generations and ages ; they extend to the utter wreck and ruin of human welfare. The doctrine of this paragraph is, that a reverse choice cannot annihilate the consequences of a previous choice. The primal transgression brought depravity into human nature : no reverse choice has been able to eliminate that element of depravity and restore human nature to its original purity. The Christian religion brings to light divine agencies for destroying the consequences of sin. But the direct control of the consequences of moral choices is beyond the power of will.

207. Will Co-operative with Other Faculties.

As has been already said, man as a spiritual being is a unit, and in the unity of that spiritual being every faculty co-operates with every other. Memory is memory for intellect, conscience, and will. Reason is reason for all the faculties. So the will acts in conjunction with reason and conscience. It is normal for the will to act in harmony with a good conscience and with right reason. It is abnormal for the will to choose that which to the

reason is foolish, or to the conscience is wrong. It is a characteristic of evil choices that they are dislocated mental operations, antagonized and condemned by conscience and clear thought. Movements of will in harmony with all the faculties are at once normal and right.

208. Will and Character.

Moral character is the product of will. Character is composed of two elements : (1) The present attitude of the will itself ; (2) The condition of the appetencies and sensibilities. The first is the existing generic choice. The second element is made up of the consequences of choices, past or present, wrought upon the spiritual being. When the attitude of the will has been rectified, there may yet remain a large residuum of evil consequences from previous choices. The first element of character may be changed instantly ; the second element changes with more or less of slowness. Many a good man is dogged and tormented by the persistency of depraved sensibilities. "To will is present," but "how to do the good he finds not." The will may be right, while the character is marred by multitudinous defects.

209. Freedom not Lost.

Persistence of choice is not bondage of will nor does it imply the loss of power to choose. Stability of choice signifies that the will has acted and refuses to change. But children are born under conditions and with environments which make it practically sure that they will choose evil and live in wickedness. Whence comes this practical certainty of an evil life ? From paralysis of the volitional faculty ? From servitude of will ? Not from

these sources, but there is a lack of ideals ; evil is present to the mind ; the good is absent and is not apprehended ; the moral law is not recognized in its strenuous authority. The will takes that which comes to hand ; it cannot choose that which the mind does not apprehend. This is the condition of pagan nations. High and clear ideals of right and goodness are not present to their minds. But when Christian ideals and Christian graces are apprehended by them in their completeness of beauty and power, not a few from sinks of vice and from the deepest depths of heathenism turn from evil and choose the good. The "Five Points" and "Water Street" are as fruitful fields for philanthropic labor as "Fifth Avenue." The east end of London is as able and as ready to repent as the west end.

210. Desire and Love Movements of Will.

It is common to think of love with reference to the sensibilities only. This omits the essential element. Every movement of sensibility finds its ground in some other mental activity. The sensibilities of desire and love have their ground in the action of the will. Choice is the perennial trunk and branches ; sensibility is the foliage and efflorescence. The sensibility may be either pleasure or pain. To desire money or fame or pleasure, is nothing else than choosing them as motives. To love a friend is to elect him as an object of self-devotion. Parents love their children, they devote themselves to their children, to labor and sacrifice for them ; but the wayward son may make a happy love impossible. To love God supremely is to make him the object of complete self-consecration ; the joy of that love is the spon-

taneous sensibility which follows the supreme choice. That which does not contain the element of chosen self-devotion is not love. The characteristic quality and the measure of love is self-sacrifice. "God so loved the world that he gave his Son." "Hereby perceive we the love of God, because he laid down his life for us." To desire an object for the purpose of self-gratification, is not love. Admiration is not love. No mere stirring of emotion, no matter what that emotion may be, is love. A life of heroic goodness excites general admiration; few persons love such a life.

211. Choice Without a Motive.

"The power to choose is not a power to choose without a motive."¹ This must of course be true, for a motive is either something which has been chosen, or something presented as an object of possible choice. It is surely true that the mind cannot choose without an object of choice. But President Porter meant something more than this identical proposition. We find here the fallacy already discussed, that a motive is a thing of potency which has power to lay hold of the will and move it to the act of choice.

212. Motives as Influences.

"Motives are not causes which compel the will, but influences which persuade it."² If by motive Dr. Strong means something external to the mind, or something conceived as external, we have here again the same error as in the preceding paragraph;

¹ Pres. Porter, "Elements of Moral Science," p. 80.

² Dr. A. H. Strong, "Systematic Theology," p. 258.

a motive is counted a thing of potency which lays hold upon the mind with more or less of control. But an external object of choice is neither a cause nor an influence ; it is an object of knowledge, but absolutely inert.

213. Sensibilities as Motives.

“Motives=sensibilities.”¹ Here we find motive used in another sense, not as an object chosen, or which may be chosen, but as signifying an excited condition of the sensibilities. It may be granted that an object, the idea of which held in the mind awakens no sensibility, will not become a motive. No man will choose that in which he feels absolutely no interest. But the proposition that motives are nothing else than excited sensibilities, is a misleading half-truth. The subjective element implies the objective also, and in the act of choice, the will elects the objective motive and not the subjective sensibility. The man who chooses duty as the alternative of pleasure, consciously elects duty objectively considered, rather than the pleasure arising from the doing of the duty. Otherwise the choice of duty and of pleasure would be identical. The hero who risks his life to rescue the shipwrecked sailor, chooses the saving of the poor sufferer and not the gratification of an emotion. If this is not so, all motives are one and the same, namely, the indulgence of pleasurable sensibility, or the avoidance of the opposite. Then, since only one motive is possible, virtue and vice become identical in principle, and the distinction between virtue and vice ceases to exist ; all human conduct is resolved into varieties of self-pleasing, and no place is left for moral science.

¹ Harris, “Philos. Basis of Theism,” quoted by Dr. Strong.

214. The Will as an Expression of the Existing Self.

"The will can never be anything else than an expression of the actually existing self at the moment of volition."¹ By this doctrine all choices are brought into the chain of necessary causation ; the power of real choice is denied ; the will expresses that which is, and cannot do otherwise. The existing self is a fact with no alternative. This principle would render impossible the beginning of sin, or the recovery of the sinner, except by processes of corruption or of restoration acting outside of the will. According to this doctrine, virtue and sin have nothing to do with the activities of the will, but belong solely to the conditions which the will expresses. Virtue and sin pertain, then, to involuntary states. With this conception of the will, it is not easy to see how a man who finds himself in an evil condition shall set to work to recover himself ; all that will can do is to express the existing evil.

215. Reasoning in a Circle.

"Motives are not causes which compel the will, but influences which persuade it. The power of these motives, however, is proportionate to the power of will which has entered into them and made them what they are."² What is this but reasoning in a circle? Motives influence the will ; the power to influence the will is given by the will. The bellows drives the windmill ; the windmill works the bellows. It is a strong man that can lift himself by his boot-straps. A "perpetual motion" is no more rational in morals than in physics.

¹ Pres. E. G. Robinson, "Principles and Practice of Morality," p. 119.

² Dr. A. H. Strong, "Systematic Theology," p. 258.

216. Will and Sensibility.

What is the relation of sensibility to the action of will? It has been affirmed that the faculty of choice is dominated by no other faculty. This must be insisted upon, otherwise the existence of the will as a distinct faculty can hardly be vindicated. But the denial of subordination on the part of will, is not a denial of relationship of will and sensibility. Every faculty co-operates with every other. What is the relation of sensibility to choice?

217. Without Sensibility, no Choice.

It may be admitted without question that in the complete absence of sensibility there will be no action of will. I shall not choose that which to me is a matter of absolute indifference. Absolute deadness or torpor of sensibility must also mean inaction of will.

218. Sensibility a Stimulus to all Faculties.

The sensibilities stimulate all other mental activities. Under the stimulus of excited emotion, reason, memory, imagination, conscience, act with greatly increased energy; the entire spiritual being is stirred and spurred to intensest action and effort. In this general stimulus, will receives its share; it acts with a promptness and energy corresponding to the general excitement. But this stimulus to action must be carefully distinguished from a determination of the kind of action.

219. Sensibility as an Object of Choice.

A pleasant excitement of sensibility may become itself an object of choice. This is often true in the case of

bodily pleasures. The *enjoyment* of eating and drinking is made an end in itself; men labor and spend to gain agreeable sensations. But in these cases pleasure becomes a quasi objective motive; it is not an antecedent pleasure determining the choice, but a pleasure which, as an objective matter, follows the choosing.

220. Sensibility, as a Motive, a Future Sensibility.

A choice always looks to the future. Not that which is, but that which may be, must be chosen. That which now is, as a thing now existent, cannot be made an object of choice; that which is, already exists, and there is no place for an alternative. Therefore excited sensibility, as an existing state, cannot become a motive. The future continuance of a present pleasure may be an object of choice.

221. The Abyss of Moral Philosophy.

The abyss into which, in this place, so many plunge with infinite zest, and into which it is death to fall, is the analysis of every motive with its idiopathic sensibility, into some form of pleasure. This analysis is a wonderful psychological alchemy; throw what you will into its crucible, it comes out enjoyment. Obedience to the stern call of duty, in this alchemy, is only a form of self-gratification. Self-denial, self-abnegation even unto death, for the good of others, is only a subtle form of self-indulgence. At this point of the discussion there is more need of conscience than of analysis. Here is the place for indignant mockery at this calling of good, evil, and of evil, good. It must be affirmed as the ultimate testimony of consciousness, that the will can choose, and

does choose, right, duty, and self-denial, as such, and not as a "more highly evolved" form of self-gratification. Conscience distinguishes sharply between right and agreeableness, and denies utterly that potency of obligation means simply superior enjoyment. If this is not so, the Christian requirement of self-denial is an empty and delusive form of words and nothing more.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING RIGHT

222. The Grounds of Right.

The ground of moral distinctions can be found nowhere except in the facts and verities of real being ; first of all, in the eternal, unchangeable nature of God ; secondly, in the nature of man and of other beings made in the likeness of God ; thirdly, in a subordinate way, in the nature of things created with properties and forces harmonious with the nature of moral beings. Right and wrong are what they are because God is what he is, because man is what he is, and because the universe is what it is. These three grounds agree and are one, because God made man and the universe in harmony with himself. *Ideas* of obligation and right have their origin in the intuitive action of conscience, in the clear beholding by the moral faculty of that which is eternally true. The conditions under which these ideas arise are those which awaken conscience to action, that is, the recognition of authority expressed in and by a rule of conduct.

223. The Idea of Right—Definition.

Right, in its broad, general sense, or in its special, ethical sense, is conformity to a rule or standard. That is right which agrees with the pattern, standard, or rule which represents perfection ; wrong is non-conformity. The *wrong* may be merely imperfection, or it may be moral obliquity and guilt, but in either case the idea of

right and of wrong is the same. The rule of conduct may be sharp and positive, as in statute law ; it may be less exact, as in usage and precedent ; it may be yet more indefinite, as in a certain consensus of public sentiment and popular feeling. In its strict ethical sense, right is intentional conformity to the moral law.

224. The Scope of the Idea of Right.

Since right is conformity to a rule of right, the idea of right must be co-extensive with the standard. The rule of right measures the meaning of right. That which the civil law requires, is legally right ; that which conforms to the sentiments and usages of good society, is socially right ; that which agrees with the natural functions and activities of the human organism, is hygienically right. That is morally right, right in the highest sense, which conforms to God's moral will, the moral law, that supreme standard by which the conduct and characters of all men must be judged.

225. The Rule of Right Found in God.

In ethical discussion the crucial point is the standard of right. Touching this essential matter writers upon moral science have shown a singular diversity of judgment. The doctrine here presented is that the moral law, as already defined, is the will of God revealed for the government of men. If any one prefers to say that the nature of God, rather than the will of God, is the standard, let him use that form of expression. But we know the nature of God only as it is revealed in his will. Will rather than nature is expressed in preceptive form. The perfect Exemplar said, "I came to do the

will of him that sent me.” It seems more suitable and more definite to say, the *will* of God is the rule of right. The moral standard of being and of life, for man, is found in the nature and will of the Creator. We must accept no lower standard.

226. Objection—Will Arbitrary and Changeable.

The one weighty objection to the doctrine that the moral law is God’s will, derives all its force from a radically inadequate conception of the divine will. It is declared that this definition renders right and wrong an arbitrary thing, created by a word and liable to instant change and reversal. When we consider that the will of God has expressed itself in the moral nature of man and in the constitution of the universe, as well as in the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount, and that a change in the divine will involves a change in God’s nature and a corresponding change in all created beings and things, it becomes manifest that this objection is based upon a misconception. The will of God is the stability of the universe ; matter has no other basis of unchangeableness. A change of the divine will is inconceivable in rational thought.

227. The Being of God the Archetype of Man’s Being.

In the holy Scriptures we read, “God created man in his own image ; in the image of God created he him.” The being of the Creator was the pattern of man’s being. The ideal and perfection of man’s moral nature is found, therefore, in likeness to God. From this it follows, of necessity, that the divine will is the supreme rule of right and the standard of perfection.

228. God Central and Supreme.

If there is a living God, the Creator of all things, it is manifest that he must be central and supreme in the universe. In every theory of morals also, as in every man's life, he must be supreme. In maintaining that the nature of God is the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, and his will the supreme law of right, we reverently accord to him that central place. He is the "fountain of law." There is no rational middle ground between the first place and no place. Writers on morals, and not atheists, often give to the Creator only an incidental place in their philosophy. Of his own theoretical principles, Dr. Hickok says, they "find their ethical ground and validity independently of the considerations of God's being." On the other hand, it is here taught that God holds that place in moral philosophy which the sun holds in the solar system; without the sun and without God there is neither unity nor cohesion; the elements fall in pieces.

229. The Testimony of Scripture.

The holy Scriptures everywhere press upon men the law of God's will and that only. In the primal test and transgression in Eden, the will of God emerges as the sole rule of conduct for man. The divine will was proclaimed in words of thunder from Sinai and graven on tablets of stone. The Lord Jesus came to do his Father's will. When Jesus says, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect," he makes God the standard of perfection. He is counted great in the kingdom of heaven, who keeps and teaches the divine commandments, even the least. "Not my will, but

thine be done," represents the supreme example of Christ, and the supreme Christian virtue. "To obey is better than sacrifice"; "rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry."

230. Other Standards Fragments of the Divine Will.

That the divine will, revealed in many ways, constitutes the moral law, is also indicated by the fact that every other proposed standard, which shows any truth or usefulness, is a partial and fragmentary expression of that will. The proof of this is found in illustrative examples.

231. Consequences of Conduct as a Rule of Right.

Right doing promotes happiness. God has so made man that welfare naturally follows virtue. No special interposition of divine working is necessary for rewarding the good or punishing the wicked. This automatic working out of good and ill being seen, and God's relationship to this law being forgotten, fitness to promote happiness comes to be accounted the rule and standard of right—and right for the reason that happiness is promoted, and for no other reason. But this relationship of conduct to happiness is a partial expression of God's will. This fragmentary declaration of the divine mind, a torn leaf from the book of the law, is set up as an independent standard and rule of right.

232. Ideal Human Nature as a Rule of Right.

Dr. Hickok affirms that the supreme standard of right is the "spirit's own excellency." A man may "do that and only that which is due to his spirit's excellency." If there is any truth or value in this concep-

tion, it is found in the fact that man's own nature is a partial expression of the Creator's will. What is the spirit's excellency but the attributes of a being made in the divine likeness? Again a part, a fragment, a partially defaced inscription, is taken as the entire moral law.

233. The “Nature of Things” as a Standard of Right.

One school of moral philosophy finds the standard of right in the “nature of things.” If this expression signifies the nature of the material universe, or the nature of moral beings plus the universe, this also, like the previous case, is a partial revealing of the divine mind. Or, if it is intended to signify a denial of any objective standard, then it is a falling back upon the bare unstructured sentiments or instincts of human nature as the sole and sufficient law of right. But unperverted human sentiments express, in a certain measure, the mind of the Creator. Illustrations might easily be multiplied. Every proposed rule of right, aside from the divine will, is nothing else than a fragment of that will, torn from its normal relationships and set up as a law independent of God. It is better and more scientific to say that the one comprehensive will of the Creator, expressed in many ways, is the one universal rule of obligation.

234. God’s Will the Only Practical Moral Law.

It is noteworthy that when men come to practical morals and to the construction of ethical codes, every Christian thinker finds himself compelled to take the divine commandments as the practical rule of duty. No other law is definite; no other law is sufficiently compre-

hensive; no other carries with it force of obligation; no other can stand for a moment in the presence of this; they fall before it as Dagon before the ark of the covenant. And they who will not have God as the fountain of law, find themselves compelled to accept him as the administrator of the law and the practical Lawgiver.

235. Positive Commands.

Some most imperative duties are enjoined by no law which can be deduced from the nature of man or of things. Forms of worship and works of direct service toward God are matters of positive commandment. The mission of Moses to Pharaoh; the ritual of worship enjoined upon the Hebrews; the call of Christ to his apostles; the Great Commission, "Go, teach all nations"; the appointment of Baptism and the Memorial Supper, these duties could not be deduced from anything natural. But when God has spoken and enjoined them, conscience instantly recognizes the obligation as supreme. When positive commands have vindicated themselves to the mind as being the sure will of God, they at once are accounted as outranking nature. So the word came to Abraham, "Take now thy son, thine only son, Isaac"; so Paul went "bound in the Spirit" to Jerusalem, understanding that it might be going to his death; so the "secret whisper" comes to many a young man calling him to the foreign mission field, and conscience responds to the word as supreme above nature or sentiment. These things indicate that conscience counts the will of God as the rule of duty. And to deny positive commands is to deny the Christian religion.

236. The Theory of Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) taught that civil statutes are at once the ground and the standard of all right. The idea of right and duty, according to Hobbes, is the product of the civil law. Nothing is either just or unjust till the law has declared it so. Men are naturally hostile and dangerous to each other, but they must needs live together, and laws are made and penalties enforced to defend men from their fellows. The only right is that which the civil law creates, and that upon which the law visits pains and penalties is the only wrong. The only duty which a man owes is obedience to his sovereign. There is nothing behind or above the king's authority.

237. Objections to Hobbes' Theory.

This theory of Hobbes deserves little attention except as a curious philosophic fossil. If there were no moral faculty, law could no more gender the idea of right than a candle could give rise to the idea of light in the mind of a man born blind. Fines and imprisonments, the rack and the fagot, excite fear and hatred, but they show no tendency to awaken a sense of obligation. The idea of right and the laws which kings have made, have waged incessant warfare. Rule by kings is apt to awaken a sense of wrong and injustice. It is not possible that the sense of obligation should be in conflict with that rule of right which the mind recognizes as true, and from which it derives its existence.

238. Herbert Spencer's Theory.

Herbert Spencer (b. 1820) says, "The happiness or misery caused by it, are ultimate standards by which all

men judge of behavior." This doctrine touching the standard of right in conduct is not peculiar to Mr. Spencer. But his account of the genesis of moral ideas is recent and peculiar. His theory of morals, from first to last, is based upon his doctrine that man has been slowly "evolved" from the lower and the lowest forms of animal life. *Pari passu*, with the evolution of physical structure and function, there was, he says, an evolution of conduct. Activity was at first the product of nervous excitation ; by and by, in the progress of evolution, action became conscious and intelligent. All activity had for its object the conservation of life and the continuance of the species. As conduct became more highly evolved it was seen that the welfare of the individual was related to the welfare of other like individuals, and that by a certain regard for others each one best promoted his own happiness. Men learned that welfare was best secured by giving preference to remote rather than present pleasure, and by sharing enjoyments in place of greedily monopolizing them. Thus ideas of equality, justice, and benevolence arose ; there was a blending of egoism and of altruism, of selfishness and self-sacrifice ; but, he says, always and forever the ultimate aim of all action is, and must needs be, the promotion and conservation of one's own happiness, and that benevolence and self-sacrifice are admissible only as a means to more highly evolved enjoyment for one's self. The imperative element in morals, the conviction of obligation, he explains as the product of penalties inflicted for disobedience to law. In this item he goes back to Hobbes. But as was said before, law and penalty cannot develop moral ideas where there is no moral faculty.

239. Stands or Falls with "Evolution."

Spencer's theory is an attempt to analyze a hypothetical evolution of man up from a spontaneous generation in reeking "ooze." But if there was no spontaneous generation of life, and no evolution of man from beasts and from slime, then this theory is a useless effort to analyze a process which did not take place. In the confessed absence of the slightest scientific proof, we must count the doctrine of evolution, in this extreme form, the most chimerical hypothesis to which the vagaries of modern thought have given birth. Spencer's theory of morals cannot have a better foundation.

240. Facts Fundamental to Evolution.

As its necessary basis, the doctrine of evolution in its complete form assumes two facts—assumes them not only as conceivable and possible, but as actual and historic ; first, the spontaneous generation of living creatures from lifeless matter ; second, the transmutation of one species into another ; that lower forms of life may change into the higher, that fish may change into bird and beast, and beast to man. If either of these assumed facts be not true and actual, evolution falls for the lack of foundation. But if both were proved, it would do no more than indicate the possibility of evolution in the case of man. But the very friends and advocates of the hypothesis admit that neither spontaneous generation nor transmutation of species has any *scientific* basis.

241. Huxley and Spontaneous Generation.

Thomas H. Huxley, the prince of evolutionists, affirms that in his opinion, Pasteur's experiments gave the death-

stroke to belief in the spontaneous generation of life. "For my own part," he says, "I conceive that with the particulars of M. Pasteur's experiments before us, we cannot fail to arrive at his conclusions, and the doctrine of the spontaneous generation of life has received a final *coup de grace.*"

242. Huxley on Transmutation of Species.

Mr. Huxley admits and declares that no attempt to modify species has been successful to the extent of forming a new species; that geology furnishes no proof that this has taken place in the past; and that indications given by geology all point in the opposite direction. He says, "It is admitted on all hands that, at present, so far as experiments have gone, it has not been found possible to produce this complete physiological divergence," that is, the formation of distinct species, "by selective breeding." "So far as we have gone yet with our breeding, we have not produced from common stock two breeds which are not more or less fertile with one another. I do not know that there is a single fact which would justify any one in saying that any degree of sterility has been observed between breeds absolutely known to have been produced by selective breeding from a common stock."

243. The Testimony of Geology.

Having given this testimony concerning the results of experiments and experience with living species, Mr. Huxley declares that geologic investigations give no support to the doctrine of the transmutations of species. He says:

What does an impartial survey of the positively ascertained truths of paleontology testify in relation to the common doctrine of progressive modification, which supposes that modification to have taken place by a necessary progress from more or less embryonic forms, or from more or less generalized types, within the limits of the period represented by the fossiliferous rocks? It negatives this doctrine, for it either shows us no evidence of such modification, or demonstrates such modifications as have occurred to have been very slight; and as to the nature of that modification, it yields no evidence whatsoever that the earlier members of any long-continued group were more generalized in structure than the later ones. . . Contrariwise, any admissible hypothesis of progressive modification must be compatible with persistence without progression through indefinite periods.—*Lay Sermons.*

Our acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis must be provisional so long as one link in the chain of evidence is wanting; and so long as all the animals and plants produced by selective breeding from a common stock are fertile with one another, that link will be wanting.

It would seem from this statement of the chief of the evolutionists, that the first link of the chain of evidence has not yet been found. Professor Tyndall sums up the case in this statement of a general principle: "Without verification a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect." From Mr. Huxley's admissions it appears that Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics" is a hypothesis in explanation of a "mere figment of the intellect." This is not science but profitless mental gymnastics.

244. Current Theories of Right.

Theories of right, rival or antagonistic to that which is maintained in this treatise, may be divided into two classes: first, those which find the standard of right in some form or grade of utility; second, those which find

the ultimate rule of right in man's own moral sentiments, which denying any and all objective standards, attribute to human nature certain moral sentiments, instinct or intuitions, which constitute the court of last appeal in questions touching right and wrong. These two classes of theories must now be considered.

245. Theories of Utility.

Theories of right which find the standard of right in tendency to promote some kind of welfare, span the entire scale of human weal or woe. But they all agree in this, that the highest good is pleasant sensibility ; that this pleasant sensibility is the supreme object of choice and endeavor ; and the ultimate test of the moral quality of conduct is its fitness or tendency to promote enjoyable feeling. This utility may signify pleasure in the debased Epicurean sense ; it may be the higher grade of enjoyment expressed by the word happiness ; the idea of happiness may be disguised under the term well-being ; the happiness may be extended to include not only the individual actor, but the entire human race, or "being in general " ; it may be explained to signify permanent rather than present and transient enjoyment ; that permanent enjoyment may be exalted to mean blessedness for evermore. These theories stand, all of them, opposed to the doctrine that the idea of *right* is logically, morally, and scientifically distinct from tendency to promote good feeling.

246. The Argument for Utilitarianism.

The strong defense of all those theories of right which find their standard in tendency to promote happiness, is

briefly this : enjoyment is *of necessity* the aim and end of all intelligent action ; intelligent beings *cannot do otherwise* than choose that which is most pleasurable ; happiness is the one supreme good, and nothing else can be of value except as it tends to promote happiness ; if a man chooses virtue rather than vice, it is because in this he finds more enjoyment.

247. Statement of Mr. David Metcalf.

No writer has stated the utilitarian argument more acutely than Mr. Metcalf.¹ He says :

The two facts, that desire of happiness comprehends all possible subjective motive, and that happiness is the only possible object of the voluntary action of voluntary beings, are essential to the basis of moral obligation, and constitute the basis in the soul of man for moral obligation. . . Most evidently right is a source of happiness and must be so regarded or it could not be desired. Therefore nothing, happiness alone excepted, can be desired, loved, sought after or practised, which is not desired for the sake of resulting happiness. . . What is a desire of the right rather than the wrong in moral action but an *involuntary preference of the pleasure* known to be inseparably connected with right moral action? . . If *desire of right* leads to doing right, this doing right will gratify that desire, and *this gratification will be some degree of happiness*. . . Should it be said that we can desire to do right for the sake of glorifying God, then to glorify God would be to us a source of happiness. To glorify God from a desire to glorify him, and to take pleasure, delight, or happiness in promoting his glory are one and the same thing. And so of every other action.

Let these statements be held in mind for a little while. They must be referred to again.

¹ "An Inquiry into the Nature, Foundation, and Extent of Moral Obligation."

248. President Edwards' Argument.

President Edwards urges, with manifold repetitions, that agreeableness in the object chosen is that on account of which the object is chosen, and cannot be otherwise than chosen. For if the object chosen were not the most agreeable, then would something else be chosen more agreeable. The fallacy in this argument was pointed out in the discussion of motives. By a confusion of terms an elect motive is conceived as still before the mind as an object of possible choice. Edwards himself says, without perceiving the bearing of the admission : "An appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind and the mind's preferring or choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct."

249. Mr. Metcalf's Fatal Admission.

By pointing out that agreeableness and desire represent the action of the will, Edwards gave the clue to his own fallacy. Mr. Metcalf guards this point of his argument by accounting the preference for the chosen object to be an involuntary preference. He saves his logic, but at what dreadful cost. "What is a desire of the right," he asks, "rather than the wrong, but an *involuntary* preference of the pleasure known to be inseparably connected with right moral action?" He makes the desire of the right to be an involuntary preference for a certain kind of pleasure. Desire for the wrong must be an equally involuntary preference for another kind of pleasure. And a man cannot do otherwise than choose and follow this involuntarily preferred pleasure. To maintain his theory he eliminates entirely the voluntary element from human conduct. Wickedness in man is

as involuntary as fierceness in a tiger, and gentleness in a lamb is as virtuous as heroic self-sacrifice in a Christian martyr.

250. The Idea of Right and of Utility Distinct.

Against every form of the utilitarian theory it is here affirmed that the idea of right and the idea of utility, advantage, pleasure, or happiness, are not only distinct but generically unlike. They are so unlike that a man cannot make happiness his supreme motive and at the same time make right his choice. The conceptions are mutually exclusive ; the choice of the one as a supreme motive, is of necessity a rejection of the other. It is impossible to seek for *pleasure* as a supreme *obligation*. To seek for happiness as a duty, is not to seek for happiness as the aim and end, but the doing of the duty. Any logical process which leads to the conclusion that love and selfishness, self-indulgence and self-abnegation, the love of right and hunger for titillated sensibility, are at the core one and the same, is by this very conclusion branded as a patent fallacy. If choosing right be nothing else than seeking pleasure, and if choosing evil be the same, then virtue and vice are not opposites but in principle the same. Such a moral philosophy is suicidal ; it is not a philosophy of morals but of ways and means for procuring pleasure.

251. Utilitarianism and Selfishness.

It is impossible to disguise the manifest flavor of selfishness in a life whose supreme motive is enjoyment. We may cloak the selfishness by putting forward the good of others as the means by which that enjoyment is

to be gained, but so long as the real object sought is one's own pleasure, the selfishness remains. Let this principle of seeking enjoyment for one's self be expressed in plain words in social life, and at once it is felt to be offensive and base. The question is not whether an unselfish life finds its fitting reward of happiness, but whether the real and only possible motive is that reward.

252. Suggestive Illustrations.

Illustrations have not seldom the force of logical arguments. In heroic action the thought of pleasure drops out of consciousness. The weary mother walks the floor through the long night to soothe the pains of her wailing child; is her real motive to get enjoyment for herself? Regulus before the Roman senate urges that he himself be sent back to the Carthaginians, to certain torture and death—was that his method of seeking pleasure? A fireman rescues a child from a burning house and goes through life disfigured and maimed as the price of his generous daring; the mother can never forget her gratitude, nor sufficiently express her thankfulness by words or deeds—is all this on her part and on his a mere matter of self-pleasing? “O judgment, thou art fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost their reason.” If enjoyment is the sole possible motive, that prudent but honest fireman should say frankly to the grateful mother: “There is no cause for gratitude on your part; I was only seeking my own enjoyment; a person constituted like myself could not do otherwise; you may pay me for my work and trouble, if you please”; that is all the case calls for. She pays him, takes a receipt, and the transaction is ended; henceforth he is no

more to her than the tramp who clears the sidewalk and takes his pay in cold victuals. Is this the meaning of heroism and self-sacrifice? Of our Lord it is written, "Even Christ pleased not himself." In the crucible of this new analysis this declaration becomes, It pleased Christ more not to please himself than to please himself; with him the not pleasing himself was the intensest self-pleasing.

253. Brutus and his Sons.

Livy relates that Brutus sitting as judge condemned his own sons to death—and the historian remarks that as Brutus pronounced the sentence his face was a sight to see, the tenderness of the father struggling with the sense of justice and duty in the judge. It is a wonder-working analysis that makes the father sentence his sons to death, not for the public weal, but for his own enjoyment!

254. Utilitarianism Counts Rectitude Inferior.

Every form of the utilitarian theory gives rectitude, as rectitude, an inferior place. Rectitude is counted of value only as a means of gaining something else. Conscience and the Scriptures agree in placing rectitude first. "He that loveth his life," that is, puts enjoyment first, "shall lose it," even the enjoyment which he seeks; "but he that hateth his life," that is, leaves enjoyment out of account and chooses God's will only, "shall keep it," even the enjoyment which he rejected as a motive.

255. Utilitarianism Irreligious.

This does not mean that all who hold utilitarian doctrine are practically irreligious and undevout. But

every form of the utilitarian theory, consistently held, displaces God from his central and supreme place in man's love and life. Utilitarianism is essentially irreligious. Whoever loves God as a means to something else, namely happiness, gives him the second place ; he does not so much love God as he loves that which he hopes to gain by means of God. It is well that with some men there is a chasm between their philosophy and their life.

256. The Tendency of Utilitarianism.

The element of evil in utilitarianism is seen in its practical tendency toward degeneracy in morals. Future and eternal welfare insensibly gives place to present and transient happiness ; calm and substantial happiness cannot maintain itself against more potent pleasures ; and in minds wedded to pleasure, enjoyment surely gravitates toward sensuous, if not sensual, delights. No moral code, however excellent, starting with the principle that enjoyment is the supreme and only motive, and that tendency to promote enjoyment is the standard of right, can save itself from this practical degeneracy, except by inconsistency in the holding.

257. Epicurus and Epicureanism.

Epicurus taught in the first place that God does not concern himself with the affairs of men, and then that the feelings are the test of all ethical truth. But he said :

When we say that pleasure is the end of life, we do not mean the pleasure of the debauchee, or the sensualist, as some from ignorance or malignity represent, but freedom of the body from

pain, and of the soul from anxiety. For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the society of women, nor rare viands and other luxuries of the table, that constitute a pleasant life ; but sober contemplation that searches out the grounds of choice and avoidance, and banishes those chimeras which harass the mind.

Epicurus himself lived a simple, abstemious, virtuous life ; he defined pleasure after the manner of a student and philosopher ; but neither his example nor his exhortations could prevent the development of his doctrine in the direction of immorality. And his denial that God concerns himself with the affairs of men, eliminated the only element that could stay the descent toward evil. Epicureanism has become the synonym of sensual self-indulgence.

258. The Antidote for Utilitarian Theories.

The practical check to the tendency of utilitarian theories is found in that Christian teaching which emphasizes the law and government of God. Philosophies are little understood or considered by the many, but everywhere words of holy Scripture are pressed upon the minds of men, and every soul is summoned to stand and answer to the living God. And writers who make happiness the end and aim of all conduct, yet in practical ethics are constrained to assert the divine authority as supreme. Dr. Hickok's system of moral philosophy is a notable illustration. He unfolds a system which finds its "ethical ground and validity independently of considerations of God's being" ; his standard of right is "the spirit's own excellency and dignity." But in treating of practical ethics he finds it necessary to introduce "a Being of absolute sovereignty, legislating and execut-

ing in his own right." He admits that his theory of morals is not a sufficient basis for religion. He says : "Piety cannot be attained under the discipline of pure morality." "There is nothing here of the religious capacity disciplined. Here is no love to sovereignty, no obedience for God's sake ; no reverence and confiding obedience ; no praise and thanksgiving ; no worship and reciprocal communion. All is in interest of humanity only, and nothing which brings humanity in communion with Divinity." "The sole constraint of piety is complete loyalty—the love of the Lord that is served and worshiped." "The whole moving influence of piety is love to God, and all the constraint of law upon it is solely regard for the will of the sovereign lawgiver." In this connection, Dr. Hickok affirms, "positive authority must be made especially prominent." This may stand as a sample. In actual life God and his authority must be recognized in spite of adverse theories.

We may note in passing that if "sole regard for the will of the sovereign lawgiver" be possible in religion, then is the choice of something else than pleasant sensibility psychologically possible.

259. Utility not a Guide in Right Doing.

One important function of a law of right is to guide men in their moral choices before experience. For this necessary use all utilitarian rules of right are radically defective. Tendency to promote happiness cannot be known except by experience, and experience cannot be had till the choice of good or evil has been made, the moral act consummated, and the consequences felt. Such guidance comes too late.

260. Consequences Remote and not Discernible.

The thought expressed in the preceding paragraph is emphasized by the fact that consequences, whether good or ill, are often very slow in their development. They are remote, obscure, and separate from their causes ; the results of diverse courses of conduct are intricately interwoven and blended ; they are only partly experienced in this life ; the immediate consequence of wrong-doing may be pungent pleasure, the remediless ruin may be remote. Experience is not only insufficient, but brief experience is often utterly misleading.

261. The Experience of Past Generations not Enough.

It may, perhaps, be said that the experiences of past generations have already sufficiently shown the tendency of every kind of conduct. In some departments of knowledge there is a grain of truth in this. In some respects the later generations of men have advantages above the earlier. But in the highest moral concerns men learn little from the experiences of previous generations ; moral attitudes and their consequences are too remotely and too subtilely connected. Consequences may be rewarding angels or a nemesis of wrath, but a sufficient guide they cannot be.

262. If not a Guide, not the Standard of Right.

If tendency to promote happiness be not a sufficient guide in moral conduct, may it not yet be the standard by which all conduct at the last must be judged ? This cannot be, for the rule of conduct cannot be one thing and the standard of right something else. That law which a man is bound by moral obligation to obey, is

the law by which he must be judged ; and the law by which he must be judged is for him the standard of right. The will of God, expressing his own moral nature and man's moral constitution, wrought into the nature of things, and defined by positive precepts, is the rule of conduct and the final standard of right. Following this rule there is no need that a man perish in order to learn that the way is dangerous.

263. Regard for Consequences, not a Moral Element.

We have already seen that consequences cannot constitute a guide for conduct, nor the standard of right. It is also true that regard for consequences has in it, strictly speaking, no moral element. Good men and bad men alike take account of consequences. There is surely no virtue in turning one's foot away from a recognized pest-house. What moral quality would the young man Joseph have shown if he had said, "I cannot do this thing, for surely an evil disease will cleave to me and consume my flesh," only this and nothing more. And the case is no different if the consequences to which regard be had are not expected to appear till a man shall enter upon the future life. Mere regard for consequences, here or hereafter, is prudence, and it may be a very selfish prudence.

264. Happiness Attained Indirectly.

That philosophy which teaches men to make happiness the object of supreme desire, would render happiness forever impossible. This principle explains the misery of the world. Happiness is won by choosing right without respect to happiness. Doubtless the Crea-

tor will permit no man to suffer ultimate loss by reason of obedience to him, but for this final reward he must be trusted. The government calls men to the battlefield, to risk limb and life in deadly strife ; the assurance of care for the sick and the maimed and of a pension for the widow and orphan, furnishes the suitable condition under which the patriotic heroism of the soldier may show itself. In like manner does that government which is over all, give assurance that martyrs for righteousness shall not suffer loss ; but blessedness is not the hireling's pay but the inheritance of faithful sons. "He that loveth his life shall lose it," expresses the profoundest philosophy.

265. Subjective Standards of Right.

The other class of theories antagonistic to that philosophy which finds the ultimate ground of moral distinctions in the divine nature, and the standard of right for man in God's will, makes the standard of right a subjective matter—the moral instincts, sentiments, or notions of men. In a certain sense these theories make every man a law unto himself.

266. Dr. Hickok's Theory.

In his "Moral Science" Dr. Hickok affirms that the ultimate standard is the worthiness and dignity of every man's own spiritual being. Whatever agrees with the spirit's worthiness is right. But who shall estimate, grade, and define that worth and dignity ? Every man must needs do this for himself, otherwise at once another standard is introduced. This gives a sliding scale of morals, the most variable that can be imagined. To

the prophet who walks with God, and whose faith embraces immortality, the worthiness of his spiritual being has one significance ; to the Epicurean who says, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," the worth and dignity of man mean something very different. But for the Christian philosopher, for the savage, and for the debauchee, their own estimate of their worth and dignity is made the standard of right.

267. Dr. Peabody's Theory.

Dr. Andrew J. Peabody¹ says : "Fitness and unfitness are the ultimate ideas that are involved in the terms right and wrong." This in real significance is hardly distinguishable from Dr. Hickok's theory. The fitness or unfitness must have reference to such a being as a man counts himself to be, and under such and such circumstances. The standard proposed is within the man himself, and cannot rise above his own notions.

268. The Practical Supplement.

In this case, as with utilitarian theories, in practical morals the will of God is brought in to supplement the "spirit's worthiness," and the "fitness and unfitness," by declaring that which God accounts worthy and fit, and the supplement speaks with authority and supersedes that which is supplemented. They who will not have God as sovereign, are constrained to receive him as magistrate—but the divine magistracy swallows up the subjective sovereignty, and becomes supreme. No rival can stand when brought face to face with the divine will.

¹ "Manual of Moral Philosophy."

269. Right and Wrong “in the Nature of Things.”

Another theory, in essence like those already considered but in statement more elusive, demands attention. This is the theory of right and wrong grounded “in the nature of things.” This is strongly stated and defended by Professor Joseph Haven. It is said that right and wrong have their ground, not in the nature of man, nor in the will of God, nor yet in the nature of God ; that the will of God does not in itself constitute a reason for doing or forbearing to do anything ; that whatever God commands, he commands because it is right apart from his will ; that God himself is under a law of right eternally existent apart from his own nature ; that whatever is right, is right “in the nature of things” ; and whatever is wrong, is wrong “in the nature of things,” entirely apart from any consideration of the will, character, nature, or existence of man or of God. Professor Haven goes so far in repudiating the authority of God, as to say, “Granting that the will of God is as is affirmed, what has that to do with my conduct? wherein and how does that place me under obligation to do what the Deity wills ? ”

270. “Nature of Things” in the Obvious Sense.

Understanding this phrase, the nature of things, in its most obvious sense, as meaning the nature or permanent constitution of the parts or elements of the material universe, we must say that there is no nature of things apart from the will of the Creator. Nature is what it is because God made it so. Moral distinctions which find their expression in the nature of things, have their ultimate ground in God, the creator of nature.

271. His Language Unfortunate.

The language used by Professor Haven would suggest a survival, or revival, of Manchæan Dualism. He says :

Right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things. They are not the creations of expediency, nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine character. They have no origin. They are as eternal as the throne of deity ; they are as immutable as God himself.

The most obvious meaning of this language would imply the eternal, uncreated existence of things. And since these distinctions exist independent of God, and since God himself is accounted subject to this law inherent in the nature of things, this nature of things is made sovereign and supreme over God. Does this signify Dualism ? The author doubtless does not mean this. His language is unfortunate.

272. His Intended Meaning.

Professor Haven intended, doubtless, to deny the existence or possibility of any objective standard of right. By the nature of things he means the nature of actions. He intends to affirm that actions are right, not because they agree with any rule or standard, or on account of any relationship ; they are simply right or wrong in and of themselves, right or wrong without a reason. God recognizes actions as being what they are, and we must do the same ; and he stands related to this moral nature of actions just as do his creatures. The attempt to conceive clearly the sense of this language, to define sharply to the mind a moral quality apart from any rule or relationship, must of course be futile. This elusive property belongs to the nature of the theory.

273. Real Significance of the Theory.

The intention of those who talk of "right in the nature of things," seems to be to find a standard more immutable than God and his will ; they succeed in setting up a standard absolutely subjective to the mind of man. It amounts to this, whatever agrees with one's own instincts, sentiments, or sensibilities, must without a reason be accounted right, binding alike upon man and upon God. A standard more subjective and illusory is inconceivable.

274. Objections—the Standard Subjective.

The first objection to this theory of "right in the nature of things," is the fact that it is purely subjective. If this subjective standard be a man's own sentiments, right becomes merely a go-as-you-please in conduct. Or if the theory implies an intuitive and infallible discernment of the moral qualities of actions, then we must deny that such infallible intuition is found in human nature. The diverse moral judgments which prevail among men prove that conscience does not intuitively discern the moral qualities of actions.

275. Magistracy in Place of Sovereignty.

This theory of right reduces the Creator of the universe from a sovereign to a magistrate and from a magistrate to a subject. God is represented as subject to a law existing apart from himself and above himself, as fully subject as is man. In his government he administers and enforces a law not his own. He is made a magistrate without personal authority. By what right then does he assume to punish the disobedient ?

276. Obedience not Due then to God.

This theory transfers all moral authority from God to its imaginary subjective rule of right ; as Professor Haven boldly demands, "Granting that the will of Deity is as is affirmed, what has that to do with my conduct ? wherein and how does that place me under obligation to do what the Deity wills ?" This dethronement is logically performed by setting up a superior authority. God becomes merely a "*primus inter pares,*" first and chief in the brotherhood of subjects.

277. Destroys the Sense of Moral Obligation.

This theory leads legitimately to decay in the sense of moral obligation. Duty exists between persons. We cannot feel obligated toward things, or to consequences. Let it be once fully accepted that we do not owe obedience to God, but to an impersonal something, and the conviction of obligation will die an easy natural death by atrophy.

278. Defense of "Right in the Nature of Things."

It is said that if the nature and will of God be the ground and rule of right, "we have only to suppose the will of Deity to change, and what is now wrong becomes instantly right." "It follows also that had there been no divine law to establish the character of actions, all actions would have been alike indifferent." "If there is no standard of right but the law itself, there is no propriety or sense in speaking of God's law as just and good." "To say that his statutes are just and right, is to say that his statutes are his statutes." "If the law creates moral distinctions, how can the law itself possess

moral character?" "For the same reason, we are shut out, on this principle, from attributing to Deity himself any moral character. One thing is as right as another for him; everything is equally right, and strictly speaking nothing is, for him, either right or wrong." "If right and wrong depend ultimately upon the character of God, then we have only to suppose God to change, or to have been originally other than he is, and our duties and obligations change at once. Had he been precisely the reverse of what he is, he had still been, as now, the source of right, and his own character would have been as truly good and just, as it is now. This is virtually to rob him of all moral character." "It does not meet this objection to say that God is holy, holy by a necessity of his nature and can never be otherwise."

279. Arguments Founded on Misconceptions.

The entire group of objections given above seem to spring from misconceptions. The divine will is conceived as an arbitrary thing without relation to the nature of man or of the universe. Let it be understood that the will of God is nothing else than nature; that is, that the will of God is first of all expressed in the nature of the universe and the moral nature of man, and then was revealed as a precept, and let it be considered that the divine will cannot be conceived as self-contradictory, commanding by precept that which it forbids in nature, and at once all these objections are seen to be futile.

280. Objections Reducible to Two.

Passing over the fundamental misconception of the divine will as arbitrary, and possibly self-contradictory,

we find the multiform objections cited above, reducible in principle to two: (1) The difficulty of conceiving that the distinction of right and wrong should not exist, or should be other than it now is; (2) the supposed necessity of finding a standard by which to test the ultimate standard of right.

281. A Change of Right Inconceivable.

A change of right and wrong is inconceivable; but why? Because, forsooth, that one can conceive that God should change, but cannot conceive that "the nature of things" should be other than it now is? Surely not for that reason, for the latter conception is easier than the former. But the idea of right is one of the ultimate forms of human thought. We can no more rid ourselves of moral ideas, or change the form of those ideas, than we can put away or change our notions of time or space. Man can think only as man, nor can he conceive how he would think if he were not man. But this indestructibility of moral ideas proves nothing touching the standard of right; it only shows that the Creator has made the moral nature of man an incorruptible witness for him.

282. What, if God should Change!

The changes are rung upon this exclamatory question, What, if God should change! We must then found morals upon a more immutable basis than the nature of God; let us try the "nature of things." The nature of God, forsooth, might change, but the nature of things, or perhaps the nature of human thoughts, that is changeless.

But if the question be pressed for an answer, What if God should change? the reply lies close at hand. (1) The problem is incapable of solution, for a change in the Creator logically involves a change in the creation; hence, the Creator and all created beings and things being changed, our present thought and knowledge must needs be invalidated, and science, philosophy, or speculation finds no place to rest a foot. (2) If God change, the creation remaining unchanged, the Creator is brought into conflict with the creature, and infinite contradiction, confusion, and chaos must ensue. If the Creator come into conflict with the creature, the creature must perish. (3) An infinite fiend would, doubtless, create finite fiends, and thus the Creator would still be the matrix and norm of the creature. But the supposition of an infinite fiend at the head of a universe of fiends, turns all moral conceptions into chaos and renders virtue or vice equally absurd. And this would be equally true whatever the standard of right.

283. A Standard by which to Test the Standard.

The second class of objections, that there must needs be a standard of right other than God, and back of God, or higher than God, in order to give moral character to God and his law, is a short and swift *reductio ad absurdum*. There must then be an infinite series of standards, or else we must stop at a standard which, being the ultimate authority with nothing higher to which it must conform, is neither good nor evil, a moral standard without moral character. But those who talk of right inherent in the nature of things, and of actions right or wrong in and of themselves, do not escape the phantom

abyss which they have dug so deep. They say that to speak of God as being right, just, and holy in and of himself, is absurd. But of actions, Professor Haven says: "We mean to say that such and such acts of an intelligent, moral agent, whatever they may be, are in themselves, in their very nature, right or wrong." The theory laughs at itself. Who asks for a standard for the "imperial yard"? Is it something else than a yard, neither right nor wrong, because it is itself the standard and there is none beside?

284. The Genesis of the Theory.

How shall we explain the genesis of this theory that the ultimate rule of right is found in the nature of things? God has spoken, and the universe is full of echoes, and men mistake the echoes for original voices and proceed to measure the actions of men and of God himself by these reverberations.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THE REVELATION OF THE RULE OF RIGHT

285. One Law—Multiform Revelation.

The will of God has been shown to be the supreme rule of conduct, the ultimate rule of right. This has authority ; this is highest ; this immutable. When this has been recognized as the divine will, conscience responds with an instant sense of imperative obligation. But this one will is expressed in many ways. In the multiform expression of the one rule lies the only possible unity in the many proposed standards of right. Men have taken some torn leaf of the divine revelation ; they have listened to some one lone echo of God's voice ; they have attributed some scant authority to these fragments of revelation, apart from God himself. In the recognition of one supreme authority, one will, one rule of right revealed in many ways is found the unity of Moral Philosophy.

286. Revealed in Man's Own Nature.

The moral law is revealed, first of all, in man's own moral nature. This is the primary and most fundamental revelation. This comes closest home to consciousness. From this a man cannot escape. From this they never will be able to escape in all the future. This is the basis and point of departure for every other manifestation of the divine will in whatever way that manifestation be made.

287. The Testimony of Sacred Scripture.

That the nature of man is a revelation of the divine will the Scriptures expressly declare. God created man in his own likeness. In the divine nature we find the ultimate ground of moral distinctions. In the nature of man, created in the divine likeness, we must find, therefore, a secondary or derivative ground of the same moral principles.

288. Scope of this Revelation in Man's Nature.

The revelation of the rule of right, made through the nature of man, is broader than the moral faculty merely. Perfection includes the perfect normal condition and action of every faculty—of the moral faculties first and chiefly, and then of every other faculty in due measure and proportion. So far as we are able by consciousness, reflection, experience, or by any other source of knowledge, to form an ideal of our own being according to the Creator's idea, we read the revelation of the divine will made in our own being.

289. The Rule of Right Expressed in the Nature of Things.

In the second place, the rule of right is revealed through the material universe. The world of things is what the Creator pleased to make it. The world is a school and a workshop for the training of human faculties; it is an opportunity and an agency for forming and testing moral character; it is also an automatic agency for rewarding right doing and punishing evil, for declaring by means of the consequences of conduct the law of right. Molecular vibrations on earth and in the stars, keep rhythmic time with the thunders of Sinai and

the Sermon on the Mount. When the lover of pleasure finds his vice smitten with the loathsomeness of decay, he feels the pressure of the moral law written upon the nature of things. In the health, long life, and happiness promoted by temperance, faith, and charity, we have the Creator's will declared concerning such a life. But nature is not the law, but the page of stone upon which the finger of God has graven the law.

290. The Law of Right Indicated in History.

The will of God is revealed through the experiences of men. In the life of man we see the product of unseen spiritual agencies; of beliefs, aspiration, character; of spiritual impulses and forces coming whence man knows not. These combined influences and agencies work out the fortunes of men and of nations. Such courses of conduct, such modes of life, such beliefs, such elements of character as work out the decay of man and of human welfare, are marked thereby as evil.

291. Franklin's Testimony.

Before the convention which framed the Federal Constitution, Benjamin Franklin arose and said: "I have lived a long time, and the longer I live the more convincing proof I see that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been assured in the sacred writings that except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it. I firmly believe this." So much of truth have they who hold that tendency to promote happiness is the test of right and wrong. But it is not

history, but God manifest in history, that has the moral authority. And the moral teaching of history as read even by the most discerning is partial and fragmentary.

292. The Rule of Right Revealed in Sacred Scripture.

With this revelation of the rule of right the common thought of men is most familiar. "Holy men of old wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The Scriptures teach many things which the world by searching could never find out. They affirm distinctly and powerfully where other forms of revelation speak faintly. The Decalogue carries a weight of authority which does not belong to nature. Sinai is greater than all the mountains of the earth. This is the most complete of all the revelations of the moral law, but even this could not stand alone; it presupposes the existence of moral intuitions in man, and it would be utterly discredited were it not supported by nature and experience. It needs also to be supplemented by an expression of the divine will still more immediate.

293. Duty Revealed Directly by the Divine Spirit.

The rule of right as declared by methods and means already considered, needs to be supplemented by the direct teaching of the divine Spirit. This may seem to some to be leaving the domain of moral science and entering that of personal religion, and others may count it sheer mysticism; but it is neither. Religion is an element of moral conduct and cannot be counted as outside of moral philosophy; and the direct teaching of the Spirit of God is no more mysticism for the reader than it was for Moses, the lawgiver, or for Paul, the apostle.

294. Specialized Guidance Necessary.

Every revelation of the moral law previously set forth, expresses the rule of right in general principles only. Duty is enjoined in such general forms as are applicable to all men alike. Love to God and to man ; truth, justice, and purity ; these, and similar attitudes and activities of the spiritual being are commanded always and everywhere. Aside from general principles the moral law, as heretofore treated of, is occupied with prohibitions. But the lives of men are not made up of general principles, or of prohibitions, but of specific and individual activities. No two lives can be alike. By what special acts shall the general principles of righteousness be lived out? Shall Paul preach the gospel to his own people at Jerusalem, as he wished exceedingly to do, or shall he go to foreign cities? The specialized command said, "Depart, for I will send thee far hence to the Gentiles." Shall the young man live virtuously, casting his net into the sea of Galilee, or shall he leave his nets and become a fisher of men? Shall this young woman remain quietly under her father's roostree, or shall she go to Asiatic zenanas, to teach the women whom only a woman can reach? Consciences sensitive and strong, but without specialized guidance, are torn with anguish under the stress and strain of questions like these. Christian men, men in deepest harmony with God, believe that the Holy Spirit guides them with a teaching special to the needs of the individual life. They believe that in response to the prayer of faith, wisdom is given them beyond the mere discerning of truth by the human understanding. And not only this, but men who have previously "neither feared God nor regarded

man," feel themselves consciously called with a personal summons to repent and seek the Lord. Their souls stand trembling before the Judge of all the earth. The reality of these unseen transactions is evinced not only by Scripture, but by the radical, permanent, and beneficent character of the results.

295. The Spirit's Guidance Explicit.

The inward guidance of the divine Spirit is often very explicit and positive. To Abraham the word came, "Go from thy land, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, to the land that I will show thee." The Spirit led Paul to Troas, with his face to the sea, and then the word came, "Come over into Macedonia and help us." And every instance from sacred Scripture can be duplicated by a score of like experiences from modern Christian life. Upon the response made to such a special divine word has often turned the destiny of men ; from that hour the man has gone up or down, and if down, no opportunity of retrieving the fall has come. By this special guidance the outlines of general laws are filled in, according to the divine mind respecting individual lives. Phenomena like these in the life of man come easily within the purview of moral science.

296. Striking Illustrative Example.

A Christian woman was led, by inward call and by outward discipline, first to adopt the Quaker habit and then the public gospel ministry according to the faith of the society of Friends. In the course of her ministry she felt impressed to go to New York City, to bear "testimony" in certain concert halls, or "dens" of that me-

tropolis. She went, found a home with friends and told them her purpose. They tried to dissuade her ; they said that she must be mistaken in her sense of duty ; that it was unsuitable and unbecoming in a woman to do such a thing ; that it could not be done, and that she must not attempt it. Under such influences her purpose wavered ; she thought that perhaps she had been mistaken in the divine call. But one morning as she awoke the call came again with all the distinctness of an audible voice, "If thou art faithful to-day thou shalt save a soul from death." She arose and told her friends that she must execute her purpose. They saw that further remonstrance would be vain, and prepared to give her what help they could. They engaged a policeman to give the needed protection. Late in the evening they set out for the place of the intended visit. In the dark approach they halted, and the policeman went ahead to reconnoitre and see whether admission could be gained. He reported that admission could not be gotten and that the project must be abandoned. She insisted that admission must be possible ; that she must go and would go. The policeman went again to see whether admission were a possibility. She followed closely behind, and when he pushed the door a little ajar she instantly thrust herself in. The hall was full of men and women intent upon their orgies. In the momentary hush that followed her unexpected entrance she began to speak, and in her clear, sweet voice gave her testimony and her message. Then she kneeled and prayed. Rising from her knees she turned to a young woman who sat at the side of the hall having no part in the revelry, and said, "I have come for thee," and brought her out.

The history of that young woman thus rescued was this. She herself was a Christian and the daughter of a Christian deacon. That afternoon she had walked with her betrothed lover, and he, under pretense of having certain business which required immediate attention, had brought her there and left her to await his return. It appeared afterward that he did this to stain her fair name and make a reason for breaking his engagement. When she found herself alone, she soon discerned the character of the place, and she understood also that an attempt to escape at that time would be vain. She therefore sat in silence and gave herself to prayer for help. When at length she saw the Christian woman enter, she knew that her deliverance had come. Before her trouble and danger came, the messenger had been sent for rescue. Moral science must recognize facts like these.

297. Danger of Self-Deception.

The field to which the preceding paragraphs have introduced us is spread thick with dangers. It is a region of traps and pits. Here we find delusions, self-deceptions, distempered minds, and fanaticism. The sacred Scriptures, with intense and tender earnestness, warn men to be on their guard against these dangers. "Take heed lest ye be deceived." "Believe not every spirit." "For Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light."

298. The Test of Spiritual Impressions.

The test of every spiritual voice in the soul, is the permanent and standard rule of right. This, as we have seen, is found in the moral nature of man, in the nature

of things, and in the holy Scriptures. The transient and special must be tested by the permanent and universal. That which addresses the personal consciousness alone, must be tried by that revelation which is accredited by objective proofs seen in supernatural works and prophetic knowledge. The doctrine, the precept, and the moral tone must first of all agree with sacred Scripture.

299. The Test of Reason.

That which comes to the soul as a special monition must be tested by right reason. That which in the light of clear reason is self-contradictory or absurd, cannot be accepted as the voice of the Lord. The Creator respects that rational nature of man which he himself created. But, on the other side, the perfect reasonableness of the subjective guidance cannot always be apparent till vindicated by results. The touch of the divine Spirit will do no violence to reason, but it may go beyond reason. When the spiritual call has certified itself to consciousness as divine, being in harmony with the holy Scriptures and not contrary to rational thought, then the final results must be awaited to vindicate to others the validity of the subjective word.

300. The Touchstone of Peace.

The touch of the Holy Spirit upon an obedient soul brings deep calmness and peace. Simulated or spurious spiritual impressions bring a disturbed, agitated, distressed mind. The one is normal to the nature of man ; the other is abnormal. Demoniacs become maniacs ; the touch of the divine Spirit brings clear thought, self-mastery, and peace.

301. Safeguards.

Humility and love are safeguards against spiritual delusions and fanaticism. Humility is the atmosphere in which reason operates with transparent clearness. Pride is an air of fog and smoke in which truth appears distorted and falsehood can with difficulty be discerned from the truth. Love is the abnegation of the evil life of self. Fanaticism is proud and selfish and tends toward hatred. When love to God and to men are the ruling principles of a man's life, small foothold is found for delusive phantasms and fanaticism.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING THE GROUNDS OF OBLIGATION

302. Obligation Ultimate but Rational.

The idea of obligation is the primal and primary dictum of conscience. It arises spontaneously from the normal action of conscience. This idea is ultimate and incapable of analysis. It cannot be defined except by synonyms. Obligation is obligation ; duty is duty, and nothing else. Obligation is neither utility, nor happiness, nor yet a wise self-love. But the soul is able to account to itself for this conviction of obligation. Reason can give a rational ground for it. And the more clearly this rational ground of obligation is seen, the stronger and more intelligent becomes the action of conscience.

303. Ultimate Obligation Grounded in Creatorship.

Creatorship confers supreme proprietary right. The thing made belongs to him who made it. This principle is recognized among men as an element of absolute justice. The highest application of this principle is found in God's relation to beings made by him in his own likeness. In sacred Scripture this principle is presented in a pressing appeal to man's reason and conscience alike. "Hath not the potter power over the clay to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" "Render therefore to Cæsar

the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's." The "image and superscription" of the Creator are upon man.

304. Limitation of Proprietary Right.

The limit of the divine proprietary right is that which the Creator has set to himself in the nature of man. He must needs deal with men according to their nature, for to do otherwise would be to destroy them. The watchmaker must treat his watch, and the machinist his engine, according to its structure; and in like manner the Creator will deal with his creatures according to their moral constitution. In making man with reason, he limited law and obligation to that which is in harmony with reason. In creating man with free-will, he guaranteed to man a government which should not treat him as dead matter under the law of necessary causation, but a rule under which submission should be voluntary, enforced by moral agencies alone. And seeing that the Creator made man in his own likeness, this limitation signifies that he will exercise authority according to the principles of his own being. Authority and rule which accord with the divine nature, must needs accord with human nature also.

305. Obligation Grounded in Perfection of Being.

The perfection of man's being is found in voluntary submission to the divine will. This furnishes a rational ground for the conviction of obligation. In alienation from the Creator there is no perfection. This subordination of man to the Creator is the supreme environment of the human soul. Harmony with environment is volun-

tary; acceptance of this subordinate relationship is obedience. Men may do this and live in harmony with the divine ideal of their nature, or they may dash themselves against the eternal bars and wreck their glory and beauty. It is rational to accept our necessary environment, the only place which the attributes of our being render possible.

306. The Perfections of God a Ground of Obligation.

The conviction of obligation to God finds justification in the infinite perfections of his being. The holiness, the justice, and the love, which the Scriptures declare to be attributes of the Creator, and which the nature of man and of things so powerfully emphasizes, render him supremely worthy of man's devotion. Worthiness of the being who claims man's love, is a rational ground of obligation to render that love. The more intelligently the perfections of God are apprehended, the more powerfully conscience responds with the sense of obligation.

307. *De Jure* Rationally Grounded in *De Facto*.

The obligation to recognize God as supreme, is rationally vindicated by the fact that he alone is able to govern the world. He alone has the attributes which render supreme sovereignty possible. He has infinite knowledge and wisdom for ruling well, and infinite power for maintaining universal dominion. Jehovah, Jupiter, and Cæsar stand before the soul of man, claiming allegiance; Jehovah, the creator of all things, with wisdom to rule wisely and well, with power to maintain his authority over all, a ruler in fact over the universe, sitting on no precarious throne; Jupiter, a gigantic man, shar-

ing sovereignty with rival gods and waging uncertain warfare with those who dare his displeasure ; Cæsar, a man like other men, to whom fortune has given a crown and empire for a day. When the intellect apprehends the attributes of each, conscience responds with instant sense of obligation to God. It is reasonable to recognize as supreme the being who possesses the attributes of sovereignty, and does actually rule the universe.

308. Divine Love a Ground of Obligation.

A strong showing of the goodness and benevolence of the Creator may be made from nature. The sacred Scriptures declare the love of God, an attribute deeper and higher than the good-will of benevolence—an attribute of mercy and self-sacrifice. He gave himself ; he emptied himself, took the attitude of a subject, was made in the likeness of man, that he might suffer with and for man. Benefits conferred expressing perfect love, pure self-sacrifice, constitute a rational ground for the deepest obligation. To obligation grounded in love conscience is quick in its response. On grounds like these—on the ground of the divine creatorship ; on the ground of the infinite worth and worthiness of the sovereign ; on the ground of his actual sovereignty over the universe ; and on the ground of his measureless love and self-sacrifice, the soul gives account to itself and vindicates at the bar of reason, its intuition of supreme obligation to the High and Holy One.

309. Grounds of Inferior Obligation.

The primary dictum of conscience is the obligation to obey the Supreme Being. That being whom the

mind apprehends as greatest and highest, is lord of the conscience and gives it law. But there are subordinate bonds of obligation, obligations and duties not wholly apart from God, but having indirect reference to him. Reason asks a ground for this inferior or secondary obligation.

310. Ramifications of Obligation.

Obligations existing between men are often nothing other than ramifications of the one supreme obligation. The same law which says, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," says also, "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." One cannot obey God without doing right to his fellow-men. One and the same obligation embraces both classes of duties. Obligation to God is the essence of all obligation.

311. Grades of Being.

In the second place, the grounds of obligation which we find in God, we find in an inferior and secondary way, in man made in the likeness of the Creator. In fatherhood and motherhood there is a reflection of the divine creatorship, on account of which it is reasonable to say, "Honor thy father and thy mother," "Children, obey your parents." There is excellence in human character, which constitutes a good ground for honor due. There are grades, ranks, and authorities among men, and these differences are realities of being which must needs be recognized. The self-sacrificing love of a mother, justifies to reason the obligation of the child to render love and tender care in return.

Obligation has, then, a solid rational basis in the realities of personal being, the supreme obligation being grounded in the being of God and in our relations to him; the secondary obligations, in the realities of man's being and life. And the secondary obligations are contained in the primary—potentially, impliedly, and often expressly.

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE REQUISITES FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

312. Some Conditions Requisite.

The primary dictum of conscience is the duty of obedience to the Supreme Being. When this sense of obligation has been outraged, conscience confesses that guilt has been incurred, and stands trembling in the presence of impending penalty. This signifies a sense of moral responsibility. Children feel this toward their parents ; pupils feel it toward their instructors ; subjects toward their sovereigns ; all men toward those whom they recognize as standing in places of legitimate authority ; pagans toward their gods in proportion to the supremacy imputed to each ; and when the one true God is apprehended, the conviction of responsibility to him is unmixed and dominant. But that this moral responsibility may exist, certain conditions are prerequisite. Men lay commands upon a horse or a dog, and expect obedience, but they do not impute to these a responsibility which can be called moral. They inflict pain upon them to secure obedience, and that infliction of pain implies a certain power of choice ; but real responsibility, with the consequent righteousness or guilt, is not imputed. What attributes or conditions are necessary to render a creature responsible with a responsibility which is truly moral ? In respect to general principles the answer to this question is easy, but the application of those principles to special cases which lie

along the border line of accountability, within or outside, is difficult to the last degree.

313. Intelligence Requisite for Responsibility.

First of all, intelligence to apprehend the rule of right, the lawgiver and his law, is requisite to render any creature morally accountable. Where there is no law there can be neither obedience nor transgression ; and where there is no intelligence to know the law, it is the same as if the law did not exist. If a sense of obligation could exist apart from the recognition of a rule of right, it could be no more than an uneasy, ill-defined yearning ; a law of conduct would be necessary to give it direction and potency.

314. Limitations of Intelligence.

The ordinary limitations of intelligence by which responsibility is reduced or extinguished, are of three kinds. In proportion as intelligence is abridged in either of these ways, responsibility is approximately destroyed.

315. Limitation by Infancy.

It is scarcely needful to say that the intelligence requisite for apprehending the rule of right may be limited by infancy. Out of the condition of infancy with its limitations, the mind emerges by insensible gradations. There is a period during which moral responsibility is manifestly impossible. Slowly some knowledge of the rule of right comes to the understanding, and evokes the idea of obligation, and makes its appeal to the will. At length responsibility becomes full and cannot be

evaded. The theological problem which meets one at this point does not belong to moral science, and is incapable of solution anywhere. So long as by reason of infancy the mind can understand neither the law of duty nor the consequences of actions, accountability cannot exist.

316. Responsibility Limited by Idiocy.

In the second place, intelligence and the consequent responsibility may be limited by partial or complete idiocy. Unlike infancy this is a permanent limitation and incapacity. In this case also the extinguishment of responsibility is approximate or complete according to the degree of idiocy.

317. Limited by Necessary Ignorance.

Responsibility is limited by unavoidable and irremediable ignorance. Infancy, idiocy, or ignorance do not altogether bar the natural consequences of conduct; but ignorance of the law's requirements, ignorance which cannot be helped, ignorance necessary in the beginning and irremediable to the end, must needs be a bar to moral accountability. But willful ignorance, which undertakes to evade moral responsibility by not knowing, ignorance which signifies indifference to obligation, is not a limitation to duty or responsibility. It is a part of duty to use every due and sincere effort to learn what duty is.

318. Conscience Requisite for Responsibility.

The second great requisite for moral responsibility is endowment with a moral faculty, or conscience. With-

out conscience there could be no discernment of the element of moral rightness in conduct, and no sense of moral obligation. If a dog could have intelligence to understand his master's bidding, yet so long as the intuition of obligation and right should be lacking, there could be no moral responsibility. Without conscience the necessity of obedience might be felt, but necessity is not identical with duty. Without conscience one may understand the evil consequences of vicious conduct ; but regard for consequences is not regard for right. True responsibility presupposes the power of discerning the moral qualities of conduct and of feeling the bond of moral obligation.

319. Disregard of Conscience not a Lack of Conscience.

In this connection we do well to bear in mind that disregard of right and duty does not indicate the lack of conscience, or even a special weakness of the moral faculty. Dissolute men have shown by their praises of virtue, that they understand the right and are able to appreciate its excellence. Compare Goldsmith's description of the village pastor with the life which he himself lived. Unjust men show a quick appreciation of justice when wrong-doing touches themselves. There may be, moreover, a stupor of conscience, which not only does not abridge moral responsibility, but which is itself a crime for which a man is deeply guilty. Deadness of the moral faculty comes from conscious wrong-doing. Conscience is flouted, insulted, trampled upon, until she retires into silence—silent until judgment looms into view. The silence of conscience on account of previous abuse works no limitation of responsibility.

320. Power of Choice Requisite for Responsibility.

Power of choice, that is, freedom of will, is a third necessary condition of moral accountability. The power of choice means here the ability to obey the law of right, or to disobey. If a creature has no natural power of choice in moral concerns, he is subject to the law of necessary causation ; he cannot be brought under moral government ; like a tree he develops of necessity according to the natural forces of his being ; like a river flowing in its bed, he goes his way and lives his life with apparent spontaneity, but that spontaneity is only apparent—there is no choice. A being that cannot choose, cannot be addressed by motives ; a being that cannot choose from considerations of right and wrong, is not morally accountable.

321. A Guilty Loss of Freedom.

In respect to power of choice, as with intelligence and conscience, there may be a lack which does not limit responsibility, but for which lack itself a man is guilty. It is a law of the will that repetition of choices becomes a habit of choice ; habit grows into fixedness, and when habit and fixedness are on the side of evil, freedom becomes spontaneity, with no power of reversal. This is moral bondage ; the man has sold himself to work evil. This fixedness of moral choice, though it is a bondage, does not destroy responsibility. It is a great crime to come into such a condition. It is the indelible record of a habit of intended disobedience to the law of right ; it is the choice of evil, made and repeated, affirmed and re-affirmed as the irrevocable purpose of the spiritual being. He has made his choice and is

responsible for the issue, and the effect of his choice upon his own moral nature is one of the inevitable consequences.

322. Sanity Requisite for Responsibility.

A fourth requisite for moral responsibility is that condition of health or sanity in which the normal action of the faculties of intelligence, conscience, and will is possible. If by reason of insanity reason ceases to be reason, and knowledge becomes mere distorted, dislocated, and grotesque notions representing no reality ; if conscience is lost ; if will becomes a wild impulse without self-consciousness, responsibility cannot survive. But in this there appears again the provision that the inability be not the result, perhaps the intended result, of previous wrong-doing. The insanity of intoxication is sometimes induced for the very purpose of committing crime without relenting. The crime is planned "with malice aforethought," and then insanity is induced in order that conscience, kindness, and all thought of consequences may lie dead until the deed of evil is done. Or if this intoxication is induced with no purpose of crime, there must yet remain a certain residuum of responsibility for crime committed while in this condition. A man knowingly puts out the eye of intelligence, and puts off self-control, and lets loose the evil beast that is in him ; he does this knowing what consequences may follow. It is a crime to induce this condition and there must be some responsibility for the consequences. These principles are generally recognized in Christian jurisprudence, and from these principles men judge men in common things.

323. Degrees of Responsibility.

The lack or the loss of intelligence may exist in all possible degrees, and there is a proportionate diminution of moral accountability. But where intelligence is found, it may be doubted whether conscience and will are ever so lacking as to render a man irresponsible. This would seem equivalent to becoming a brute, not as a figure of speech, but in reality.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING RIGHTEOUSNESS

324. The Term Righteousness.

Righteousness is rightness, that is, conformity to the standard of right, conformity to the moral law. The use of this term in theology and in religious literature does not unfit it for the uses of moral science. On the other hand, by its exactness of definition, theology has prepared the word for scientific uses anywhere. There is no other word which can well take its place. Morality and virtue are both too general and too inexact in their common import. Morality is used to mean outward conformity to the moral law, uprightness of conduct, and this outward conformity is not understood to signify completeness and exactness of conformity. To call a man moral is sometimes only a step removed from positive reproach. Virtue is used in like manner to signify general moral excellence, but with a predominant reference to a right purpose or intention—a general condition of right feeling. But in the word righteousness we have a term already wonted to exactness of meaning and use. Complete conformity to the moral law is righteousness always and everywhere; anything less than this is not righteousness anywhere.

325. Objective and Subjective Righteousness.

Conformity to the moral law may exist with respect to action and conduct, or with respect to desire, choice,

love, and purpose. The first is actual objective conformity to the rule of right, considered, where this is possible, apart from the quality of intention ; the second is the sincere intention of conformity considered apart from the actual, objective conformity in fact and deed. Conduct may show an outward, formal harmony with the moral law, while there is no inward harmony of intention ; and, on the other side, there may be complete nonconformity in fact, while perfect conformity was intended. The actual conformity we may call objective righteousness ; the intention of conformity, the supreme love of the right, we may call subjective righteousness. The former is partly expressed by the term morality ; the latter is poorly expressed by the term virtue. The former is a rightness, or righteousness, of deed and life ; the latter is a righteousness of the doer. This distinction must be kept well in mind if we would judge men with justice.

326. Neutral Conduct.

A large part of human conduct, considered by itself, must be counted morally neutral, strictly speaking, neither right nor wrong. Many things are neither commanded nor forbidden ; to do them is not wrong, not to do them is equally blameless. A wicked man performs these actions, but they constitute no part of his wickedness ; a good man does the same, but they form no part of his righteousness. Men breathe and sleep, they hunger and thirst, the bodily functions go on, but we impute to these activities no moral quality. The moral law does not directly require a man to raise wheat rather than corn, or cotton instead of sugar. These concerns

which do not come directly within the scope and purview of the moral law constitute no small part of a man's life.

327. Neutral Conduct Indirectly Right or Wrong.

Conduct which the moral law neither requires nor forbids, must be counted, in and of itself, as morally neutral, but this is only half the truth in the case. This conduct, neutral in itself, may come into such relationship to a supreme motive as to become itself positively right or wrong. To speak the truth, to deal justly, to love and serve the Lord, are duties always and everywhere. To till the ground is not always a man's duty. But if a man sees that by cultivating the ground he can better fulfill all his obligations to God and man than by sailing the sea, then it becomes his duty to do the former rather than the latter. That which ought to be done, ought to be done in the best possible way. This principle has numberless applications. When once a man has elected his supreme motive, no small part of his life consists of ways and means by which to accomplish that radical and supreme purpose. These ways and means may have in themselves no moral quality ; but from their relationship to the supreme motive, they derive moral character. To cut a die for coining lawful money is right ; to cut a second die like the first for coining counterfeit money is wrong. Agriculture is both right and necessary ; but if a man spend his life in raising corn for the distiller of whisky, it were better for that man, and for the world, that he had never been born. A good conscience will take account of this secondary and derivative right and rightness.

328. Neutral Conduct Counted Right.

In popular speech all neutral conduct, considered apart from some unlawful purpose, is spoken of as right. It is right in the sense that it is not wrong ; that is, it is not forbidden by the moral law. It is more exact to count such conduct neutral since the doing or the not doing is equally right.

329. Subjective Righteousness.

Subjective righteousness is the inward moral rightness of the actor. The radical and essential element in subjective righteousness is the intention, the absolutely sincere intention, of doing right. If the actor intend perfect conformity to the moral standard, whatever else is lacking, he is not counted personally blameworthy. On the other hand, in the lack of intention to do right, or in the positive intention to do evil, the actor is blameworthy and guilty, whether or not he succeed in accomplishing the purposed evil. This signifies that virtue lies primarily in the right action of the will. If the will acts in harmony with intelligence and conscience, there is subjective righteousness.

330. Illustrations.

Illustrations of the above principle might be multiplied without limit. A troop of skirmishers disguised as the enemy, falls in with another company of their own men. Their friends take them for what they seem to be, and for what they intended to seem to be, and give them a quick and deadly volley. Here is matter for unmeasured regret ; there is good reason for saying that some one blundered in the arrangements, but there

was no lack of right intention on the part of those who slaughtered their own friends. A mother receives from the druggist medicine for her child. The druggist had sent poison. Without suspicion, and with no reason for suspicion, the mother administers the supposed medicine and the child dies. The mother is wild with grief, but there is no proper place for self-reproach. A robber lays his plans to waylay a traveler and murder him for his money. He lies in wait, but the traveler goes on his way by another route, or the robber's pistol misses fire; the traveler comes safe to his journey's end, but the other man is none the less a murderer. He intended murder, and his plan was unexecuted from no relenting of purpose. It is well that his intention failed, but he is none the less guilty. The conclusion is obvious; subjective righteousness lies in the right action of the will.

331. Effort to Know the Right.

It cannot be denied that virtue is found in rightness of intention. But right intention cannot exist apart from due effort to know what is right. If there is a supreme desire to conform perfectly to the rule of right, there will be, there must needs be, a like desire to know what is the rule of right. Subjective righteousness is justly impeached by any lack of effort to attain objective righteousness.

332. Righteousness and the Sensibilities.

Excited sensibility may precede the action of the will, or may follow it as a consequence or product of that action. As an antecedent condition under which the will comes to its choice, excited sensibilities are sometimes

spoken of as motives. This aspect of sensibility has been already sufficiently discussed. But sensibility as affected by choice, as the product of choice, and hence as an element of personal moral character, remains for consideration. It is manifest that the condition of the sensibilities is an important element of moral character. In the mind of one man the thought of moral law and of strictness of duty awakens a feeling of repulsion ; there is an instinctive rebellion against the idea of moral obligation. In the mind of another, nothing else is so lovely as the rule of right ; the sense of obligation is joy. Not only does conscience approve the right and the will choose the same, but the sensibilities rejoice in it. The appetencies of the soul hunger and thirst for holy gratifications. To some the thought of dissipation and vice is an exciting pleasure ; to another the same thought brings a quick thrust of pain and awakens disgust. There are souls so corrupted that every moving of the sensibilities seems like the stirring of a cess-pool, whose breath is stench and poison. And there are also souls so pure that the sight of vileness stirs no impure thought or feeling, as the sunshine falls upon all uncleanness and is tainted by none.

333. Sensibility an Element of Moral Character.

That condition of the spiritual being out of which pleasure in vice, or joy in right doing, spontaneously arises, must surely be counted an element of moral character. He is a better man to whom the thought of dishonesty, of dissipation, of uncleanness brings instant pain and aversion, than he who finds in such thoughts a seductive pleasure. And in the presence of those who

struggle against depraved sensibility and deny it gratification, who condemn themselves for that condition which renders such sensibility possible, we must say that he is a better man who is a stranger to this struggle, whose moral enemies are outside, foreign foes, and not within.

334. Sensibility as a Product of Choice.

That sensibility is an element of moral character is manifest by the fact that depraved sensibility is largely the product and necessary consequence of previous moral choice. It is a natural and necessary consequence arising from the constitution of the human soul. One wrong choice not only begins a series of wrong choices, but also it engenders, as a natural consequence, a depraved condition of the soul out of which evil emotions must needs arise. This consequence of the action of the will is not under the control of the will. Having chosen good or evil, a man cannot prevent the effect of that choice upon himself, nor can he by a reverse choice restore his emotional nature to its former condition. He may fight against perverted sensibilities ; he may refuse them satisfaction, but the corruption of sensibility he cannot cure by a mere act of the will.

335. Inherited Debasement of Sensibility.

Corrupted sensibility has become a permanent characteristic of the human race. It is transmitted to children and to children's children through the generations. For this degradation of the sensibilities, so far as it is purely an inheritance, we cannot impute personal responsibility. But perverted sensibility may be indulged and reinforced, or it may be weakened by self-denial , and

for this every man is personally responsible. If we indulge vicious emotions and thus strengthen them, we accept the evil heritage and make it truly and wholly our own.

336. The Cure of Evil Sensibility.

It is not outside of moral philosophy to note that the cure of debased sensibility is found in the Christian religion. That which the personal will cannot do, the gracious work of the Holy Spirit in the soul can accomplish. To restore the emotional nature to its normal state, so that righteousness only shall give pleasure and evil shall awaken aversion, is a part of that radical spiritual renovation which in Holy Scripture is called the new birth and sanctification.

337. Sensibility and Desire.

In clarifying our thought upon this question of sensibility as an element of moral character, we must carefully distinguish between desire and mere emotion without desire. Desire signifies the choice of some object of possible attainment or possession in the future. Pleasant sensibility alone does not constitute desire. The will may resolutely put aside and reject the very thing the thought of which thrills the soul with delight. Under the bond of a supreme obligation many a maid has refused to wed the man she loved, though by that refusal pleasure perished from her life.

338. Evil Sensibility Itself an Object of Choice.

We ought also to note in this connection that the pleasure of excited debased sensibility may itself be-

come an object of choice, entirely apart from objective wrong-doing. There is, it may be, no purpose of overt evil doing. Shame hinders. The risk of troublesome consequences seems too great. The deed seems perhaps more evil than holding the pleasant picture in the mind. But the thought of evil is invited and cherished for the sake of the pleasant excitement. The fact to which attention is here called is that the moving of depraved sensibility is itself made the object of choice. This inward corruption of life is surely an element of moral character.

339. Some Conclusions.

From the preceding considerations we must conclude that moral character belongs, first and radically, to the generic choices by which the soul takes its permanent attitude toward the Creator and his law; secondly and in a lower degree, to the special volitions by which the generic choice is carried into effect; thirdly, to the sensibilities which arise responsive to acts of choice, and by which the action of the will records itself upon a man's own moral nature.

340. Responsibility for Character.

On the ground that character is generic choice and the reflex consequences of choice, we must hold that men are responsible not only for conduct, but also for character. And since the normal and constitutional relation of sensibility to will is not one of mastery, it follows that debasement of sensibility, whether inherited or originated by one's own personal act, does not destroy responsibility. And still further, by reason of that

special provision of grace made by the Creator for the renovation of man's moral nature, every man becomes responsible for his own moral recovery. The spiritual forces and appliances await his acceptance, and to refuse them is to choose continuance in his debased moral condition.

341. No Moral Neutrality.

The law of right is not satisfied with moral indifference, inertness, or neutrality; it demands the choice of obedience with all the energies of one's being. "With all thy heart," "with all thy mind, might, and strength," is the required measure of right choice and intention. Moral neutrality is indeed from the nature of the case impossible. Between the intention of obedience and the absence of that intention there can be no middle ground. But there may be a comparative moral inertness, a feebleness of choice which falls far short of the law's requirement. "I did not think" does not excuse wrong-doing; strenuous intention will secure the needful thought and attention. "I do not care" signifies the choice of disobedience.

342. Evil Thoughts.

The sight and the knowledge of evil do not of necessity imply evil thoughts. Jesus Christ lived in the midst of wickedness; it met his eyes and saluted his ears everywhere, but no word spoken by him indicates a tainted thought or a sullied feeling. There is danger, however, that the knowledge of evil will become to us an allurement to evil; that the frequent thought of evil will become thought that is evil. The question of ques-

tions in the moral education of the young, is the method of introducing them safely to the knowledge of evil; to meet the evil of the world, to feel the thrill of temptation, and not be contaminated by it, but overcome it.

343. Safety from Evil Thoughts.

To know the world at all in truth is to know it as evil, and to know its evil. To prevent this touch of evil from gendering evil thoughts, there must be the utmost vigor of moral choice. There must be no double-mindedness. Wherever and whenever the slightest hesitation of strenuous moral choice appears, evil finds a joint in the armor and thrusts in its spear. But evil thoughts sometimes pursue men in whom there is no feebleness of virtue. They are a heritage from a previous life of lower moral grade; they dog them; they haunt them as if supernaturally injected into the mind. They cannot be driven away by direct efforts of the will. Whatever fixes attention upon them tends to hold them in mind rather than to expel them. Great moral victories come of supernatural grace.

344. The Psychological Remedy.

As already indicated above, evil thoughts cannot be expelled by any process which fixes continual attention upon them. There are psychological means, however, which are useful in driving away these birds of night. Let the mind be intently occupied with that which is good. In proportion as the mind is filled with themes which are high and uplifting, other thoughts will fall away for lack of place and opportunity. If sporadic evil thoughts start into consciousness, attention must not

be directed to them. Neglect them; ignore them; treat them as of no consequence; direct the mind all the more earnestly to worthier work. By this process evil tends to fall out of thought, and out of our lives, as dead leaves fall from the trees; it ceases to be an attribute of one's self, drifts away into the past, and is forgotten.

345. Limitations of Moral Responsibility.

Limitations of moral responsibility have been considered in part in treating of the requisites for responsibility. But in giving a résumé of these limitations something more needs to be said.

346. Responsibility Limited by Physical Inability.

Taking no account of physical inability or infirmity caused by previous wrong-doing, we must say that moral responsibility cannot extend beyond physical ability. The rule of right does not require of a man that which his physical limitations render impossible. Among the poor and the vicious in our great cities, Christian women go about intent on ministries of charity. But the work is too great for the workers; if they were multiplied ten-fold, they could not make the charity and grace equal to the suffering and sin. They wear themselves out in labors beyond their strength, and then can scarce quiet their consciences, and cannot at all satisfy their pity. Physical inability limits their duty.

347. Inability Itself a Sin.

Inability, which is itself the product of wrong-doing, cannot be counted a limitation of responsibility. On

the other hand, it is plainly a crime to render one's self unable to fulfill his obligations. A drunkard is not relieved by his drunkenness from any obligation which would rest upon him as a sober man. If a man wastes his means in riot and revelry, he is not cleared by this from the duty of paying his debts. If this be not so, then by flagrant disobedience to the moral law a man may free himself from obligation to keep the law; wrong-doing and duty become then inversely proportional; as wickedness increases obligation diminishes. And the limit on the one side is moral wreck and ruin of being, and on the other the annihilation of obligation. But ability may perish while duty survives.

348. Responsibility Limited by Mental Inability.

The mind of man is limited in its possibilities as absolutely as is the body. There are impossibilities of knowledge and thought, and that which is possible for one may not be possible for another. The future is hidden from man, and we do innocently that which foreknowledge would render a crime. The possession of "five talents" brings the duty of using five talents well. Natural gifts define and limit obligation.

349. Unused Abilities.

Limit of mental ability is a limitation of duty. But unused and undeveloped ability does not signify limitation of ability. Faculties are given for use and growth. Till the limit of development is reached, use and growth of faculty are a duty. Shrinking from untried work, from difficulties and from possible failure, is not a limitation of faculty. We are under obligation to do not

only what we now can do, but also that which we can make ourselves able to do. Moses said, "I am not eloquent," but when pressed into leadership no lack of ability was found. The real limit of personal power cannot be known till ability has been used to the utmost.

350. Responsibility Limited by Ignorance of the Law.

The general principle is this—in proportion as knowledge of the rule of right becomes impossible, so that knowledge is not a duty, in that proportion responsibility for failure to obey is limited. A general sends his adjutant with an order for a regimental commander. The adjutant falls by the way and the order is never delivered. The colonel does not obey the order. He could not obey because he did not know; he could not know, and ignorance was not a fault. The justice of this principle is easily recognized by all. And the holy Scriptures recognize the same principle in the Divine administration: "To him that knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin."

351. To be Remembered.

We ought to remember, as a weighty admonition to ourselves, that unless there is first a supreme love of the right, and the unmixed intention to obey the rule of right, there can be no relief from the full measure of obligation and responsibility, by any limitation whatsoever.

CHAPTER XII

CONCERNING MORAL DEPRAVITY

352. Depravity a Fact.

Moral depravity in man is a fact. We may call it by what name we will—a deterioration of man's moral nature, a tendency toward evil, a habit propagated and inherited—but whatever the name, the fact of an inclination, a tendency, a drift in human nature and in the race toward evil, lies upon the face of all life and all history. It is easier to do wrong than to do right. This means more than that right is one and wrong many. The presence and touch of evil is recognized by a sympathetic stir in the soul as if evil were something congenial. The sacred Scriptures declare the fact and explain the historic genesis of this evil drift. Under the impulse of temptation the first man disobeyed the divine commandment and lost his righteousness. One consequence of this transgression was that moral deterioration which we call depravity. In the transmission of life this depravity is transmitted—for in the transmission of life there must needs be a transmission of its qualities—and now the supreme word declares “the mind of the flesh” to “be enmity against God.” This record of Scripture no historic or psychologic criticism can controvert.

353. Moral Science must Recognize Depravity.

Moral philosophy must take account of depravity. Unless it does this, it deals with mere conceptions, not

with actualities, with ideal men who have no existence anywhere. If a man is under obligation to God, it is a depraved being that is under obligation ; if the moral law speaks to man, it speaks to a fallen race ; and whatever relations subsist between man and man, those relations subsist between beings in whose nature evil has already wrought deep damage. It belongs to moral science to investigate the psychological nature of this depravity, and estimate its bearing and effect upon obligation and responsibility. Nor is it averse from the work of this science to examine the rationale of the methods proposed for the recovery of man from the ruin of wrong-doing.

354. Effects of the “Fall.”

Speaking with broad generality, we may say that man's primal transgression brought, directly or indirectly, deterioration or damage to every human faculty ; to bodily faculties as well as mental ; to intellectual faculties as well as moral. But this is not sufficiently specific and exact. We must examine more in detail that moral deterioration which now affects the human race.

355. Effects of the Fall upon the Body.

The consequences of the fall were either direct or indirect. Among the indirect consequences are infirmities, disease, decay, and death of the body. We must say indirect, because the most flagrant violations of the moral law do not act like corrosive poisons, nor do they implant germs of disease to breed functional derangements. Falsehood and blasphemy pertain to the spiritual nature. But all will acknowledge that the wicked-

ness of the world is the great promoter of disease and untimely death. The sacred Scriptures indicate more than this, that from the primal sin death took its rise. We ought to note here how deep a damage is wrought upon the physical nature by vicious excitements and indulgences. Pure and noble emotions are the friends of all the physical functions, but base sensibilities disorder the body. Lack of faith in God, leaving men the prey of gloom and despondency, has brought many a man to an untimely end. The Fall has also introduced vices which destroy health and life. Gluttony, drunkenness, licentiousness, and excesses of every kind, work damage to man's physical nature. Idiocy and insanity show the extremest damage to the nervous system. No organ of the body escapes the touch of evil. But this physical degeneracy is not to be counted depravity.

356. Depravity and the Intellect.

There is a connection between moral character and the body, but there is a closer connection between moral character and thought. If the moral "eye be single," there is clear light in the understanding; if the moral "eye be evil," the judgment is disturbed in its action and becomes untrustworthy. By reason of depravity the intellect is clouded and becomes an easy prey to false beliefs and delusions; the mind busies itself with trifles, follies, and base things. Under the influence of wicked purposes, even the counsel of Ahithophel becomes foolishness. Selfishness does not reason so clearly and safely as does love. But this damage to the intellect is not that deterioration which is signified by the term depravity.

357. Depravity in the Sensibilities.

The Fall affected man in his emotional nature very deeply, and this is true depravity. In the normal and perfect condition of man's moral nature, that which is right gives pleasure; that which is wrong is offensive. But wrong-doing has reversed this condition of the sensibilities. Evil once tasted has become very pleasant, and the rule of right has become offensive. Men enjoy evil doing. A "good time" commonly signifies a relaxation of moral tension and self-restraint. There is now no righteousness without self-denial. The world is full of taking pleasure in evil—too full to call for illustration. The common notion is that a life of strenuous conformity to the rule of right must be a painful and joyless life.

358. Resisting Depraved Sensibilities.

Debasement of the sensibilities renders great vigor of choice necessary for continuance in right doing. The more eager the hunger for evil enjoyments, the more vigorous must be the action of the will in opposition. In this sense virtue maintained in the face of special depravity, is virtue of special merit; it must be vigorous in order that it may exist at all. But a holy soul is right not only in respect to choice, but also in respect to sensibility. But that depraved sensibility can be resisted, is proved by the fact that good men do resist it.

359. Depravity in the Conscience.

Since depravity is a moral deterioration, it must needs show itself primarily and especially in the moral faculty. It shows itself strongly in the conscience. As an intui-

tive faculty conscience discerns the element of right in conduct ; depravity is a blunting of the sharpness and fineness of that discernment. Conscience discerns and affirms moral obligation ; depravity weakens the sense of that moral bond. The hot indignation which burns in a good conscience at sight of wrong and injustice, is cooled and quenched. The accusing voice of conscience is hushed, and the apprehension of impending wrath upon a guilty soul is soothed to sleep. Depravity enfeebles conscience in all its action.

360. Depravity in the Will.

The will is the spring of moral action. From this fountain transgression and evil took their rise. Depravity must, therefore, have touched human nature primarily in the element of will. And at this point that touch has been most disastrous. Since the will, in respect to its own choices, is a first cause and the mode of its action a mystery, it is not easy to put into language an account of depravity in the will, without introducing an external determining element contradictory to the very nature of the will. The first transgression was a generic and radical choice ; in that choice the soul took its attitude toward the moral law ; that choice was the root of a limitless series of choices, and gave to all the series a bias toward evil. Without rendering the will less a faculty of choice, a habit of choice was begun. As the first transgression brought guilt upon the soul which no subsequent act of obedience could cancel, so the first evil choice engendered a tendency to evil choices, and out of will begot self-will, which no right choice could rectify. A generic moral choice, when once the choice

has been made, can never come again before the mind in the same form ; when the question reappears, it has respect to the ratification of a choice already made, and the momentum of the previous decision makes its repetition easy. It is of the nature of will that a chosen moral attitude tends to permanence, and a repetition of choice becomes fixedness of choice. From the nature of the case, a chosen attitude toward the moral law, is not a choice for a moment or for a day, but forever. Depravity weakens the will in the choice of the right, and generates a corresponding readiness in the choice of evil.

361. Depravity Known by Consciousness.

Any attempt to investigate the nature of the change wrought in the essence of a spiritual being by the coming in of depravity, must needs be utterly vain. To conceive depravity after the analogy of physical or chemical change is foolish and futile. It is childishness and fatuity in philosophy to think of depravity as a disease of the spirit, a disturbance of function by the coming in of a foreign something, a molecular derangement of spiritual substance. We know depravity by consciousness of it in ourselves and by its manifestation in the life of men. What it is previous to consciousness is inconceivable, as unknowable as the essence of spirit apart from its attributes. As to the origin of depravity, we can only say, going at once to the heart of religious thought, the normal life of the spirit is a life in most intimate union with the Creator, the source of its life ; transgression severed that union ; and the life of the spirit in its separation from the Creator, becomes of necessity a self-

life—a life which finds its spring and its end in self, an abnormal life. By the very fact of its being a self-life, it becomes a depraved life.

362. Depravity Hereditary.

Life is propagated, and in the propagation of life the attributes of the propagated life are also propagated. Life is a mystery, undefinable, perhaps inconceivable, except as the consciousness of a self-conscious being. But whatever it is, if life is propagated, it must needs be propagated with its own rather than with other attributes. That this is a fact is manifest from all history. Depravity in the sensibilities, in the conscience, and in the will, is universal ; it is found *semper, ubique, et in omnibus*. It may be modified in its form and power, but everywhere its presence is manifest. As certain families show in successive generations special and characteristic mental traits, so do families show a hereditary bias toward characteristic forms of vice and wickedness.

363. Depravity and Responsibility.

To measure the exact moral merit or demerit of men does not belong to man, and the attempt to do this does not belong to moral philosophy. To do this, one must be able to read the heart and to balance power and opportunity against limitations, far beyond the knowing of the intent and motive. He alone who made man, and knows his nature, and knows the ruin wrought by the Fall, and also understands what touch of supernatural impulse and help comes to each individual, can measure responsibility and merit. But moral philosophy must consider the relation of depravity to responsibility.

And this must be based upon a correct psychology of the will in its relation to other faculties of the soul.

364. The Duty of Holding Depravity in Check.

It will hardly be questioned anywhere that every man ought to hold the evil tendency of his nature under strict control. The denial of this would mean that a man may rightly, or must freely, indulge his evil propensities. But the duty of holding depravity under control, implies that depravity is not a force which must needs dominate the will. The will, as will, is free. If the thought of vicious self-indulgence kindle a glow of pleasant sensibility, that brings no necessity of yielding to vice. The practical denial of this duty would turn men into beasts.

365. Depravity Actually Held in Check.

That men can hold their evil propensities under control is manifest by the fact that they actually do this when they will. Drunkards resist a perverted appetite and become sober men. Men hold their anger firmly in leash, when they count it for their self-interest to do this. It is an element of "social culture" to restrain sensibilities and give no sign of their excitement, to school the face to be the mask of feeling. The worst of men, for bad ends, hold their evil impulses in restraint. The pugilist may be a glutton and a drunkard, but in his training he denies himself and "keeps his body under." A man's heart is full of hot revenge, but he holds it in absolute control until he pleases to indulge it. That self-mastery which bad men can exercise for bad ends, good men surely can exercise for right ends.

366. Sensibility not Dominant over Will.

In our study of the will we reached the conclusion that the normal relationship of will to sensibility is not the relationship of subordination. Emotion naturally follows in the train of choice. Depravity does not reverse this normal relationship. For this reason also we must believe that men are under obligation to hold depravity in firm restraint. The punishment of crime by human governments everywhere proves that the natural sense of justice does not look upon depravity as neutralizing guilt.

367. Fixedness in Evil not Inconsistent with Responsibility.

It is to be noted also that the probability, or the practical certainty, that a man will choose evil indicates neither the lack of freedom nor the absence of responsibility. Stability and certainty may have other ground than necessity. To deny this is to declare stable virtue to be impossible. In proportion as character becomes settled, the action of the will becomes uniform and certain. There are good men whose moral choices are so certain that men build upon them as upon the uniformities of nature. And in regard to some men there is no doubt that they will choose evil. But the fixedness of the good man's will exalts his virtue, instead of neutralizing it, and the fixedness of the bad man's will aggravates, and does not palliate, his guilt. Fixedness of choice signifies a choice made, affirmed and reaffirmed till the soul refuses to reopen the case or to consider the question of an alternative. The fixedness of the Divine will is the immutable ground of all certainty. We conclude, therefore, that fixedness and certainty in

evil choices, which is the token of mature depravity, does not involve the loss of moral responsibility.

368. Responsibility for Depravity Itself.

There is an inherited depravity; but not all depravity is inherited. If as soon as a soul comes to know good and evil, the will chooses the good and sets itself to deny indulgence to all depraved appetencies and to restrain evil feeling, the native depravity left unnourished falls into feebleness. But depravity indulged, encouraged, fed, and renewed in strength by personal transgressions, takes on an increment greater far than the original. For this personal increment of depravity every man is responsible; it is the product of his own evil choices; he has invited it; it is his by creation. Men feed and fatten to a giant and a monster that infant evil which they should leave to perish of atrophy.

369. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do Right?

It cannot be denied that many human beings are born into the world under conditions in which right doing is beset with exceeding difficulties. Poor and disordered nervous systems; intellect feeble and clouded and left in ignorance; sensibilities effervescent at the sight or the thought of evil; conscience dull and weak; will irresolute in withstanding base hunger; evil soliciting and clamoring on every side; the moral law dimly apprehended; the authority of the lawgiver scarcely recognized; no high ideal before the eye of the soul—under such circumstances, if virtue survive it must struggle against fearful odds. To measure the merit or demerit of unfortunates thus born, and allot the due reward or

penalty, requires a knowledge that does not belong to man. Philosophy must here join with faith and believe that the Judge of all the earth will do that which is just in the final adjustment of destinies.

370. Responsibility and Supernatural Help.

The supernatural help which comes to men, a stimulus and a strengthening for right doing, is an element of responsibility. We are responsible not merely to the measure of that which is possible in our separation from the Creator, but for all that good which supernatural grace shall render possible. Philosophy must recognize the fact that man's spiritual nature lies *en rapport* with spiritual forces. "He giveth power to the faint, and to them that have no might he increaseth strength." With the proffer of this supernatural aid there comes responsibility, first for accepting it, and then for every moral achievement which that help renders possible. The victorious lives of men great in goodness show the moral possibilities of human nature, even when handicapped, as it is at the start, by depravity.

We nurse sturdy, strenuous virtue in ourselves better by binding the moral law about our souls and strengthening the sense of moral obligation, than by petting ourselves, pitying our weaknesses, and palliating our faults.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING SOCIETY

371. Human Beings not Unrelated Individuals.

Hitherto we have been considering the moral law and individual human beings under the law. This was necessary for the understanding of certain facts and principles which pertain to men as individuals, and to all men alike. But the human race is not composed of molecules unrelated, or having only the accidental relationship of juxtaposition. The human inhabitants of the earth constitute one species. By the teaching of holy Scripture, and by all the tests which science employs to distinguish between species and mere varieties, the human race is shown to be one race. In their widest separation and in their greatest differences, every member of this race is related to every other. They sprang from common ancestors. There is one kind of life in all. The same nature with like attributes is found in all. In their bitterest hostilities men are brothers. They are bound by common bonds to the same God and Creator. The necessary relationships subsisting between these brothers in the human family, embody and reveal certain moral principles. Some of these social principles must now receive our attention.

372. Relationships Necessary.

The various relationships of men with men are neither accidental nor optional, but in the highest sense neces-

sary. They have their ground immediately in the nature of man, and ultimately in the nature of God. Without these relationships the human race would perish; or if isolated individual existence were possible, the individual in this isolation could not come to full personal development. Without society, large development of thought, conscience, or sensibility is impossible. By the mutual interaction of social forces, infant human beings grow to men of thought and power.

373. Classes of Relationship.

The necessary forms of human relationships may be grouped under four heads. First, the universal human brotherhood. This has been already referred to. Every human being is a member of the same species or universal family. "God hath made *of one* every nation of men for to dwell upon all the face of the earth." The Christian religion very greatly emphasizes this relationship.

374. Family Relationships.

The second class of necessary relationships are those which are seen in the family, in the narrower sense of the word family. That there may be families there must be husbands and wives, parents and children. Husbands and wives are related to each other as to no other human beings, and the relation of parents and children is unlike any other relationship in the universe.

375. Government and Subject.

The third class of relationships is composed of those which arise from civil government. There must be

rulers and subjects. Men must have relationships as citizens with other citizens and with the State.

376. Relationships of Mutual Assent.

The fourth class of relationships include all those which arise through personal assent and choice. These are again divisible into two sub-classes: first, those which are formed by mutual consent and agreement, but which, when once entered upon, cease to be matters of mere consent, and come under the regulation of law; second, those relationships which have their origin in consent and agreement, which also have their form and limits fixed in the same manner, and which may be terminated at the pleasure of the parties. Some of the relationships of the second and of the third class fall also into the first of these sub-classes. In their incipiency, the marital relationship, and in the formation of a new government, the relations of rulers and subjects are matters of choice, arrangement, and consent; but when once established they cease to be optional and come under the dominion of fixed law. The acceptance of the relation is optional, but not its form or termination. There are also relations which are optional at every stage; they are formed, modified, and terminated at the pleasure of the parties concerned. Each of these classes of relationships must now be examined with respect to their essential form or controlling principle.

377. First Class : a Common Relationship to the Creator.

In considering the human race we find two fundamental facts, plainly seen in the nature of things, and as plainly included in the essential principles of the Chris-

tian religion. The first fact is that every human being holds the same fundamental relationship to the one God and Creator. The differences which exist among men in respect to *condition* cannot be exaggerated. From the idiot to the genius; from the savage to the savant; from Lazarus to Dives; from the slave to the king; from Nero to Paul, we find every possible gradation. Some of these differences are by no means unimportant. In the sight of God some of these differences are exceedingly great. They pertain to perfection of being and determine destiny. Some distinctions are indeed mere names.

Princes and lords may flourish or may fade,
A breath can make them, as a breath has made.

But none of these differences affect the one common relationship which all men hold to the one Creator. Upon the same Divine will and care all depend for life; the same Divine will gives moral law to all; and before the same impartial Judge all shall stand at the last. We cannot too strongly emphasize this common relation of all men to the one Creator.

378. Brotherhood in the Race.

The second fact is that all men hold the same relationship to the one human race. Descended from the same first parents, all men inherit the same human nature, with the same essential attributes of good or evil. This means the essential brotherhood of man. That brother of ours may be a lordling who refuses to know us; he may be a menial who does base work for scanty pay; he may be a brutal master, or a lying,

cringing slave ; he may be a prophet whose spiritual life shines like a star, much too high for our kinship ; he may be Caucasian, Mongolian, or Ethiopian ; but whoever or whatever he may be, he is of the same species ; he is our brother.

379. Equality of Natural Rights.

A *right* is some advantage, privilege, or good which one person cannot take away or withhold from another without injustice or wrong-doing. That privilege or good which we may justly claim for ourselves is our right. Grounded in the two facts set forth above, we find the principle of equality in all natural rights. One God over all; one human nature in all. Prove that some natural right belongs to one man, and you prove it for all men. This lord has an "unalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" ; the peasant and the serf have then the same right. The rich man has the right to possess and enjoy the fruit of his own labor, and so has the poor man. If the priest has the right of "soul liberty," the unpriestly layman has the same right, and to the same degree. Right and justice are the same for all.

380. Universal Benevolence.

In the two great facts already cited we find also the principle of universal good-will or benevolence. Since all have the same natural rights, since right is right for all, and justice is the same for all, justice requires that a man have the same regard for the rights of others as for his own. To all men their own welfare is equally precious, and to God the welfare of each is equally

dear; in the universal brotherhood it belongs, therefore, to each to seek the good of each with equal solicitude. To seek good for ourselves by depriving another of his equal rights is a breach of the universal brotherhood. This principle of universal good-will is the golden rule of the New Testament. If this principle is denied, we find no limit to the right of sacrificing the welfare of others to our greedy grasping after selfish advantage.

381. Benevolence not Communism.

The Golden Rule is a true principle of moral and social science. Universal benevolence is grounded in human nature, but universal benevolence does not signify communism. No man can live another's life for him. Every man must carry his own load of responsibility. The activity of one cannot secure the personal development of another. The attempt to throw upon others that care for ourselves which belongs to us and not to another, and the attempt to do for others that which God intended that they should do for themselves, are alike destructive to individual welfare. For personal development and for moral discipline every person must bear burdens and responsibility for himself. Not communism but the benevolence of the Golden Rule is required. In doing each his own work and bearing his own responsibility, men must work as friends and helpers, and not as enemies or as pitiless competitors.

382. Résumé.

We find, then, in this most general relationship of men, two informing or controlling principles: First

equality of natural rights; secondly, universal benevolence. Whatever conduct violates these principles, is shown by this to be wrong. No other more special relationship can justly violate this most general.

383. Relationships of the Second Class.

The second class of social relationships are seen in the family. First comes the relationship of wedded life, then the parental, and then the filial. Some of these relations are, in their incipiency, matters of choice; but even in their incipiency they are optional in respect to the individual only; for the race they are the most necessary of necessities. They are entered upon in fullest freedom, but back of that freedom lies a necessity of nature. It must needs be that human beings put themselves into these relationships, which once formed must continue forever, the form and responsibilities of which they must accept, but have no voice in determining.

384. Marriage.

The relationship of marriage is freely entered upon by consent and agreement. But the relationship of wedded life, when once established, comes under the control of law and cannot be terminated at the will of the contracting parties. Law, divine and civil, becomes a party to the contract. The duties and responsibilities of the marriage relation are not determined by agreement.

385. Parentage.

The same doctrine essentially must be laid down touching parentage as concerning marriage. With re-

spect to the individual, parentage is optional ; but the duties and responsibilities of parentage, when once assumed, are fixed by nature and law, and are to the last degree imperative.

386. The Filial Relationship.

From the nature of the case the filial relation can have in it no element of choice. The child finds itself with certain parents and with certain environments, and however painful or unfavorable those conditions, they are unalterable. The moral law and not choice or agreement, determines the form and the duties of that unchosen relationship.

387. Informing Principles of the Family Relationships. First, Fidelity.

One aspect of the marriage relation is that of an indissoluble covenant. Two persons join their fortunes for life, giving themselves to each other and assuming very weighty obligations and burdens. This they do upon the ground of mutual confidence, upon the assurance that each will be true to the other in keeping the covenant. Only on the basis of a life-long covenant, to be faithfully kept, could marital responsibilities be assumed by either party. The informing principle of the marriage relation, in this aspect, is faithfulness, fidelity. A lack of fidelity, according to the degree of unfaithfulness, is so far a breach of the marriage covenant.

388. Reverence, Obedience.

The family is a natural organization; not a combination of similar elements, but an organic and vital union

of unlike elements, forming a unity. This organic unity finds its headship, leadership, or representative unity, in the husband and father. So the nature of man and of woman indicates, and so the holy Scriptures declare. The recognition of this headship in the family unity, is expressed by such words as reverence and obedience. "Let the wife see that she reverence her husband," for he is the representative and executive head of the family. The combined will of the husband and of the wife, as one will, finds expression and energy of execution in the one head. Reverence is the willing recognition of the family unity in the headship of the husband and father. For the children this headship in the family marks a profounder difference of essential rank, and their recognition of this headship is expressed by the word obedience. These principles are fundamental to the existence of true family life. Without this reverent and obedient recognition of the family unity, there can be no true family life, but a collection of human units each struggling for self-assertion or, it may be, contending for the mastery.

389. Love, Self-sacrifice.

We must here recall the essential nature of love. Love is more than sensibility, and something else than sensibility. Love is something else than finding in another person a source of pleasure. Beings and things may be sources of enjoyment, yet such that love would be impossible, or if possible, highly unseemly or positively wrong. Love is choice, the choice of an object to which to give one's self, an object of self-sacrifice. According to the readiness for limitless self-sacrifice is the greatness

of the love. This fullness of self-giving and self-sacrifice brings a deep movement of sensibility. Love is the informing and characteristic principle of the family organization. Love is the principle which creates the organism and controls its growth, as life controls the growth of a tree. It is in response to love that fidelity, reverence, and obedience become possible. Real family life cannot be maintained upon the principle of justice merely, so much given for so much received. Family life expresses self-sacrifice, in which each gives himself to each and to all, and lives for all. The divine ideal is given by Paul, "Even as Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it."

390. Relationships of the Third Class. Civil Government.

A third class of social relationships arises from civil government. With no reference now to the *form* of government, we must say that civil government is a necessity of nature and the appointment of God. "There is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God." To administer justice and to punish crime, to defend men from injury and to promote the common welfare, to gain by combination advantages which cannot be secured by individual effort, there must be a controlling governmental agency. Aside from every other need, bad men compel the establishment of governments. No nation, no tribe of men has ever been able to do without civil rule. Men complain against government; they rebel and break it in pieces, and then straightway proceed to organize another, more imperious perhaps than the former.

391. Theories of Civil Government.

Touching theories of civil government, we need to consider here one question only. Does civil government find its ultimate ground of authority in the concessions and consent of the governed, or does it exist independently of consent and by a necessity which is altogether above individual consent? Does civil authority derive its right from the consent of the subject or from the appointment of God expressed in the constitution and necessities of nature?

392. Not a Question of Form.

This inquiry touching the ultimate grounds of civil authority has nothing to do with the form of government, whether patriarchal, monarchical, republican, or purely democratic. A monarchy may be as legitimate, as popular, and may rest upon the consent of the governed as fully as any republic. Napoleon, "Emperor of the French," commemorated in his title his appeal to the people and the popular acceptance of the empire. On the other hand, the great American Republic, with popular consent, suspends the right of *habeas corpus*, and establishes for the time a military dictatorship. The grounds of righteous civil authority are doubtless the same in every form of legitimate government.

393. Not a Question of Good Government.

This inquiry concerning the ultimate ground of civil authority is not at all a question concerning just or unjust administration. Any form of government may be unjustly and wickedly administered. A republic may be mercenary and corrupt; a pure democracy is most com-

pletely irresponsible. It is possible also that an absolute monarchy should seek assiduously and promote effectively the welfare of the people, and for this a monarchy has some great advantages over a republic.

394. Not a Question of Legitimacy, or *de jure*.

This is not a question concerning legitimacy. The genesis of some certain government, the process by which it becomes a *de facto* government, the means by which a dynasty comes to the throne, is one thing ; the ultimate ground of civil authority is quite another matter. In one sense every government rests on force ; its foundation stones are cemented by blood. But this signifies only that force must be used in maintaining civil authority. Back of the force we must look for the right to use the force. In changes of administrations and in the establishment of new governments there is an element of consent and agreement ; but consent does not explain the genesis of authority as authority.

395. Not a Question of Limit.

Our inquiry concerning the ground of authority does not concern the limits of civil authority. Let the authority be stretched to the utmost, or let it be held within the narrowest limits, upon what basis does authority exist at all ? By what right does civil authority come to you and to me and demand submission, with limitless penalties if we refuse obedience ?

396. Authority not Grounded in Consent. First Objection.

To the theory that civil authority finds its ground in the consent and agreement of the governed, only this

and nothing more, there are sundry insuperable objections. These objections amount to a *reductio ad absurdum*. In the first place, if civil authority is grounded in the consent of the governed, then must that consent be the personal assent of every subject. For if one may consent for all, then at once the basis for authority is shifted from consent to something else. But if consent is the ultimate basis, then civil rule is binding upon those who give their assent, and not at all upon those who refuse and give their voice against it. It surely will not be said that on the ground of consent one hundred men have the right to govern ninety and nine who do not consent—that a consenting majority have the right to rule a protesting minority.

397. One Generation Consenting for the Next.

If civil authority rests absolutely upon the consent of the governed, then complete unanimity of consent cannot bind the next generation. Every individual of every succeeding generation must consent for himself, otherwise the government lapses into a mere usurpation of authority. But if it is said that consent is requisite only in the incipiency of the government, this is a full abandonment of the principle that all just civil authority is grounded in consent and agreement. We have to do with an authority that lives through generations and ages.

398. Non-consenting Law Breakers.

Another objection to theory of consent is seen in this, that by this theory authority is stripped of all right at the very point where it must needs assert itself most vigorously. Government has then no authority over law

breakers, for they of all men refuse assent. The most dangerous of all criminals, the anarchist, goes free. At every crucial point the theory of consent breaks down. The right of ten good men to restrain and punish one bad man cannot rest upon his consent, either present or past, actual or constructive.

399. Born Under Authority.

The naked, obvious fact is that authority exists independently of consent. Touching modes of administration there must needs be a consensus of consent enough to give efficiency. But human beings are born under authority, a three-fold authority, the authority of parents, civil authority, and the authority of God. Neither of these authorities asks our consent that it may exist and assert itself. We have no part in the origination of either authority. If a citizen changes his country, he merely shifts the authority which holds him. He cannot escape authority except by fleeing from the dwellings of men and living in solitude. But if this solitude is invaded by other men, men fugitive like himself from society, they soon find themselves constrained to organize a rule which shall assert itself alike over those who consent and those who protest.

400. Authority Administered by Men.

Civil authority, whatever its genesis, must of necessity be administered by men. Even the Hebrew theocracy was so administered. The form and method of administration must therefore be matters of consideration, concession, and agreement. The right of reform and revolution inheres in the right of administration. This,

however, is not an origination of authority. And in no proper sense do majorities rule minorities ; but since unanimity is impossible, the entire people administer the government *by means of majorities*. To this method of administering civil affairs the minority assents and wishes to have it so. But this is a method of administration, and does not touch the ground of authority.

401. Ramifications of Divine Authority.

Ultimate authority belongs to God. As the source and ground of all existence, for “all things were made by him,” and “in him all things consist,” the Creator has authority over all. But he has arranged that some part of his government of men shall be administered by men themselves. The holy Scriptures say to the child, “Honour thy father and thy mother” ; “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right.” The Creator invests parents with a certain limited portion of his own authority, and commands the child to recognize that authority. In like manner civil government is God’s arrangement for governing the world in civil affairs. The sacred Scriptures therefore declare the magistrate to be “God’s minister” “attending continually upon this very thing.” The authority which he exercised is declared to be a branch of the divine authority : “All power is of God ; the powers that be, are ordained of God.” For this reason we must obey the magistrate, not from fear only, but for conscience’ sake.

402. Authority Ramifies Downward.

The general principle is that authority always and everywhere ramifies from above downward, and not

from below upward. He who has no authority cannot impart it to another. The sum of authority belongs to the Creator, and from him it ramifies downward according to his appointments and the nature of things which he has made. Civil authority finds its ground then in the divine authority, and takes its rise from the divine appointment. Administered within the proper limits, and according to God's will, it has power to bind the conscience.

403. The Divine Authority Limiting Civil Authority.

If civil authority has its ultimate basis in the Creator's authority, is "the right divine of kings to govern wrong" the legitimate conclusion? Not this, but the opposite is the necessary conclusion. If the civil ruler is the "minister of God" to administer an authority which is above himself, then is his authority strictly limited by that which is given him. When the ruler exalts himself, and makes his government destructive of the welfare of the subject, disobedience may become a duty. Rebellion against tyrants may be obedience to God. This principle helps to determine the due limits of civil authority. When the civil ruler undertakes to come between the individual soul and Creator, it is manifest that he has gone beyond his right. When civil laws assume to forbid that which God has commanded, or to require that which God has forbidden, to repeal the Decalogue and to enact statutes contrary to it, we see again that the civil government has become a transgressor. In this principle we find the unchangeable constitutional rule which holds all civil government within righteous limits.

404. Determination of Methods and Limits.

Accepting the principle that all authority descends from above, it yet remains for man to determine the form and manner of the administration. Shall the government be monarchical, aristocratic, or republican? This determination, in times past, has commonly been brought about by long processes, in strife, in war, and in mutual concessions; and foundations laid in one age in cement of blood, the next age has torn up and relaid in gore. This is man's folly, selfishness, and crime. Limits must be set to the sphere of civil government. By all manner of tentative and experimental processes, by enactment and repeal of enactment, by decision of courts and the growth of precedents, this work goes on, never finished. When general principles have been elaborated and accepted, their application still remains more or less a matter of experiment. New exigencies arise calling for new adjustments. This is a work of endless detail. Into this detail it is not the province of moral philosophy to enter. We consider here only the general principles which underlie civil government.

405. Relationships of Ruler and Subject; how Determined.

From the principles considered above, it is plain that the relationships of the ruler and the subject cannot be determined by reference to the fiction of a compact between the king and his subjects, or between citizen and citizen. If such a compact were made, it could by its force as a covenant bind only the contracting parties. But moral philosophy must look upon civil government as grounded in the necessities of nature and life, and as representing the Divine will. It must discern the moral

elements in civil government, not as interpreting a compact, but as applying general and immutable principles.

406. The Civil Organization to be Characterized by Justice.

The informing principle of this third class of social relationships is justice—justice on the part of the ruler toward the subject, justice on the part of the subject toward the ruler, and justice in the law which defines the relations of the two parties. One chief purpose of civil government is to secure justice between man and man ; to protect the people and all the people against all forms of wrong ; to make every individual secure in all his rights. To accomplish these results, the government itself must be just. The ruler must be just and impartial in his ruling. This is the prime touchstone by which every law and every administrative act must be tried. On the other side the citizen must be just toward the ruler and the government. “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s.”

407. Government Benevolent.

A second informing principle of civil government is benevolence. This is the purpose for which government exists. Benevolence, as here used, of course does not signify the giving of alms. But government is established for the benefit of the governed. The ruler does not hold his place for his own easement or advantage. If this is not so, then is government itself organized injustice ; it is exacting service from the many for the benefit of the few. But “the magistrate is the minister of God to thee *for good.*” He that is greatest of all is servant of all : and he is made great for the sole purpose

of being servant. Every law or public measure must be tested by the intent of benevolence. Any measure which has not the purpose and the fitness to promote the welfare of the people, has no reason for its existence, and no right to exist.

408. The Duty of the Government not Self-perpetuation.

The doctrine laid down above shows the utter fallacy of the proposition that the State may do that, and only that, which is necessary for its own preservation. In the presence of the Christian religion the Lycurgan notion that the individual exists merely for the State, cannot survive. If the government exists and operates merely that it may continue to exist and operate, there remains no reason for its existence. The government builds forts, maintains armies, equips navies—for what purpose? To save a dynasty? To maintain intact a form of government? To continue its own existence? Not this at all, but that the people, the public weal, may suffer no damage; "*ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica.*" The proposition that the State may do only that which is necessary for its own preservation, is a quick *reductio ad absurdum*. Why should the people bear burdens to maintain that which lays burdens upon them merely that it may continue to exist and lay burdens upon them? The State educates the people, not merely that they may be intelligent voters, but that they may be able to win for themselves every kind of welfare. The State bristles with arms that there may be peace and security for all in every kind of work and enjoyment. When a government comes to exist for self-perpetuation merely, the time has come for a just revolution.

409. The Principle Clear ; the Application Difficult.

The doctrine that justice and benevolence are the informing principles of civil government, is plain enough in the abstract, but exceedingly difficult in the application. Measures of general beneficent intent and effect, sometimes work damage to this or that individual. To draw the line between that good which is best secured through governmental agency, and that other welfare which is better left to be wrought out by private enterprise, demands the highest wisdom, a wisdom which must, in part at least, be derived from experiment and experience. One element of welfare is that personal development which comes of bearing responsibility. The highest qualities of manhood appear when men are left to hew and carve their own fortunes from the rough material of circumstance, without overmuch help or embarrassment from others. There must be a balancing of advantage and disadvantage. But it is as legitimate for the State to build a road for commerce as for war; to build a schoolhouse as a fort; to educate a civilian as a soldier; to train men for self-support as for public defense. But expedience would seem to require that the agency of government be minimized as much as possible, and the sphere of private enterprise be magnified—and this for the welfare of the individual.

410. Justice Includes Protection.

The administration of justice signifies, first of all, the protection of every subject in the undisturbed enjoyment of his natural rights. This secures for every one a free field in which to work out his own welfare. For this object no small part of the machinery of government is

devised. This defense from damage may be against a robber, against a slanderer, or against a foreign foe ; the principle is the same in either case. This work of defense is exceedingly great and far-reaching, and is equally just and beneficent. Men seldom appreciate its value except by its loss.

411. The Right of Public Defense.

The question of individual non-resistance toward injury, is not involved in the right and duty of civil government to protect the subject. The individual often foregoes, indeed, the exercise of private defense, because defense and retribution are better exercised by the higher powers. In respect to government, the right to protect itself is inherent in its very nature. Without the right to do this, and the power also, government would cease to be government. Righteous authority leans upon power. The "magistrate bears not the sword in vain," but for solemn use. Even the government of God stands because he is omnipotent.

412. Punishment.

The administration of justice involves not only the restraint, but also the punishment of evil-doers. Much confusion of thought would be avoided if those who discuss the subject of punishment would hold in mind its real significance. Punishment is not revenge, nor the expression of malevolence, nor is it retribution in the low sense of paying back evil for evil. Punishment is the expression of conscience. It is the testimony of righteous authority against wrong-doing—that testimony which the nature of all moral beings demands. Con-

science sees and feels the eternal distinction between right and wrong. Conscience feels a deep indignation toward the wrong. This indignant disapproval cannot be quenched or repressed. Conscience is in God, and his conscience can no more be quenched or denied expression than can his justice, truth, or love. The expression of the indignation of conscience is punishment. This expression of conscience must needs make a difference between well-doers and evil-doers. Not to make a difference would be unjust. Punishment is a necessity of government. Man's moral nature demands it. It is the ultimate appeal of conscience unto conscience. When punishment ceases to be the voice of conscience, and becomes the voice of anger or malevolence, it loses the characteristic quality of punishment and becomes itself a crime.

413. Government Must Punish.

No government, human or divine, has been able to escape the necessity of inflicting punishment, in the strict sense of the word. Something more than mere curtailment of opportunity to repeat crime is necessary. Men of criminal intent must be made to understand that crime will be followed by painful consequences for the wrong already done—an infliction of loss and suffering which shall express the aroused consciences of good men and of God.

414. Punishment not Contrary to Benevolence.

The purpose of government, as we have already seen, is benevolent. The infliction of punishment is not contrary to this principle. Punishment is not, in and of

itself, a direct expression of love toward the offender, nor can it be analyzed and resolved into love. Punishment is the indignant testimony of excited conscience. The infliction of penalty ought, however, to be pervaded by benevolence. It seeks the welfare of the people. And from this benevolent intent the criminal himself is not excluded till his own obduracy, or the heinousness of his crime, put the welfare of the criminal beyond regard. Nor does the element of punishment in the treatment of the criminal render the benevolent intent less operative. The contrary effect is produced. If the criminal understands that his imprisonment and his daily tasks are punitive inflictions ; that he is incarcerated, not as an insane man for safe-keeping, but as a punishment for his crime ; that it is the testimony of conscience addressed to his conscience, this of itself will constitute a stirring call to repentance and reformation. Mere restraint sets watchfulness and power on the one side against watchfulness and wit on the other ; malice stirs up malice ; conscience mingled with benevolence and addressed to conscience moves the heart to repentance. Gushing sentimentality, which sees no guilt in crime and eliminates the element of conscience in the treatment of the criminal, renders the moral improvement of the criminal hopeless.

415. Immortal Interests.

The protection of the people in the enjoyment of their rights signifies much more than defense from injury done to body or property. Reputation is more precious than riches. The most grievous of injuries is corruption of moral character. It is legitimate for the

government to defend the young, the inexperienced, those who are morally weak, from agencies which work for their moral ruin, and this is more important than to keep the orphan secure in the enjoyment of his patrimony. Among the corrupting agencies against which governmental protection is requisite, we must reckon that literature which glorifies crime, defiles the imagination, and incites to lewdness; obscene art, which through the eye engenders moral defilement; the allurements of lotteries, gambling places, drinking saloons, and houses of shame. If the government cannot concern itself with the real welfare of the people, why should men lay down life in its defense? And why should indignant wrath fall upon the villain who only speaks an insulting word to the daughter, but to the same man be given the legal right and the privilege of alluring the son to drunkenness and debauchery with impunity?

416. The Present Tendency.

In matters of detail the limits of just governmental action cannot be determined by the study of general principles. As the result of experience and of changing conditions, the sphere of governmental control is continually changing. In recent times, on the one side, the drift has been away from the attempt to control the individual in respect to conduct, injurious perhaps, but not immoral *per se* and not directly damaging to others. Among these personal concerns we may mention the rate of personal expenditures, the style of dress and of living, and forms of religion. This drift in some countries has already reached its utmost limit. On the other side there is a tendency to extend governmental control

over private concerns, which in the vastness of their operations affect the welfare of all the people, and threaten to crush the individual and dominate the State. This includes such matters as the management of railroads, the acquisition of immense landed estates, combinations of capital to destroy competition. The civil government is also more and more relied upon to suppress agencies which injure the people partly by their own consent and choice. Here we find laws against the adulteration of food, against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, and the publication of obscene and corrupting literature. The drift in this direction is becoming stronger, and the end is not in sight. The bounds which justice and benevolence will set to this drift can be determined only by experience.

417. The "Higher Law."

Civil authority cannot nullify God's authority and must not assume to do this. The law of God represents alike the nature of God, the nature of man, and the nature of things. That which negatives the divine law is contrary to the nature of man and the nature of the universe. It follows that no civil law can be expedient as a measure of policy which requires that which God forbids or forbids what God commands. But it does not follow that civil government shall undertake to administer and enforce all the moral law. It does follow, however, that civil authority shall not ally itself with evil and license and protect transgression of the moral law. So far as civil law reaches, it should be a helper of the highest right. Shall the divine authority in its civil ramifying turn against itself and become self-con-

tradictory? Or shall men undertake to legislate against the Divine will?

418. Licensing Evil.

Legislation for the repression of an evil, where only repression is possible and extermination is impossible, in order to mitigate an evil which the law cannot uproot, is not contrary to the principle that civil rule must not ally itself with sin against God. Moses undertook to restrict and reduce the evil of unlimited divorce, without attempting to administer the full moral law in the case. But when the civil government sells the legal permission to do evil and by selling becomes a sharer in the gains which accrue from the evil doing; when the government represses the wrong-doing by the many, that it may protect the gains of the few to whom the gainful privilege has been sold for money paid into the public treasury, this surely is not repression but partnership. This is "framing mischief by a law." Such legislation is not practically repressive, for it makes the wrong-doing more gainful to those who engage in it. But a general tax may be at once repressive and righteous; it makes the evil expensive and gives no protection. It gives no permit and confers no monopoly, but lays a burden upon every wrong-doer without distinction. But taxation has not proved successful in repressing the sale and use of intoxicating drinks.

419. Civil Authority in a Republic.

The principles which have been laid down touching civil authority, are true alike in a monarchy and in a republic. In the one the sovereign comes to the throne

by inheritance ; in the other the legislator, the magistrate, the judge, comes to his office by designation of the people. In either case civil authority means the same and rests on the same ultimate basis. The vote which elects the president of the great republic invests him with no authority ; it merely designates the man who shall exercise the authority which inheres in the place. But in both monarchy and republic there is an element of popular influence in the government which must be noted. The influence and responsibility of the people in the government of themselves ought to receive careful consideration.

420. The Subject a Ruler Also.

In a monarchy, simple and absolute, civil authority is vested in one ruler. It is characteristic of a republic that the administration of the government is in the hands of the people. By means of majorities the citizens choose their own rulers, make laws for themselves and rule over themselves. The same people are subjects and rulers. From this it follows that upon the people, individually and collectively, rest the duty and the responsibility of good government. In the second place, the rule of the sovereign people, like the rule of the monarch, must be characterized by justice and benevolence. Not for private gain, not for the advantage of a class, but for the good of all, must laws be enacted and government be administered. And for the sovereign people there is a supreme rule of right, a "higher law," the will of God. All the people are as absolutely under the supreme rule of right, as any one of them. In the third place, we note that in a repub-

lic there are special difficulties in the way of good government. The law-breakers have an active part in shaping and administering the laws by which they themselves are to be brought to justice; the voter of to-day may have been a criminal yesterday and may be a criminal again to-morrow; folly and vice have as potent a part in the management of affairs as wisdom and virtue. These difficulties may become overwhelming and render good government impossible. Only a virtuous and intelligent people are prepared to administer a republic.

421. Forming Public Sentiment.

In a republic there must be a sustaining consensus of public opinion, otherwise good government is impossible. It becomes therefore the duty of a good public officer to do his best to develop a right public sentiment. For a ruler in a republic three courses are open: he may undertake to represent the popular mind, right or wrong; he may undertake to enact right laws and then leave them to become inoperative for lack of popular favor; or he may use his official influence to develop that moral sentiment among the people which shall secure good administration. In the first case he governs the people as a weather-vane governs the wind; in the second case authority fails to assert itself and government exists only in name. A good officer will be a bold public leader in righteousness.

422. The State a Unity.

In a very deep sense the people who are grouped under one government constitute a unity. There is a community of interests and welfare. The advantage or

the damage, the gain or the loss of each individual, is shared by all. While the personal molecules are ever changing, the State survives with interests and obligations unimpaired. There is a continuity of existence, a continuity of welfare, and a continuity of obligation. Good and ill are perpetuated. The labors and sacrifices of the fathers win welfare for the children. From this unity of life and responsibility there arise very important consequences.

423. A Community of Burdens.

From the unity of the State there arises the obligation for all the people, in proportion to their strength, to bear the burdens necessary to secure the welfare of all. In respect to no welfare of the body politic has any citizen the right to say, This is of no advantage to me; in this good I have no share, and I will bear no burden for the sake of it. A tax is laid upon the property of some citizen for the support of public schools, but he has no children. He is not an importer of goods, nor an owner of ships, nor does he travel by sea, yet he is taxed to build lighthouses and maintain life-saving stations. He never saw the great river, but he must help clear its channel and improve its mouth for the passage of ships. But what citizen is not benefited by the education of all the people? What individual does not receive advantage from the prosperous commerce of the country? In the prosperity of manufacturing and trade, the lowest laborer receives a benefit. It is the duty, therefore, of all to share in the burden-bearing. In this community of burden-bearing, justice and the Golden Rule walk hand in hand.

424. Majorities and Minorities.

In the unity of the State is found the rational ground for government by means of majorities. When a majority of the citizens determine the policy of administration, this does not signify that the many triumph over the few and hold them in subjection, but that the State as a unity governs itself by means of majorities. How otherwise than by majorities can officers be elected and the will of the people be expressed? Surely not by minorities. It is the will of all the people that the government be administered by majorities. In the hour of their success the majority should consider that for the time the minority has entrusted to them the keeping of their welfare. When, instead of this the majority in their hour of triumph, exult and mock and taunt the minority, it is no wonder that bitterness springs up, and citizens come to count each other as enemies.

425. Dangers which Arise from Parties.

One danger which is likely to arise from government by means of parties, was indicated at the close of the preceding paragraph. The exultation of the victorious party and the corresponding chagrin of the other, may beget bitterness and alienation. This alienation, as the last result, may bring war and the destruction of the government.

There is another more imminent danger. When good citizens are divided into parties, the bad come at once to hold the balance of power. The lawless classes understand this and make the most of it for the destruction of efficient government. They demand concessions from each party as the price of their votes. If either

party adopts measures to suppress vice, the vicious element at once transfers its vote to the other party, and the attempted good government becomes futile. And in the heat of party strife, to keep themselves in power, each party vies with the other in making concessions to the worst elements of society; and so it comes to pass that the wicked bear rule by means of good citizens. This danger cannot be escaped so long as good citizens separate into parties upon minor issues, and count party success more important than the great measures of righteousness. At this point appears the inefficiency of republican forms of government.

426. The Principle of Sacrifice.

In the unity of the State it may chance that the welfare of all must be secured by the special danger and damage of some, as the hand must meet the blade which threatens the breast. When danger assails the State some individuals, and not all alike, must needs bear the brunt of the assault. The property of some must be taken, and some must risk limb and life for the good of all. In the unity of the public weal this principle of vicarious sacrifice finds its explanation. In this, also, the characteristic principles of civil society, justice, and benevolence, have a distinguished application. Justice and benevolence alike demand that sacrifice and damage, as well as benefits, shall as far as possible be shared by all. This signifies that damage of property incurred for the public weal, shall be shared and borne by all, and that for loss of limb or life in hazardous service for the State, compensation shall be made as far as the case admits. A pension for the maimed soldier or fire-

man, and for the widow or child of him who falls in his country's defense, is a benevolence, but it is no more almsgiving than is the payment of a just debt. If one member of the unity is left to suffer alone, the unity is broken.

427. Relationships of the Fourth Class.

The fourth class of social relationships are those which are alike freely formed and freely terminated. To remain out of them, to enter into them, to withdraw from them, involves no wrong *per se*, and no necessary repudiation of obligation. These relations may be considered under two sub-classes: First, those which are regulated by civil law, relations which must be formed and dissolved according to legal forms; secondly, those which are unknown to civil law, organizations which from inception to dissolution are shaped and managed solely at the pleasure of the parties concerned.

428. Voluntary Associations under Law.

The voluntary associations which are recognized and regulated by civil law are commonly those which involve the ownership or management of property. In this class are business firms or corporations, banks, incorporated institutions, and municipalities. For the conservation of property interests, for the protection of stockholders, creditors, or heirs, these organizations must be formed and conducted according to law, and their existence must be terminated at the last by legal methods. The law holds them till they have fulfilled all obligations, or until their ability to fulfill them has been exhausted. But these relations are nevertheless

purely voluntary. To enter them or not to enter is purely optional; and there is an easy way out, and when the members please, there is a legal method by which the organization may cease to exist. The informing principle of these organizations is justice. The law watches over them to secure exact justice. For this cause alone does the law take account of their existence. They are beneficent so far as justice is beneficent.

429. Associations Unknown to Law.

These are voluntary associations formed and terminated at pleasure. For social enjoyment, for mutual improvement, for moral influence, for co-operation in work, the constituent elements come together, and when the bond becomes too weak they fall asunder. These associations exist either with or without organic forms. They hold no property, and the civil law takes no account of their existence. The informing principles of these voluntary associations are truth, fidelity, and friendship. By this touchstone must the mutual relations of their members be tried.

430. The Christian Church.

Consideration of this form of social relationship has been deferred to the last because its characteristic principles belong to no one class. They belong to the first, to the two sub-classes of the fourth, and in some respects to the second.

431. The Church as an Association of the First Class.

After the analogy of the great human brotherhood, the Christian church is a brotherhood of closer relation-

ships and stronger sympathies. In the church universal, along with many differences, there is a unity of inward life, of moral purpose, principle, and sensibility. This is intended, of course, to apply to those who are Christians in deed, and have the Christian spirit. As in the great human brotherhood, so in the church universal, the informing principles are justice and benevolence. In addition to these, according to the fullness of the Christian life, there is a sympathy which goes beyond benevolence, and becomes a love which expresses itself in self-sacrifice. In the Christian brotherhood, whatever is contrary to these informing principles is abnormal and wrong.

432. The Church as an Organization of the Second Class.

In some aspects the church has a likeness to the family. It is of divine appointment; the higher wants of man's life and nature require it; the form of the organization is set forth in the holy Scriptures. As with the family in its beginning, entrance into the church is a man's own free act. Religion is voluntary or it is nothing. But when by his own free act the individual has entered into church relationship, he finds the form of that relationship fixed by divine appointment. The obligations assumed are not optional. He cannot withdraw without fault; it is as if one repudiated the obligations of the marriage covenant.

433. The Church as an Association of the Fourth Class.

In certain respects local churches resemble social organizations of the fourth class. With reference to civil obligations, it is optional whether one shall enter such

an association ; but if one will enter into that relationship, it must be done, not according to his own pleasure, but according to the divine command. The church is a voluntary association, yet not one to legislate, but to administer the law of its Founder. But the church, *the spiritual body*, belongs to the second sub-class ; it is a voluntary association unknown to the civil law ; it is formed, organized, managed, disbanded, or abandoned at the pleasure of those who belong to it. There are no civil penalties ; the discipline of the church cannot go beyond the withdrawal of the privileges of membership.

If a church be incorporated under the civil law for the purpose of holding property, in this aspect it is not a church at all, but a civil body corporate, like a bank or a manufacturing corporation.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCERNING SELF-LOVE

434. The Nature of Self-love.

The term self-love needs no elaborate definition. Self-love is a desire for one's own happiness and welfare. On the one side, it is a shrinking from pain, or the loss of enjoyment ; on the other, it is a desire for positive enjoyment, pleasure, or happiness. Self-love is an instinct or impulse natural to all sentient beings, and necessary to their self-preservation. It belongs to the lower orders of life in proportion to their intelligence and sensibility. The absence of this instinct would involve a self-contradiction of nature ; it would signify that pain and pleasure were equally agreeable ; that is, that pain is not painful, and that pleasure is not pleasing. Without self-love living creatures would surrender themselves to destruction and perish without a struggle. As a mere natural instinctive impulse without relation to conscience or will, self-love, as such, has no moral quality. It is no more a matter of right or wrong than is hunger or thirst or sleepiness.

435. Self-love and Selfishness.

In the moral deterioration which has come upon the human race, self-love has been perverted into selfishness and has broken away from all right and reason. Self-love, therefore, like the bodily appetites, must be regulated and held in due control. This regulation of

self-love is a very important element of virtue. Self-love unrestrained and excessive is itself an evil, and is a copious fountain of evil. The normal limits of self-love we must now consider.

436. Self-love to be Limited by Reason.

All right action is in harmony with reason. Self-love must be guided and limited by reason, otherwise it becomes a blind, brutish eagerness for self-indulgence. We see illustrations of this in the mad pursuit of pleasure, in gluttony, drunkenness, and licentiousness. The same unrestrained self-love we see in the greedy pursuit of gain, an insatiate hunger for riches, which disregards the needs and the rights of others. Self-love unguided by reason is sure to fail of its object.

437. Reason Distinguishes Between Enjoyments.

The subjection of self-love to reason is seen in the choice of higher enjoyments in preference to the lower. Not all pleasures are of the same grade. A delight which is nothing more than a titillation of fleshly sensibilities, an excitation of taste or smell or touch, is surely not of the same worthiness or desirability, as enjoyments which spring from mental activity—and much more is it inferior to the happiness which springs from high moral action. The alliance of reason with self-love is indicated by preference for the nobler forms of enjoyment.

438. Reason Prefers Lasting Enjoyments.

The alliance of reason with self-love shows itself also in the choice of lasting happiness rather than pleasures which are merely transient. Some pleasures are in their

nature brief, almost momentary ; others are permanent. The pleasures of eating and drinking must of necessity be short. The excessive pursuit of bodily pleasures is followed by a sense of disgust and degradation. On the other hand, there are enjoyments which increase by their continuance. The higher intellectual activities, pure and unselfish social pleasures, activities which express benevolence and carry blessings to others, the exercise of faith and love toward God, the soul *en rapport* with the heavenly world, are sources of an enjoyment which does not decay and is followed by no reaction. Reason leads self-love to these sources of permanent happiness.

439. Reason Leads to Self-denial.

The guidance of reason in the action of self-love is seen in the practice of self-denial for the sake of greater good in the future. Intelligence and reason are always mindful of the future. It is a brutish life that takes account only of the present. One hour of self-denial may bring years of real welfare ; one hour of eager, reckless self-indulgence may engender remediless ruin. Rational self-love takes account of the future even more than of the present.

440. Reason Takes Account of Means.

The control of self-love by reason is shown by the choice of means suited to promote the happiness which is sought. A rational seeking for happiness must needs embrace the use of the means from which happiness can flow. A rational desire for a harvest will lead a man to plow the ground, sow the seed, and tend the growing

crop. To snatch eagerly at pleasure and at self-indulgence, is not wise self-love, but folly. In this matter, as in many another, unripe fruit plucked untimely, withers in the hand.

441. Self-love Limited by Duty.

In the second place, self-love is strictly limited by the moral law, the law of obligation. Self-love must not undertake to gain enjoyment by transgressing the law of right. It does not meet the case to say that happiness *cannot* be won by wrong-doing. This is true ; but self-love is blind and human intelligence is shortsighted, and unless the will of God be held supreme, self-love will seek gratification through breaking the moral law. Self-love must therefore be held strictly subordinate to right and duty. Obligation outranks self-love.

442. Self-love Limited by the Rights of Others.

A normal limit is set to self-love by the equal rights of every other human being. In the pursuit of good for himself, no man has the right to encroach upon the equal rights of another man. To every man his own welfare is dear and equally precious. Before God every man has an equal right to seek for his own welfare. The strong must not crowd the weak. Rights do not conflict, and the line between rights is not justly determined by the ability to push. Might does not make right. This principle that self-love is limited by the equal rights of others, is nothing else than the Golden Rule, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Self-love is right so far as it is matched and limited by an equal regard for the rights and welfare of all.

443. Self-love and Self-sacrifice.

In moral character self-sacrifice outranks self-love. In the highest forms of moral action self-love seems to drop out of consciousness and the divine will takes its place. One hour of conformity to God's will is counted better than a lifetime of good feeling. Love, forgetful of self and delighting only in the object of love, rises into joyful self-sacrifice. Damon and Pythias have had few successors, but Christian faith has furnished numberless examples of joyful self-abnegation. First of all is Jesus Christ, who came into the world not to please himself, "not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." Following him there has been a line of men who have not counted life dear to themselves, but have rejoiced to suffer for him. In this sublime abnegation of self through supreme love, is doubtless found the highest blessedness of existence.

444. Selfishness.

Self-love, unregulated and excessive, is called selfishness. It is selfishness in that it seeks supremely for the pleasing of self, and it is selfishness in the sense that it has its source in the deepest springs of the self-life, that is, a life of alienation from the Creator. Selfishness shows itself in an eager reaching after one's own pleasure with less regard for the satisfaction of others; in unwillingness to do for others that which is expected from others; in greed to get more than is given. When this eager reaching after gratification is joined with power, the rights of others are disregarded and trampled under foot. Selfishness is willing to make gains through the losses of others, and to enjoy pleasure through their

pains. In its extremest forms it becomes cruel and fiendish. Parrhasius tortures his slave to death that he may paint his dying agonies. Looking upon the sufferer as an enemy, selfishness can take pleasure even in the anguish itself, without respect to other gratification gained thereby. Thus an instinct and impulse, innocent in itself and for all sentient life a necessity, becomes by lack of regulation the cruelty of a fiend.

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

445. The Idea of Soul-liberty.

Freedom of conscience is the right of determining for one's self one's own relationship to God, without constraint or interference, except by rational and moral influences. It covers, first, the domain of faith or religious belief, and secondly, the domain of religious worship and service. Freedom of conscience is to be distinguished from religious toleration. Toleration implies a concession granted as a favor; but freedom of conscience is a right which belongs alike to every human soul. It may justly be counted an affront for a man to assume to tolerate in another the enjoyment of a natural and unalienable right. This soul-liberty, which has been won from intolerance and tyranny by unmeasured suffering, is often grotesquely misconceived, and thus made utterly inconsistent with strong convictions and loyalty to truth. If freedom of conscience is to be honored and defended, it must be rightly understood.

446. Not Indifferentism.

Freedom of conscience does not imply that all forms of religious faith are equally true, and to be equally revered. There is an absolute truth in respect to all things. There is such a thing as absolute truth in religious concerns. Between the propositions, There

is a God and There is no God, no middle ground is possible ; one of them is absolutely true and the other is wholly false. Diverse religious doctrines abound in categorical affirmations and denials. Some of these doctrines are true. Freedom of conscience does not require that a man hold his beliefs feebly and always subject to revision. It requires only this, that he freely accord to every other man that which he desires for himself, the right of determining for himself that which he shall hold as true. Freedom of conscience lays upon every man the responsibility of choosing right and truth for himself.

447. Does not Forbid the Use of Rational Influences.

Freedom of conscience does not forbid the use of moral and rational influences for or against religious beliefs. Truth and falsehood, doctrine and denial, may contend with the weapons of reason ; they may hurl the darts of invective, satire, and mockery ; they may implore with tenderness and tears—for all this lies in the field of moral influence. In this moral conflict, whatever privilege or right is claimed for one form of faith, is to be freely accorded as the right of all.

448. Only the Right to Hold and Enjoy.

Freedom of conscience is the right to hold and enjoy one's own faith without molestation, but it does not imply the right to thrust our faith upon others, or to force the teaching of unwelcome doctrine upon unwilling hearers. If a religious teacher changes his faith, it is no part of his right to obtrude his new faith upon those who do not desire it, and if his former adherents refuse

his instruction and dismiss him from his place of leadership, they do him no injustice. It is hard to conceive anything more senseless than the charge of intolerance and persecution which is so often made against those who do no more than refuse the instruction of a teacher whose doctrine they count false and unsafe. The violence done to freedom of conscience in such a case, is found on the side of the teacher.

449. Disapproval of False Doctrines.

The principle of soul-liberty does not forbid the utmost moral disapprobation toward doctrines which are counted false and dangerous. Such doctrines taught among the people cannot do otherwise than awaken deep apprehension and displeasure on the part of good men. The contention of truth against falsehood is very much more than a trial of dialectic skill; it engages heart and soul. Freedom of conscience does not signify the opportunity of corrupting the young and the unwary, while good men stand aloof and say, "Hands off; every man has a right to be heard!" Every man must, indeed, bear the responsibility of electing his own belief, but by all moral means falsehood is to be resisted.

450. Not a Shield for Immorality.

The idea of soul-liberty is utterly perverted when it is made a defense for immorality. Freedom of conscience is not immunity for vice and crime. The most notorious and grotesque illustration of this perversion furnished by this generation is Mormon polygamy. Under the plea of religious liberty the Mormons claim immunity in immorality destructive of the foundations of human wel-

fare. Yet, a great educator commended them for the battle they had waged in behalf of freedom. Crime committed by Mormons, Jesuits, or Thugs, in the name of religion, is crime none the less.

451. Not Freedom to Sow Seeds of Vice.

Freedom of conscience does not signify the right to disseminate literature which engenders and fosters vice and crime. This principle is a corollary from the preceding paragraph. But whenever an attempt is made to suppress the agencies which promote crime, at once a cry is raised against this curtailing of personal liberty. What kinship is there between the right to adjust unmolested one's own spiritual relations with his Creator, with the opportunity unhindered to corrupt the young by insidious temptations to vice?

452. The Denial of Soul-liberty Unjust.

A man's personal relationships with God lie outside the sphere of civil government. Civil rulers cannot know the inward life of men, and must not interfere in that life. No man can work out a good destiny for another, and religion is nothing unless it be voluntary; every individual must bear the consequences of his own choices, and therefore no one should embarrass another in making that choice, the results of which, whether good or ill, he alone must experience. To help another, by rational and moral means, to distinguish between truth and error, and to choose the good, is the greatest benefit which one person can bring to another. But interference by agencies which do not address reason and conscience is a great wrong.

453. Intolerance Futeile.

It is true that many persons use their liberty to their own injury. They believe that which is false ; they love that which is evil ; they worship every kind of mental idol ; they work out their own remediless ruin. But the remedy cannot be found in coercion. Force cannot control the spiritual attitudes of men toward God. If force be used, it fails of its end. Force can gender hypocrisy ; force can secure conformity to a ritual ; it can drive truth into caves and mountain fastnesses ; it can bring brave souls to martyrdom ; but force cannot gender faith nor build up righteousness.

454. Intolerance Destructive.

Not only does persecution—even the persecution of a false religion—do no good to the true, but it does unmeasured damage. Persecution makes the persecutor and the truth odious. Religious intolerance makes infidels as well as hypocrites. Truth suffers more when it persecutes than when persecuted.

455. Freedom Abridged by Assumed Authority.

Freedom of conscience is most violently restricted by positive pains and penalties. A milder restriction is sometimes imposed by the exercise of undue authority. This may be done by parents toward their children, and even when the children have reached an age at which they must needs act largely for themselves. Husbands sometimes assume to exercise a like control over the religious professions of their wives. There is a place, indeed, for legitimate influence, but even influence must not be pressed to the point of coercion.

456. An Established Church.

As it is a violation of soul-liberty to require uniformity of religious faith, so it is the same to compel men to pay for the propagation of a faith which they reject. This is done when the civil government levies taxes upon all for the maintenance of a State Church. This makes men unwilling sharers of the worship and unwilling propagators of the doctrine of such church.

457. Discriminating Favors.

Preferences shown and discriminations made by the civil government for the holding of certain forms of religious faith, is a wrong done to freedom of conscience. Law-abiding citizens have equal rights under the law, but to bestow special favors upon one, is to limit the rights or privileges of another. Civil law must not discriminate between men on account of that which the law has no eyes to see and no right to recognize. And patronage is worse for religion than attempted repression. The favor of Constantine wrought deeper damage upon the Christian religion and the clergy than the sword of Diocletian.

458. A Distinction.

There are religious faiths which are something else, either more or less, than merely religious. They render their adherents something less than loyal citizens; they bring the citizen under a foreign authority, and in effect make him an alien. So far as this is done the civil authority has the right to take account of it. In accordance with this principle it has been judicially declared that the religious oath of the Mormons is something else

than religious, and that in its civil aspects it is inconsistent with loyal American citizenship. This principle has other applications than to the Latter Day Saints of Utah.

459. A Second Distinction.

A second important distinction must be made. For the government to require the holding of John Calvin's doctrine as the condition of civil preferment, or to discriminate against the faith of John Wesley or of Roger Williams, would be violence done to the rights of conscience. But that which the law must not do, the individual elector may do without injustice. If the constitutional law should say, No red-haired man shall sit in the congress of the United States, it would be a flagrant wrong; if the elector says, I will never give my vote to a man having red hair, he may well be counted grotesquely foolish, but no charge of injustice can be made against him. It is no wrong to a candidate for office to make inquiry touching his religious faith and character. If an atheist choose to try, on the basis of agnosticism, whatever destiny the future has in store, he has the full natural right to do this,—God alone is his judge,—but his unbelief is a sufficient reason for my withholding my help to place him in a position of advantage for weaving his atheism into civil legislation. I will not place in his care the educational agencies for molding the minds of the young. But his freedom of conscience is nowise impaired by my withholding my vote, for he has no claim upon my vote.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING PROPERTY

460. The Right of Private Ownership.

All men everywhere hold property in private possession and ownership. This has always been so. The consciences of men recognize this private ownership as just and right. God recognizes the same. The Decalogue recognizes and defends private ownership. One important end of civil government is to ensure security to property rights. It is not easy to see how the affairs of the world could be adjusted and conducted without the recognition of private ownership. The right to hold property is so deeply rooted in the instincts, the consciences, the customs, and the necessities of mankind, and so intrenched in the divine law, that we accept it as a fundamental principle.

461. The Idea of Ownership.

Ownership signifies the right of exclusive use, the right to hold and to use, and the right to exclude others from a like possession and use. The right to use and the right to exclude others from a like use are both essential to ownership. The citizens of a city have the right to use the streets and public parks ; but this does not constitute ownership, for they cannot exclude others from the same use. Where from the nature of the case there can be no exclusive possession, there can be no ownership. No man

owns the uncaught fish of the high seas, or the glories of the sunset clouds, or the sunshine and the rain.

462. Ownership Grounded in Production.

The right of private ownership is grounded in the fact that the product of a man's labor is his own. Wealth is the product of labor expended upon the raw material which God has provided in nature. Labor is requisite, first, to appropriate the material, to get it in possession ; secondly, to fit the raw material for use. A man's bodily and mental faculties are his own ; their activities are his own ; therefore that which is produced by his labor is his own. He may rightly use that which he has produced, and may justly exclude others from its use.

463. Ownership Grounded in First Appropriation.

In the second place, ownership may be grounded in acquisition and possession with no rival claimant—that is, upon first possession. A man who takes a fish from the sea, owns it. It was held in possession by no one ; this man has gotten possession ; he has dispossessed nobody ; there is no rival claimant—therefore it is his by exclusive right. In getting possession of it he, and he alone, has expended labor upon it, and whatever value pertains to it is the product of that labor. In this manner uninhabited lands are taken possession of by the first comers, and held in ownership by the first users. Mineral treasures are held in ownership by the discoverers. When the previous possessors cannot be known, lost articles are held in ownership by the finders. Some limitations of this general principle are stated farther on.

464. Ownership by Exchange.

In the third place, the right of ownership may rest upon exchange. One man by his labor produces a harvest of wheat, another by his labor produces cloth. By mutual consent and agreement they exchange the products of their labor, a bushel of wheat for a yard of cloth. In this case the original ownership rested upon first appropriation or upon production. The secondary ownership is based upon the right of the owner to transfer to another the exclusive possession and use. He places the article in the possession and control of the other and surrenders his own claim forever. Thus the second owner holds it with no rival claimant.

465. Ownership by Gift.

This is like the preceding, except that there is no exchange of property. Transfer by gift consists of two elements : first, the putting of the property into the possession and control of another ; second, the quitclaim or surrender of all further right of possession or use. When this transfer and quitclaim is made with the understanding that it is final, it becomes final and cannot be withdrawn. Under this head comes the ownership of property by testament and by inheritance. The last will designates the person to whom the property is given, and by death the quitclaim of the former owner is made. In case of inheritance when death has established the quitclaim, the law designates the parties who shall succeed to the possession of the unowned property. Or, in the absence of legal heirs, the property escheats to the State—that is, all the people take the ownership by virtue of possession with no rival claim.

466. Ownership and Public Policy.

The most difficult problems touching the ownership of property, are questions of public policy, rather than of moral philosophy. Undoubtedly the Creator intended the surface of the earth to be the dwelling-place of the human race, for the benefit of all, and not for the enrichment of the few. But how shall that universal benefit be best secured? Shall the land be held in private ownership as men take possession of it for use, or by fraud or violence; or shall it be divided into equal parcels for the free use of all who wish; or shall it be held by the State as the joint, undivided possession of all, and rented to users for the benefit of all? This is largely a question of public policy, and this would be especially true in the first settlement of a country, when as yet no private ownership had been acquired. To this time all civilized nations have adopted the policy of private ownership. The fact that the value of improved lands lies so much in that which labor has wrought, and so little in the untouched soil, the wild land priced at one dollar twenty-five cents per acre, the improved land worth fifty, or five thousand, or five million dollars per acre, and the difficulty of handling the immense increment of value which labor has brought, in separation from the very small original value, will be likely to hold civilized nations to this ancient and inherited policy.

467. Estates and Landlords.

The question of limiting landed estates is also a question of policy. It is surely better that there be many owners of the soil, each one working his own land, than that there be a few great landlords with many renters or

laborers for hire. It is no injustice to refuse to a man the possession of immense tracts of land of which he has no personal need, and to hold such land for those who are perishing for its use. Great landed estates are not for use, but for the exclusion of others and for the exaction of rent. The public welfare is the law of public policy, but no policy which violates moral principles can work well for the public welfare.

468. **Vested Rights.**

A question of no small difficulty, a question of right and of public policy alike, arises in respect to certain ancient holdings and privileges. For example, many generations ago a hostile army overran a country, seized upon the lands, divided them among their chiefs, and held the former occupants as serfs. In the lapse of time the serfs have disappeared by rising to the condition of free citizens ; but the lands have come down in immense holdings to the heirs of the old plundering chiefs, and the actual tillers of the soil pay heavy rent to the great landlords. As the result, a few men are immensely rich with incomes derived from holdings which represent no benefits conferred upon mankind, and the many unable to get land for themselves are held in the condition of renters, or of workers in a market overstocked with labor. Here is a problem of right, as well as a question of public policy.

469. **The Nature of the Problem.**

In respect to right, it must be said that ownership by mere conquest is ownership by robbery ; possession is gained, but not rightful ownership. The military chiefs

could not confer upon others a right of ownership which they themselves did not possess. Successive transfers could not create ownership, it could only remove the holders to an increasing distance from the original spoliation. But time has rendered restitution impossible. The original owners are gone, and the line of heirship is utterly destroyed, or cannot be traced. The serf has ceased to be servile, and his blood has mingled, perhaps, with the blood of the great lord. What are the equities in the case? Have the holders, with such a ground of ownership, the right on moral principles to hold the lands and exact rental forever?

470. Limitation of Rightful Ownership.

There is an ownership to which no just limit can be set. If a man raise ten thousand bushels of wheat, but has need for only one thousand ; if he build a hundred houses, though he can dwell in no more than one ; if he dig gold from his lands beyond the counting, his right of ownership is not impaired by absence of personal need or of actual use. Does possession gained by conquest and transmitted by heirship confer a like limitless right of ownership ?

471. Ownership Grounded in Mere Possession Limited.

It was said above that discovery and occupancy with no adverse claimant gives ownership. But occupancy means more than discovery ; there must be appropriation for actual use. The berry picker upon the commons owns the berries which he actually picks, not all that he can see, or all that he can enclose within the limit of four stakes driven into the ground. And the

ability to drive away other claimants does not confer ownership. So with the robber-baron. Even if the lands seized upon are wild lands, his ownership is limited by reasonable need and actual use.

472. Ancient Holdings Subject to Public Policy.

The historic illustrations of ancient landed estates are found in the landed aristocracies of the old world. The Norman chiefs appropriated the soil of England. Their possession of the country began in conquest. This conquest and spoliation could confer no moral right of ownership. Their great estates have come down more or less impaired to their modern descendants and successors. Their title is not like ownership grounded in production. There is possession only, against which all rival claims have long since perished. This ownership is therefore subject to the requirements of public policy. No wrong is done in requiring such holdings to be broken up and reduced to the conditions of absolute ownership. The method of doing this must be in harmony with all the equities in the case.

473. The Increment of Value from Labor.

In breaking up the great holdings of land, account must be taken, in the interest of the present holders, of the immense increment of value derived from labor since their original acquisition. It may happen, therefore, that the breaking up of ancient estates will entail little loss upon the present holders. The signs of the times indicate a probable process something like the following : a public sentiment forcing legislation which will operate to reduce rents ; a continuance of this movement till

holdings of land become less profitable than other forms of investment, and so much less profitable as to be less desirable ; then legislation will render it possible for tenants to become owners ; and then the great estates will be gradually divided and distributed. In these sales, partly voluntary, partly made compulsory by legislation, the sellers will be awarded such prices as will render the sale a gain rather than a loss. The purchaser will be enriched by passing from the condition of a tenant to proprietorship. The public welfare will be promoted by the multiplication of small land-owners. Uncultivated land will be brought under cultivation. The land will be more fully and better cultivated, and will be able to support a larger population. This is the peaceful revolutionary movement, for righting the ancient wrong, which seems to be indicated by the present social drift.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

474. The Christian Religion Grounded in Ultimate Principles.

If we count the Christian religion true, we must of necessity believe that it is the expression of a true moral philosophy. We must believe that it is grounded in the nature of God, and in human nature. The infinite reach of the Christian scheme, springing, as it does, from the eternity past ; embodying preparatory stages of human history ; fully revealed in this final age, the “last times” ; expecting the regeneration of all things ; looking forward through the eternity to come ; having to do with things in heaven as well as on earth—this limitless scheme carries in itself the demonstration that it represents no local or transitory phase or form of moral life. It expresses eternal principles ; it cannot do otherwise. The Christian religion meets the highest demands of the human intellect. It has its mysteries, but it never flouts reason by follies of thought, by self-contradictions, or by the denial of intuitive truth.

475. A Philosophy Implies Comprehension.

A true philosophy of the Christian religion implies a right comprehension, and a comprehension not wholly inadequate, of Christ and his work. The facts must be correctly apprehended as facts, otherwise they cannot be explained with reference to their principles.

We account the Christian scheme as the divine method of saving sinners—a fallen, depraved, guilty race. We do not look upon it as a method of developing a race in process of evolution from lower orders of life. The facts of the Christian religion, and of human history, do not harmonize with such a conception. The holy Scriptures rehearse the story of a primal fall, and treat the depravity of men as a guilty life. The very heart and soul of the Christian religion is atonement for sin. In paganism the need of atonement for sin stands out in gloomy distinctness as the great conscious need of the human soul. By gifts, bloody sacrifices, and self-inflicted suffering, they try to expiate their conscious guilt. In Judaism, with impressive ceremonial grouped around bleeding victims and smoking altars forever unsatisfied, and in Christ, the sin-bearer, the “Lamb of God,” atonement for sin stands as the central historic fact. This historic fact must be our point of departure. And a philosophy of the Christian atonement implies some explanation or theory of the atonement itself. We here accept without discussion that explanation of the atonement which accounts Jesus Christ as the sinner’s representative substitute for penalty and for righteousness. The sublime simplicity of this historic fact of the atonement—a mountain summit lifting itself into the eternal silence, its meaning declared, but its philosophy unexplained—signifies that any attempted philosophy must be reverently simple.

476. A Reason for the Purpose of Redemption.

We look, in the first place, for a rational explanation of the divine purpose to save a fallen race. In the love

of God we find a fountain from which all purposes of goodness and grace may flow. In the moral nature of man appears a correlative ground of the divine intent. What is man that God should be mindful of him? Shall God undertake the salvation of beasts, of which the Creator said, "Let the earth bring forth," made of dust only, and quickly returning in their totality to dust? In the moral nature of beings created in the likeness of God, endowed with immortality, with capacity for sharing the divine blessedness, or doomed to an alternative destiny of moral ruin and misery, in this high moral nature of man we find the rational explanation of the entire plan of revealed religion. Any account of the origin and nature of man which takes away this his crown of glory, robs the Christian religion of all rational ground for the divine self-sacrifice for man's sake.

477. Why the Written Revelation ?

The human being is wedded for this present time to matter. It is normal for him to receive knowledge through his bodily senses. Through his senses the soul is addressed by means of signs and symbols. The whole material world is a storehouse of symbols of thought. And not only this, but by the pestilent touch of sin the spiritual nature of man has become gross and dull, slow to receive spiritual impressions, and unresponsive. Seeing, men see not, and hearing, they hear not. In this condition of man there is need of a revelation which shall address the eye and ear, and address men independently of their subjective spiritual state. There is need of a revelation which shall stand for God in the world, a sign of the divine presence among men, having

a positive objective existence. In the two-fold nature of man, and in the inertness of his spiritual nature, we find the need and the rational ground of the written revelation brought to the world in the Christian religion.

478. Possibility of the Incarnation.

The possibility of the divine incarnation and the rational ground of it are found in the likeness of the divine nature in man. God created man in his own image and as a manifestation of himself. The great elements of man's spiritual nature have a likeness and a correspondence with God's being. That which is true and rational for man is the same for God. Man is able to think God's thoughts. And the normal life of the human spirit is not a life separated from the Creator, but in closest union. The divine and the human are normally in touch. In this likeness of human nature to the divine and in this normal spiritual union we find the possibility that God should be manifest in human nature, that the divine Word should become flesh and dwell among men. There is in this nothing to offend pure reason. There is somewhat in it which is beyond man's current experience, but there is nothing of which one can say that it is contrary to the divine nature or to human nature. The incarnation of Jesus Christ is reasonable.

479. Limitation of the Divine Manifestation.

The necessary limitation of the manifestation of the divine nature in Christ is found in the limitations of human faculties. The divine indwelling could do no violence to human faculties or human life. Through

faculties infantile and undeveloped nothing distinctively divine could perhaps be expressed. Even mature human intelligence, if seen in an infant, would seem monstrous. Through the largest and highest human faculties the expression of the divine life must be limited. Here we have the rational ground for the limited manifestation of the divine Word in Christ. He existed "in the form of God," but in the incarnation he must needs take "the form of a servant" and be "made in the likeness of men."

480. Wherfore the Incarnation?

The human race had lost the true conception of God. The idea of the divine character, the blended holiness and love, had been lost from the minds of men. Words and descriptions could not give this conception. Law could not put into the minds of men the true idea of Jehovah. Here was a deep need of the incarnation, to the end that Jesus might say, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." There was almost an equal need of giving to men the idea of perfect human character and life. Words could not give it, and there was no man on earth whose life could give it except as an approximation. And whatever excellence of character there might be, stood before the world with no authority to say, I am a perfect example for all men and all generations. In Jesus Christ the world was given the needed ideal of perfect human nature, a life "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners." And by the indwelling divinity the life of Christ became authoritative; it was the moral law written in a divinely human life. Still further, and it may be with a deeper neces-

sity, the divine Word was made flesh that he might become the representative sin-bearer for the race ; that in human nature he might bear the sins of men and might have the right to represent his own. These considerations seem to show a rational ground and a necessity for the incarnation.

481. The Significance of the Atonement.

Wherein lay the necessity of atonement or expiation in order that sin might be forgiven ? Why without the shedding of blood could there be no remission of sin ? Was it a spectacle of suffering needful to soften the hearts of wicked men and lead them to penitence ? Was it a necessity of the divine government that penalty be inflicted somehow and somewhere lest law fall into dishonor ? In these things reason finds no sufficient ground for atonement by the shedding of blood. The atonement expressed the conscience of God, the deep disapprobation, revulsion, or wrath of the divine nature against moral evil. There is as deep and eternal necessity for the expression of God's conscience as of his truth and love. The manifestation of love apart from holiness, with no expression of the infinite revulsion of the divine nature from sin, would be an essentially false revelation of the divine character—a misrepresentation and a caricature. The conscience of God must needs speak.

482. The Special Problem of the Christian Religion.

To express the disapprobation of God—that is, the wrath of the divine nature—toward sin and at the same time express his love ; to express the wrath without con-

suming the sinner, this is the problem of the Christian religion. Wrath and love must alike find expression, and equal fullness of expression. Love must not disparage conscience, and conscience must not limit the free course of love—for in the divine nature there is no schism.

It is from the solution of this problem in the holy Scriptures that we discern the nature of the problem itself.

483. The Solution of the Problem.

The problem referred to in the preceding paragraph finds its solution in the sin-bearing of the sinner's representative substitute, the "Lamb of God." To express this fact of vicarious sin-bearing no language is better than that of sacred Scripture. "Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and by his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." "He who knew no sin was made sin for us." "He bore our sins in his own body on the tree." As touching this representative sin-bearing, it cannot be said that the expression of the divine disapprobation is feeble or that love is insufficiently manifest.

484. Representative Sin-bearing not Unrighteous.

If vicarious sin-bearing is unrighteous, it must be unjust either toward the representative sufferer or toward

the actual sinner, or it must be inadequate, and hence unrighteous, for the purpose for which penalty is inflicted. There is no element or aspect of injustice or of doubtful justice in either of these respects. As respects the sin-bearer, he was a willing sufferer, a voluntary substitute. He came into human conditions and linked himself to the human race for this very purpose. Willing self-sacrifice is not unrighteous, otherwise all love is unrighteous, for love signifies self-sacrifice. The sufferer for love's sake is the last one to think of injustice in the case. As toward the sinner who receives the grace there surely is no injustice. And as we shall see in the paragraphs which follow, vicarious sin-bearing is adequate for all the purposes of penalty. In the life of men vicarious good and vicarious ill are ever-present elements in human life.

485. Representative Sin-bearing Grounded in Reality.

In order that representative sin-bearing may be adequate for the purposes of penalty, it must be grounded in reality. There is no place here for a mere fiction of words; there must be reality. The Sin-bearer took human nature into actual union with himself; he wedded himself forever to the human race. Those for whom the atonement is made effective he brings into a vital spiritual relation to himself through faith in him. He represents them because he has the right to represent them; he has the right to represent them because they are his own, his own members. On rational principles of justice the head stands for the body with all its parts. The sin-bearer has the right to represent his own, those who are in and of himself.

486. The Atonement Adequate for Government.

This manifestation of the divine conscience, this wrath of the divine nature expressed in the atonement, accomplishes every governmental purpose of penalty as fully as if the penalty fell upon the actual sinner. It does this with special emphasis. The certainty of the divine displeasure toward evil-doers is made doubly certain. The holiness which did not spare the holy representative will surely not forget the actual transgressor. And the world feels this. Men stand in awe before Calvary more than before Sinai or the gates of Gehenna. The atonement is a beacon fire of holiness kindled on the supreme mountain top of the universe. It is the ultimate appeal and warning of God's conscience addressed to the consciences of men.

487. Love's Appeal in the Atonement.

The atonement expresses self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice is love. "God so loved the world that he gave his Son." "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that God loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." This makes the mightiest and tenderest appeal to the soul of the transgressor to lead him to repentance. What could penalty inflicted upon the actual transgressor do like this? Here the rationale of the atonement goes beyond reason and conscience, and takes the fortress of "Mansoul" by storm, and breaks the sinner's heart by the limitless self-sacrifice of love.

488. The Atonement Grounded in True Psychology.

That the atonement made by divine vicarious sin-bearing is in harmony with man's moral nature, is indi-

cated by the fact that, when the atonement is believed, at once all oppressive sense of the divine displeasure leaves the penitent sinner's conscience, and nothing can bring it back except the return of unbelief. With this true psychology, John Bunyan made the burden fall from the back of the pilgrim as he stood before the cross, and tumble into the sepulchre of Christ to be seen no more. This phenomenon finds no parallel in false religions. Even the symbolic sacrifices of Judaism, symbolic of the great atonement, could not do this. By the fact that the atonement does actually take away the sense of guilt, and brings to the believer the consciousness of peace with God, it is shown that representative sin-bearing is grounded in the ultimate principles of man's moral nature. It meets both the requirements of the Creator and of the soul.

489. Mystery not a Philosophic Objection.

The interior method of the divine incarnation is, and must remain, a mystery, and representative penal suffering enfolds a constellation of mysteries ; but mystery is not a philosophic objection as against a fact. Mystery is no stumbling-block in philosophy. That the nexus between the divine nature and the human is unknown and unknowable, signifies only that it is outside of our conscious experience. So is the nexus of spirit and matter in human nature outside of consciousness. The blended consciousness of personal sinlessness and of vicarious penal suffering is doubtless beyond man's experience. But the acceptance of blame and condemnation undeserved, in order to shield one who is loved, is not beyond our experience. Human experience so

touches the hem of sin-bearing by the guiltless as to point to possibilities beyond, and to indicate that penal suffering by the innocent is grounded in reason and nature ; at least when the guilty party is man, and the sin-bearer is the divine Word in human conditions. And vicarious sin-bearing has its parallel in righteousness received by faith.

490. Representative Responsibility Illustrated.

The usage of the American military service during the Civil War furnishes a good illustration—inadequate, of course—of the vicarious responsibility of the representative sin-bearer. The law permitted a man drafted into the military service to be represented by a substitute. This substitute must be, first of all, a man who himself owed no military service. Even so the divine Word existed in the beginning, not in the form of a servant owing obedience unto law. When the law accepted the substitute, the principal for whom he stood went out from under the law free. Henceforth the law knew only the substitute. The substitute became responsible for every duty and liable to every danger and risk which had belonged to the principal. If the substitute died, it was as if the principal had died. In like manner the divine Sin-bearer came under the law and was obedient. Whatever service the law required, he rendered. He accepted man's responsibilities, the risks and liabilities under violated law, and paid the penalty. And the sin-bearing and the obedience are reckoned to those whom he has the right to represent because they are his own, and of himself. The experience of this is known by many.

491. Salvation and Blessings Conditioned upon Faith.

This is a stumbling-block in the minds of many, yet nothing could be more fully in accord with reason. After that atonement has been made, what less could be required, what more need be required, than a restoration of normal relations between man and his Creator? Faith involves this restoration of sundered relationships, nothing more, nothing less. Faith is belief; belief in the divine existence; belief in the revelation which he has made. Faith is trust; trust in the living God; trust in the Sin-bearer. And faith involves self-surrender and obedience. To believe truth and to follow falsehood, to trust in Jesus Christ and to refuse submission, is impossible self-contradiction. Faith, taken all in all, is the acceptance of our necessary condition of dependence upon God, with all which that dependence naturally includes. The requirement of faith is, therefore, no arbitrary arrangement; it is grounded in the nature of things, in the moral nature of God and of man. Faith represents the eternal normal relation of a creature to the Creator. The lapse of penalty is not salvation. The turning away of penalty is rather a condition precedent of salvation, than an element of salvation itself.

492. Ye Must be Born Again.

Something more than an adjustment of objective relationships between the creature and the Creator is involved in salvation, or rather there must be a subjective adjustment of conditions in order that an objective adjustment may be possible. The deep damage done to man's moral nature in the fall must be repaired. First of all, the will must be set right; the radical and

generic choice of evil must be reversed. This reversal of the will marks the beginning of a new life. This is the most characteristic element of the "new birth." Then that product of evil generic choice, depravity of the sensibilities, must be corrected. A work of inward adjustment and purification must take place, which shall put enjoyment of that which is good and holy in place of pleasure in evil. This requirement of a radical renovation of man's moral nature is surely in harmony with reason.

493. Purification and Power Through Faith.

The holy Scriptures represent faith as the beginning and the root of the new spiritual life. Through faith the atonement becomes effective for the removal of guilt and penalty. Through faith the will is set right and depraved sensibilities are corrected. Through faith temptations are overcome. "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even your faith." And not only this, it is also through faith that spiritual power is received, by which great moral and spiritual achievements are accomplished. This also is grounded in a true philosophic principle. Faith represents the normal relation of the creature to the Creator. Man is not a self-existent, self-centered being. As the branch has its normal life in its union with the trunk and root, so does the soul of man find its true life in union with God. In this union the spiritual life is strong. Resolving, struggling, bracing the will, cannot take the place of that union with the Creator which comes of faith. Everywhere and in all things, doubt is weakness; much more in experimental religion, unbelief is weakness and faith is strength.

494. Faith Forever.

If, as has been set forth, faith represents the normal relation of man to God, then we might anticipate some suggestion in holy Scripture that faith belongs not only to the present life, but also to the future. This suggestion we find : “Whether there be prophecies, they shall fail ; whether there be tongues, they shall cease ; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.” But “now *abideth faith, hope, charity.*” We find, therefore, that the Christian religion bases salvation neither upon an arbitrary condition, nor upon a transient phase of man’s life, but upon the necessary and unchanging principles of man’s spiritual nature. It belongs to the moral nature of man in his relationship to God that he should believe, trust, hope, and love forever. The Christian religion and moral philosophy walk hand in hand.

PART II
PRACTICAL ETHICS

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD GOD

495. Obligation Concrete.

Wherever obligation exists it must needs exist as a concrete obligation ; it must take the form of specific duties. Duty is expressed by the word ought. A duty is that which one ought to do, or to render, or to be. In Part First of these Institutes, it has been shown that obligations have their ground in the facts and principles of moral being, in the nature of God, and of beings made in the likeness of God. It remains now to take a rapid survey of human duties in the various conditions and relations of men. But it does not belong to moral philosophy to give homilies upon the virtues or to point out in detail the duties of men in all possible circumstances. Moral philosophy should discuss and classify duties with reference to their underlying principles. The range and amplitude of the discussion must be determined by this dominant purpose not to elaborate a volume of moral precepts, but to show the application of moral principles to actual life.

496. Obedience to God.

First of all, and embracing all other duties, comes the duty of obedience to God. Obedience is voluntary conformity to the will of another; the acceptance of another's will as our own. Obedience to God is the sur-

render of the finite will to the infinite. The duty of obedience to God is the primary dictum of conscience. This obligation of obedience to God is absolute. The authority of no other being, or rule, or law, can stand for a moment against God's authority. No risk or danger can be counted a sufficient reason for disobedience. There may be doubt touching what the will of God is; but when the will of God has been certified to the soul the obligation to obey is absolute.

497. The Obligation Supreme.

The supremacy of the obligation to obey God is declared, in the first place, by conscience and reason. That which shows God to be supreme, shows also that the duty of obeying the divine will is absolute.

The holy Scriptures teach the supremacy of the obligation to obey God by precept, by example, and by the imperial enforcement of the divine will. The first command of the Decalogue declares the supremacy of the one Jehovah. Everywhere the Scriptures count the word of the Lord a finality, whether that word bring life or death. Abraham recognized in the divine word an authority to which every sensibility and hope of a father's heart must submit. The life of Jesus Christ shows the same full enthronement of the Father's will. As Paul "went bound in the Spirit unto Jerusalem, not knowing what should befall him there," so many men have gone to their life-work ready to suffer death for the Lord's will. And these examples illustrate the highest grade of moral character. The lack of the reverent recognition of this supreme obligation is the primary weakness of general morals.

498. Subjective Effects of Obedience to God.

For a man to bind himself to another man in the bond of absolute obedience, is on the face of it unseemly and unreasonable. It does violence to the nature of him who exercises absolute authority and the nature of him who yields limitless obedience. The one becomes an imperious tyrant, the other an unreasoning slave. Limitless obedience to God does not operate in this manner. Perfect obedience to God expresses the highest action of conscience. With perfectness of obedience there is a tenderness, a delicacy, a power of conscience which to the common grade of life is entirely unknown. The cultus of slavery bows and breaks the will of the slave ; it renders the slave abject. Submission to God's will, on the other hand, develops the most imperial strength and majesty of will. It brings the human will into alliance with the divine and renders it invincible. With this divine alliance the will of a tender woman or of a child has been able to meet threats, torture, and death with no weakness. Around such a character temptation surges as the sea around Gibraltar. What dignity it gives in the presence of men. It prepares the peasant to stand unabashed in the presence of the king. And whether it be the rugged Elijah, the zealous Paul, or the loving John, it develops a character equally strong. And this is no more than reason would lead us to expect, for obedience to God is in accord with every element of man's nature.

499. Characteristics of Perfect Obedience.

Perfect obedience to God has three characteristics : 1. The intention of perfect obedience. The conformity to

the moral law must not be an accident, and the intention must not be the purpose to conform in part. 2. Obedience must spring from the right principle of action, namely, from love to God ; that is, from a choice of God as the supreme object of self-consecration. The obedience must not spring from fear, in the low sense, nor from self-love. 3. There must be actual conformity to the divine will, not only the intention to conform, but the conformity in fact. This supposes a knowledge of the divine will, the intention to do it, and the ability to do it.

500. Scope of Obedience to God.

Obedience to God includes, first, conformity to the moral law, as epitomized in the Decalogue and as interpreted in the requirement of love to God and love to man. Obedience includes, in the second place, direct personal service toward God, as taught in the gospel of Christ—the service of worship and the service of work for building up God's kingdom among men. It includes, in the third place, quick and profound responsiveness to the monitions of the Holy Spirit of God in the soul. Perfect obedience brings one into very intimate relations with God.

501. Grounds of the Duty of Obedience to God.

The duty of obedience to God is grounded, first, in the axiomatic principle, the primary dictum of conscience, that obedience is due to the supreme authority ; and secondly, upon the principles set forth in the chapter which treats of the grounds of moral obligation. The duty of obedience to God is the chief corner-stone in the temple of morals.

502. The Duty of Love to God.

Love is the election of an object to which to give one's self and the sensibilities which arise from that choice. Sometimes the element of choice seems more prominent, sometimes the sensibilities. Whether the element of sensibility be joy or pain depends upon the attributes of the object loved. In God is the fullness of excellency and in loving him is the fullness of joy. Love to God signifies then the supreme action of the will by which a man places himself in his normal attitude toward his maker, giving himself to God and choosing God in preference to all things else in the universe, as the satisfaction of his nature, and the joyous response of the sensibilities to this high choice of the will. Love to God stands in us correlative to the supreme worthiness of the Divine Being. He is the sun of the soul, and we ought to recognize him as being what he is. He alone can make the life of man blessed, and we ought to seek in him that blessedness. Love cannot be separated from obedience, nor obedience from love. Not to love God and have pleasure in his attributes is to show a character the opposite of the divine.

503. The Duty of Gratitude toward God.

Gratitude is the response of the soul to God's goodness, gifts, love, and grace. The consideration of his good will and favor awakens this sensibility. The world is full of the divine bounties ; the sunshine and the rain, the fat valleys waving with harvests, the hills full of treasures, all things upon which human faculties may find occupation, enlargement, and enjoyment. "God so loved the world that he gave his son." Who does not

need the divine grace? God created the nature of man correlative to his own in order that it might be responsive. The response of gratitude is not a mere barren sensibility, ending in itself. It carries with it substantial tokens of power; it finds expression in self-devotion and service. Any profession of gratitude to God that does not give this substantial expression of itself proves by this sign its lack of sincerity.

504. The Duty of Reverence toward God.

Reverence is the response which the soul makes to greatness, to majesty, to infinity. In the great universe man is but an atom. The forces of nature grind him to powder with no recognition of his existence. In the grades and ranks of intelligent beings man finds "principalities and powers" far above him. In the presence of God all man's wisdom and power turn to folly and nothingness. Reverence is awakened by the infinite attributes of God and his mighty works. Reverence is the mark of a soul capable of appreciating greatness and excellence; the lack of it is the token of a mind with no ideals higher than itself. The greater the soul the deeper the awe in the presence of the high and holy One. The duty of reverence is strongly taught in the holy Scriptures. Reverence is an essential element of worship. In the presence of God Moses said: "I exceedingly fear and quake"; the people before the golden calf "ate and drank and rose up to play."

505. Manifestations of Reverence.

Where reverence toward the unseen God exists it will show itself in many ways. It will express itself in the

general tone of life. It will show itself in a thoughtful and restrained use of the name of God. Reverence is not flippant ; it does not use the words of sacred Scripture to point a witticism or raise a laugh. Reverence counts places of divine worship sacred. Reverence is seen in the manner of addressing God in prayer ; it does not affect familiarity and does not summon and command the Divine Being ; it does not parade an inflated rhetoric ; it does not appeal to men for admiration, while in form it addresses the high and holy One. Reverence is mindful of the words of solemn caution : "Be not rash with thy mouth, and let not thine heart be hasty to utter anything before God ; for God is in heaven and thou upon the earth, therefore let thy words be few."

506. The Duty of Faith toward God.

Faith is belief and trust ; belief in the unseen spiritual world, belief in the existence of God and in the revelation which he has made of himself, his will, and his truth ; a belief by which the soul is brought under the dominion of spiritual facts and forces ; a trust by which a man surrenders himself obediently to the divine keeping. Saving faith is trust in Jesus Christ as the sin-bearer and Saviour, and is always connected with repentance for sin. Faith is the soul's recognition of the reality of spiritual things and of its own spiritual nature. Faith is correlative and responsive to the divine truth and faithfulness. As we have already seen, faith represents the normal relation of the creature to the Creator. These views of faith show well enough man's duty to exercise faith toward God. The lack of faith is an

offensive sin ; it declares either that God is not or that he is untrue and untrustworthy, or that man is independent of him and needs him not. Unbelief is always connected with disobedience. It separates a man from his Maker and renders divine help impossible. It is as unnatural as it is sinful. The holy Scriptures continually summon men to the exercise of faith.

507. The Duty of Prayer and Worship.

All prayer is worship, and one important element of worship is prayer. In some respects prayer and worship may be considered together ; in other respects they must be treated separately. Prayer is a request expressed and presented to God ; it represents conscious need, dependence, and faith. Worship is broader than prayer ; it is the expression of reverence, gratitude, faith, and love. It is expressed in words of prayer, in songs, in bodily attitudes, in symbolic actions and ceremonies, and in offerings. Prayer, praise, and offerings belong to worship always and everywhere. Symbolic ceremonies have been appointed and have been changed as the Lord has pleased. The simple forms of worship among the patriarchs were greatly amplified in the Levitic ritual, and then again new symbolic forms were introduced by Christ to express the experiences of the Christian faith.

508. Worship Grounded in Nature.

The duty of worshiping God is deeply grounded in the nature of man. This signifies that there is in human nature a deep sense of weakness and dependence. It means also that the sensibilities which find expression in

worship are not exotic affections of the soul superinduced upon man's nature. Reverence, gratitude, faith, and love are native to the true life of man ; it is a maimed and distorted human life in which they are lacking. And it means, in the third place, that the expression of holy sensibilities is natural. The life of the soul develops spontaneously into expression. So natural is worship, that in some crude form corresponding to the dwarfed and meagre life of the soul it is found among the most degraded of the human race.

509. Worship Commanded in Holy Scripture.

The worship of God is strongly enjoined in holy Scripture. Under the Mosaic regimen the forms of worship were strictly defined, and participation in the worship was required of all. From birth to death religious ceremonial touched the life of the people everywhere. Christ and his apostles were devout worshipers. The voice of all Scripture is, "Worship God."

510. Prayer Commanded.

As has been said, prayer is the expression of conscious need and faith. This element of worship is specially enjoined in holy Scripture. As samples, we may cite injunctions like these : "After this manner therefore pray ye" ; "I will that men pray everywhere" ; "Pray without ceasing" ; "If ye ask anything in my name, I will do it" ; "Ask and ye shall receive" ; "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." By precept, by example, and by promise the Scriptures teach the duty of prayer as resting upon all men.

511. Theoretical Difficulties.

Theoretical difficulties touching the divine response to prayer spring in part from false notions of God and are partly futile ; and in no case can they be counted philosophic objections. Difficulties of understanding are found wherever free will touches the fixed order of the universe. And difficulties confront one in the denial of the efficacy of prayer as well as in the affirmation. Those who deny that prayer prevails with God must first of all give account, on the basis of nature alone, of the entire fabric of the Christian religion with all its supernatural elements. If they confess the existence of God, they must justify that conception of him which represents him as unmoved and pitiless toward cries of deepest distress which his creatures raise to him. Or if they deny even the divine existence, they must give account of that spontaneous cry to an unseen power when extreme trouble comes. The difficulties which meet the unbeliever are greater than those which beset the man of faith.

512. Prayer not Dictation.

Efficacious prayer does not imply that God surrenders the option of giving or withholding according to his wisdom and his pleasure, otherwise prayer would cease to be supplication and become demand. The promise of a gracious answer when the conditions are fulfilled is positive ; but this does not mean a surrender of the divine will. Prayer presupposes the divine sovereignty. This will become manifest in the further treatment of this subject. The supreme prayer said, "Thy will be done."

513. Prayer not for the Purpose of Overcoming Reluctance.

It is utter misapprehension of the nature of prayer to account it importunity to induce the Supreme Being to change his mind, to persuade him to do that which he is reluctant to do, or to forego the doing of that to which he is inclined. Reason must needs be offended by such a conception. Prayer seeks that which God desires to do, that which he awaits the opportunity of doing in the fulfillment of conditions embraced in the right asking. Prayer does not seek to change God's disposition toward men, but to place the suppliant in an attitude and relationship to receive the good which God desires to bestow. This does not signify that prayer is a mere subjective moral exercise, a kind of spiritual gymnastics.

514. Prayer and Eternal Purpose.

Philosophy finds no stumbling-block in respect to prayer in the stability of the divine purposes. God has declared it to be a part of his eternal purpose to answer the prayer of faith ; he has spoken of no purpose more immutable. The divine purpose embraces the prayer and the answer, the free action of man and the answer of God, and weaves them into the fabric of divine providence in perfect harmony. If philosophy can admit freedom anywhere, it can equally well admit freedom in this matter.

515. Conditions of Prevailing Prayer.

Upon this subject there is one sole source of knowledge, the holy Scriptures.

The radical conditions of prevailing prayer are three : First, prayer must be something more than a mere cry

of distress ; it must be addressed to God ; it must express faith in him. If it is not addressed to God it is not prayer ; if faith is lacking, the soul is separate from God and not in the right relationship to receive anything good. Second, prayer must be offered with a right intention. In sacred Scripture it is written, "I will that men pray everywhere, lifting up *holy* hands, without *wrath* and doubting." "Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss, *that ye may spend it in your pleasures.*" The intention must not be self-indulgence or self-pleasing, but some purpose which in the sight of God is right and good. In the third place, prayer must represent not a man's own personal will merely, that is self-will, but a will that has become one with the divine will. The word of holy Scripture is, "If we ask anything according to his will, he heareth us." "Not my will but thine be done." "We know not how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us." The prayer which is inspired in the soul by the indwelling Holy Spirit cannot be contrary to the divine will. Jesus said, "If ye abide in me and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." These words express a union with Jesus Christ such that the words, "in my name," represent a real fact of experience as if the prayer were presented by Christ himself. These are three radical conditions of prevailing prayer as presented in the sacred Scriptures. Philosophy cannot stumble at these conditions.

516. The Testimony of Experience.

The experience of good men in all ages encourages prayer. The men who have the largest experience of

prayer ought to know best whether prayer is useless. The men who decry prayer are the men who have never prayed. They have never tried it ; they have no experience in the matter and have no right to speak. Those who pray most believe most strongly that prayer is not useless. Theoretical difficulties cannot stand against facts of universal experience.

517. Characteristics of Worship.

First of all, the worship of God must be sincere, absolutely sincere. It must express real feeling and the inward life of the worshiper. If it is not sincere it is worse than nothing. Worship is for God and not for the eyes and ears of men. "God is a spirit, and they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." The worship of God ought to be characterized by great simplicity. Simplicity is closely allied with sincerity. Pompous or subtle rhetoric, artistic grouping of ceremonies, gorgeous ritualism, are nothing to him who made the heavens and the earth. Such things dissipate spirituality. The satisfying of a man's artistic sense can easily be mistaken for worship. Simplicity is an element of sublimity. Worship ought to be characterized by deep reverence. God is in heaven ; "God alone is great." Shall man approach God with affected familiarity ? Worship ought to be suited to the divine majesty and holiness. Sensible of their nothingness and their sin, let men come thoughtfully, with head uncovered and bowed, into the presence of him who sits on the circle of the heavens, to whom all nations are as the dust of the balance, who dwells in light unapproachable, and whose holiness is a consuming fire. A fourth

characteristic of worship is suitableness to the occasion and the feelings which dominate the time. That which is suitable for private worship in the closet may be very unbecoming in the great congregation. Worship on days of joyful thanksgiving may rightly differ from the worship of humiliation and fasting.

The formative principle of worship is that it suitably express the actual verities of the spiritual life.

518. Private Worship.

Every individual human being has an inward life peculiarly his own and unlike any other. In some of its elements this interior life is not expressed to men nor in the presence of men. This secret life has its relationships to God. It must be laid open to him; it must be brought to him for comfort, for nurture, or for gracious correction. By this private waiting on God men of faith are prepared for public life. So Christ commands, "Enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father in secret, and thy Father who seeth in secret, shall reward thee." In the divine responses to private prayer are found the springs of great achievements.

519. Family Worship.

The family is the unit of social relationships, the closest and most permanent form of social life. This family life has its own private elements with which a stranger must not intermeddle. Family life ought to have expression in worship. It must be brought to God for blessing and sanctification. That life may not become secular and material, there is need of worship in

the family more frequent than the public assemblies. It is especially needful for training the children of the family in faith and the fear of the Lord. If the children see no worship in the family there will be little to remind them of spiritual realities, and those faculties of the soul by which it is brought in touch with the spiritual world will be left undeveloped. Piety is not hereditary, yet a pure and deep religious life in the family tends powerfully to propagate piety with all its blessings.

520. Public Worship.

There is a broader social life than that of the family. This larger social life demands expression before God ; it needs to be penetrated and permeated by spiritual influences. Public worship is especially necessary for instructing the people in religious truth and duties. No other method has been found so effective for doing this. In public worship spiritual influences are brought to bear upon the irreligious and the immoral to lead them to repentance. The resistless tide of emotion in great assemblies is often effective in turning the life of the most obdurate men into better channels. Under the stimulus and the uplifting force of the mighty current of emotion, the will is able to turn from the evil past and to make a new generic choice.

521. Repentance.

Repentance is the turning from sin and from the love of sin unto obedience to God and the love of righteousness. It is a generic choice of the will attended by excitement of the cognate sensibilities. This generic choice and change of the will and of the related sensi-

bilities is a "change of heart." From the nature of the case this change is radical and is intended to stand forever. The choice of righteousness with the purpose that the choice be temporary is impossible; the thought of it is self-contradictory. That would not be the choice of righteousness, but of some ulterior object to be gained by the form of righteousness.

522. Repentance a Duty.

The duty of repentance is involved in the duty of loving and obeying God. If it is the duty of every man to obey God, it must needs be the duty of every one who has not been obedient, to cease instantly from his transgression and begin a life of obedience. Every soul of man that has not loved God supremely is under the most pressing obligation to cease from that life which has self for its end and make God his supreme object of devotion. In affirming the duty of obedience conscience affirms the duty of repentance. The holy Scriptures strongly enjoin the obligation to repent of sin. God "commandeth all men everywhere to repent, because he hath appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness."

523. Repentance a Privilege

Repentance should be accounted a duty, but it should not be looked upon as a hard and painful thing, to be contemplated with dread and approached with reluctance. Repentance is a door graciously opened to sinful men for their escape from evil and misery. It is the opportunity of recovering perfection of being, to be healed of a mortal taint and sickness, and to attain

health of the soul. That one has been a great sinner against God is ground for boundless regret, but the repentance is full of the elements of happiness ; it is to be embraced with eager haste and boundless gladness.

524. Keeping the Sabbath Holy.

The question whether the seventh day of the week or the first day shall be accounted the Christian Sabbath does not belong to moral science. Whichever day has been divinely appointed the obligation to observe it is the same, and the benefits of the observance are the same. The obligation to observe the Sabbath as a day of holy rest from secular labor finds its ground in the divine will declared first, in the nature of man ; secondly, in the sacred Scriptures. Corresponding to these are the benefits which flow from the observance of the Sabbath, first, physical and temporal welfare ; secondly, spiritual and eternal good. Secular thrift, good morals, and spiritual elevation follow hand in hand the right observance of the Sabbath.

525. Physical Benefits.

Days of rest, regularly recurring and frequent, are needful for man's physical welfare. By experiments made in France it has been proved that a rest of one day in seven is better for men than of one day in ten. It has been proved by numberless experiences and experiments that in long-continued labor men can accomplish more by observing the Sabbath than by continuous toil ; that by regarding the Sabbath the mind is kept in a fresher condition and better fitted for work requiring attention and carefulness ; that health and lon-

gevity are promoted; that the improved condition of workmen is shown by a marked reduction in the number of accidents; that continuous labor brings such weariness and dullness of mind in the oversight of machinery that dangerous and destructive accidents become certain. And that which is true of human toilers is true also of beasts of draught and burden. Six days of labor with one of rest is found to be more productive than continuous labor.

526. Intellectual Benefits.

The mind is dependent upon the body. Whatever unduly wearis and wears out the body, impairs the efficiency of mental operations. Mental labor without a Sabbath becomes monotonous drudgery. The mind loses its alertness and vigor. It cannot grapple with the problems of business or philosophy. Errors, blunders, and failures become inevitable. And the Sabbath not only brings rest to the jaded mind, but by its religious activities wonderfully stirs and stimulates the mind to high thought.

527. Moral and Religious Benefits.

The supreme benefits of the Sabbath are found in the moral and religious training which is secured by its observance. Without a Sabbath religion is crowded out from man's life; the higher aspects and elements of life drop out of view. Without a Sabbath a busy, toiling population are too weary and exhausted to rise above the consideration of animal wants. The moral condition of a community may be pretty well gauged from the manner in which the Sabbath is observed. Without

a religious Sabbath ignorance of religious truth prevails and morality decays. The tendency to change the Sabbath from a holy day into a holiday, and to overrun the holiday with secular employments, portends nothing but evil for the people. For the weary toiler the Sabbath, made first a holiday, next becomes a work day ; and seven days' labor is less productive than six, and therefore in the final outcome less remunerative. The Sabbath broken down means for the people more work for less pay, exhausted vitality, a life of drudgery without zest, lower intellectual life, the decay of religion and of all the higher welfare of men, and the growth of vice and crime.

528. The Holy Scriptures and the Sabbath.

The duty of observing the weekly Sabbath as a holy day is enjoined in the Scriptures with the greatest positiveness. In the Decalogue we find, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour and do all thy work, but the seventh is the Sabbath of the Lord, thy God ; in it thou shalt not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy daughter, nor thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day ; wherefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it." This command is reiterated, explained, and enforced almost without end. "Six days shalt thou do thy work, and on the seventh thou shalt rest ; that thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son of thine hand-maid and the stranger may be refreshed." "Verily my Sabbaths ye shall keep ; for it is a sign be-

tween me and you throughout your generations." "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath from doing thy pleasure on my holy day and call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, honourable, and shalt honour him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words, then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord, and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob, thy father ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." No comment upon these injunctions of holy Scripture can add to their impressiveness.

529. Permitted Work upon the Sabbath.

Religious services upon the Sabbath require some labor. "The priests in the temple profane the Sabbath and are blameless" ; that is, in the offering of the sacrifices they must needs do work. Christ taught that the Sabbath is not profaned by the healing of the sick, nor by that labor which is needful to supply the natural wants of man and beast and thus prevent suffering. And there are emergencies in life which go far beyond the stress of supplying man's common needs. The saving of life is the extreme necessity. Reducing these illustrations to the form of principles, we find this rule concerning permissible work—that works of *necessity*, works of *mercy*, and works of *religious worship*, do not violate the Sabbath.

530. All Days not Equally Sacred.

It is a logical fallacy and a perversion of Christian principle to secularize the Sabbath upon the plea of

counting all days alike holy. God has commanded that every day be spent in righteousness, but he has not set apart all days as holy days. Some days are appointed for secular concerns. Sacred days and secular days are not the extreme of a see-saw ; as the sacred day is lifted up, the secular day does not on that account descend, nor does the lowering of the holy day lift up other days. The high observance of the holy day lifts up all the rest.

531. The Manner of Keeping the Sabbath.

The following principles may be laid down as embraced in the command to keep the Sabbath holy. First, the day must be kept as a *religious* day, a day devoted to God, in strong distinction from days devoted to secular labor to supply the need of man's physical life.

Secondly, the Sabbath ought to be so observed that it shall remain, as it was appointed to be, a *Sabbath*, a day of rest. If a man toil unremittingly seven days in the week in religious work, he does not indeed profane the Sabbath, but he loses one of its great benefits. He wears himself out prematurely. For the sake of efficiency in religious work there must be a rest day. But for men engaged in secular pursuits, religious activities upon the Sabbath, without undue stress or strain, are more restful than idleness. The stimulus of high religious thought may be the most restful recreation. In the third place, the Sabbath must be made a day of worship and spiritual culture. This is the positive side of the first principle laid down. The Sabbath is for "solemn assemblies," for public worship, for instruction in the holy Scriptures, for preaching the gospel, for nourishing the spiritual life of man.

532. Dedication of Property to God.

The duty of dedicating property to God is grounded in reason, justice, and human nature, as well as in positive divine command. The raw material of wealth is God's direct gift to men. Through him the forces of matter and the agencies of organized nature operate. In him we ourselves also "live and move and have our being." According to reason and justice some recognition of this is due. By consecrating a part to God men acknowledge him as the giver of all. This is so reasonable that it generally finds a place in the natural religions of pagan nations. Much more should the true God be so recognized.

The holy Scriptures strongly enjoin the duty of dedicating property to God. The withholding of offerings is called robbery. "Will a man rob God? Yet ye have robbed me, even this whole nation." The people ask in reply, "Wherein have we robbed thee?" The Lord's answer is, "In tithes and offerings." In Judaism a certain fixed proportion of every man's income was required as a religious offering. The New Testament enjoins a dedication of soul, body, and property so complete as to go entirely beyond the tithing of income and the dedication of first-fruits. When body, soul, spirit, and possessions are all holy to the Lord, then that which supports the owner is dedicated as if it fed a priest, and that which nourishes his strength for pious work is as if it were consumed upon an altar.

533. Recognizes God's Right.

The dedication of property to God is the fitting recognition of his primary right to all the wealth of the world.

The basis of all wealth is the raw material, which is God's gift; all wealth-producing is the exercise of faculties which God has given. As it is just "to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," so it is no less a matter of justice "to render to God the things that are God's."

534. Dedication of Property as a Thank Offering.

The dedication of property to God is a suitable thank offering for the divine goodness and mercies. Pagans hang up in the temples of their gods their votive offerings, memorials of great deliverances, and in this they show that such gifts of gratitude have a basis in human nature. Christian men may well do the same with profounder thankfulness and a more intelligent faith. And no life is without special occasions and experiences which call for special gratitude.

535. Dedication of Property for Public Worship.

Property is due to be dedicated to God for the support of public worship and for the propagation of the Christian religion. In the Christian faith lies the hope of the human race, and this faith must be propagated by labor and the products of labor. Through the dedication of property, each generation as it comes must be instructed and educated in the Christian religion, and by the same means the blessings of Christianity must be carried to all nations.

536. Dedication of Property for Public Needs.

Property must needs be dedicated to God to meet the great intellectual and social wants of men. Among these

great wants we may mention the founding and maintenance of institutions of learning and of scientific research. It is not the student or the scientific investigator who does this or who can do it. These wants must be met from the accumulations of wealth in the hands of the few. This work must not be left to be done by the State alone, for this would be to secularize all learning. There is a place for secular learning, and there is a place also, and a necessity, for learning which is distinctively Christian. Learning which at the first is merely secular and non-Christian, easily becomes anti-Christian. The science which is based solely upon sense-perception drifts in this age toward a denial of the unseen and the spiritual. The Christian religion cannot afford to suffer all learning and science to pass into the exclusive possession of its enemies. Wealth dedicated to God must found and support institutions of *Christian* learning.

537. Dedication of Property to Relieve Suffering.

Property ought to be dedicated to God for the relief of suffering, for the poor and unfortunate. Feeble members of the human race, incapable of self-support and friendless, are many, and the stress and strain and accidents of life are continually adding to the number. It belongs to the brotherhood of man and to the love which is born of the Christian faith to help these suffering members of the human family. However this may be done, whether by benevolent institutions or by private charity, the work must be done by the dedication of property. "The poor ye have always with you, and whosoever ye will ye may do them good."

538. The Dedication of Property not for Man's Sake Only.

The dedication of property must not be understood as having as its sole meaning to meet the wants of men ; perhaps it finds its deepest significance toward God himself. The costly gift of spikenard, complained of by Judas but commended by Jesus, relieved no human suffering. Three hundred *denarii*, the price of a year's labor, exhaled in perfume and was lost upon the air. This incident signifies that the expression of faith and love toward God is a sufficient reason for the expenditure of wealth. We expend money upon our friends, not to relieve suffering, but to express love. It is fitting to do the same toward God.

539. Actual Service to God.

Besides the obligation to believe, to love, to worship, there remains the duty of rendering actual objective service to God. This service consists chiefly in acknowledging God, in standing for God, in speaking for God in the presence of men, and especially in the presence of faithless men.

540. Acknowledging the Unseen.

The service of testimony which is due from men to God is, first of all, a bearing witness to God's existence and the reality of the spiritual world and of the life to come. Surrounded as men are by that which appeals to the physical senses only, in the paralysis of faith which so much prevails they drift easily toward a denial of the unseen world. Were it not for the testimony of men who believe in spiritual things faith would perish and the world would recognize nothing but matter.

541. Testimony to Revealed Truth.

"Truth is mighty and will prevail," but truth will not prevail without advocates. The holy Scriptures hold their place and influence by the testimony of men who believe and are willing to stand before the world as believers and defenders. The inspired writings have never been without bitter foes, and in this generation their enemies are pushing the attack all along the line. This attack must be met by the testimony of no inferior scholarship, and by literary and scientific criticism no less acute. This testimony must needs be manifold.

542. The Testimony of Religious Experience.

The testimony to revealed religious truth must be various. The testimony of scholarship appeals to learning and convinces scholarship; the testimony of faith and conviction begets conviction. The word of God, when believed, works powerfully in the hearts of men. He that believes is "born of God." Faith "works by love and purifies the heart." Testimony is needed to the reality of this inward transformation. This testimony must be the expression of personal experience. By means of such testimony from those who have been born of the Spirit, faith in a supernatural experience is kept alive and the experience itself is propagated.

543. The Duty of Service to God Imperative.

The duty of standing for God in the presence of friends and of enemies is absolutely imperative. To live truth and righteousness, to be faithful to the deepest convictions of the soul, is a mandate of conscience. The interior life of a man, if it is strong, will assert

itself and force expression. Before the great council Peter said : "We *cannot* but *speak* the things we have seen and heard." In yet more forcible language the prophet Jeremiah declares the impossibility of stifling his convictions : "His word," he says, "was in my heart as burning fire shut up in my bones, and I was weary with forbearing, and I could not withhold." If the men who believe in God and in revealed religion shut up their convictions, what will become of the human race?

The duty of testimony is enjoined as a positive command of holy Scripture. The great word of Christ is, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." "Whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this sinful and adulterous generation, of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels."

CHAPTER XIX

CONCERNING DUTIES HAVING RESPECT TO ONE'S SELF

544. Obligation Cannot be to Self.

We must not say duties *to* ourselves. The notion of obligation to one's self and that form of speech which implies this are delusive and misleading. They obscure the right conception of obligation. This matter has been already considered. But toward God and toward men we are under obligations which have respect to ourselves. The obligation is to the other party; the benefit arising from its fulfillment may accrue to us. As touching ourselves these duties may be privileges, or they may be rights which we may claim, or ought to claim, as requisite for our welfare. As rights they are best considered from the opposite view-point, the view-point of duties on the part of others. That which I have a right to claim for myself it is the duty of another to render, and my right is his duty to me, and not my duty to myself.

545. The Duty of Self-preservation.

This is a duty due first of all to God; it is also a duty generally due to men. All things depend upon life. Only by preserving life, and by preserving life in good condition, can we fulfill our obligations to our Creator or to one another. If a man owe a debt, he is morally bound not only to pay the debt if he is able, but he is equally bound to do his best to keep himself

or to make himself able to pay the debt. Many primary obligations carry with themselves, therefore, the secondary obligation to keep ourselves in condition to fulfill the first.

546. Self-preservation a Duty to God.

In the first place, God gave life of his own will ; it belongs, therefore, to him to take life. To us it belongs to nourish and conserve the life which he gave. In the second place, to destroy intentionally one's own life from stress of grief or anxiety is to repudiate faith in God and to refuse submission to his will. The pains of life, which we cannot escape, represent the will of God for us, the conditions under which it is his will that we serve him. Faith accepts these divine appointments as wise and good. To take our own lives is to deny this faith in God ; it is an act of impiety and rebellion. To hide in the grave from the shame of meeting the consequences of our sins is to cut ourselves off from the opportunity of repentance and to flee from the eyes of men to meet untimely the judgments of the Creator. In the third place, to destroy one's own life is not seldom to betray, basely and cowardly betray, the trust of those who are nearest and dearest. The suicide deserts his family and leaves helpless ones to struggle alone with difficulties and necessities. This manner of abandoning wife, children, and friends is just as faithless as any other.

547. The Duty of Caring for Health.

The same considerations which show the duty of preserving life indicate the duty of caring for health.

Health is the necessary condition of rendering the best service to God or men. To abuse one's health is to rob God and one's friends and society. The woman who suffers herself to become sick when she might be well and strong, robs her husband and her children. And it is hardly needful to say that the best privileges of life depend upon the preservation of health.

548. The Duty of Self-preservation Limited.

Self-preservation is a duty, but there may be a higher obligation than any care for self. The divine will may call for self-sacrifice in place of self-saving. Patriots and Christian martyrs have not counted personal welfare or life itself the chief good, and the world has not counted them recreant to duty. There is no heroic virtue without self-abnegation. The mother does not neglect her sick child, although her own bodily welfare may suffer. Fidelity to truth and love outranks self-preservation. High services and great emergencies call for self-consecration. This self-abnegation may be concentrated into a moment of utmost self-sacrifice ; it may stretch through years of toil and suffering till life is worn out for the welfare of others ; it may be the surrender of opportunities of self-culture and the acceptance of a narrow life that another life may be made richer. The Christian faith gives assurance that such self-sacrifice can never bring final loss to those who thus forget themselves.

549. The Duty of Self-improvement.

Self-improvement signifies attention and effort directed to the cultivation of one's own faculties, man-

ners, or character. It ought to embrace the whole extent of a man's being and life. Self-improvement is stimulus and growth for faculties that are weak ; regulation and discipline for faculties that are strong ; the development of that which is lacking ; the pruning away of that which is redundant ; change toward perfection in faculty and character. Without further analysis of the scope or methods of self-improvement, the duty of self-improvement is here emphasized. This duty is especially binding upon the young, for whom there are so large possibilities of self-cultivation.

550. Self-cultivation a Duty toward God.

Since God made man in his own likeness, it is plainly man's duty to realize as fully as possible that divine ideal. This is the sum of man's duty. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." Still further, every command of God requiring service toward himself or toward men carries with it the duty of fitting ourselves as well as possible for that work. No life is righteous, much less is it a life of love, which is not a life of usefulness to mankind. A selfish life may be full of thought and energy ; it may be great with executive force, but it can never be worthy ; it cannot fulfill the divine will. Every obligation which can bind a man to a life of love and usefulness for the Lord's sake calls him to seek for perfection of being.

551. The Duty of Claiming One's Rights.

Obedience to God often requires the surrender of one's rights without contention. The life of Jesus Christ was a continual illustration of this. His precepts

are a transcript of this element of his life. He commands men to meet hatred with love ; to wear out injury with patient submission. This surrender of one's rights does not signify merely the endurance of injury by one who by reason of weakness is unable to resist. It is the magnanimous self-abnegation of one who will not meet wrong with violence or injure another in self-defense. But sometimes it becomes a man's duty to claim and vindicate his rights. Paul would not suffer himself to be pushed out of the apostleship. Every man set in a place of trust and responsibility must stand for the rights which belong to his position, because not otherwise can he meet his obligations. God gives to every one some place of trust and responsibility. It belongs, therefore, to every man to assert and vindicate his right to do his duty and to fit himself for his duties, to make life worth something to himself and to others. By standing for the rights of conscience men have not only maintained their own spiritual integrity, but have also gained unmeasured good for the human race. The right to do right and the right to determine aright one's own immortal destiny must be vindicated at any cost. But this assertion of one's rights is often best made by the patient endurance of wrong. It is the determined fulfillment of all duty in patient passiveness toward all injury. The general principle is this : when the assertion of one's rights is necessary for the fulfillment of imperative obligation, rights must be claimed and vindicated ; when, however, the assertion of rights is the assertion of selfishness, or at best nothing more than the assertion of self-love, they may be forborne, and very often a man ought to surrender them rather than contend.

CHAPTER XX

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD MEN

552. Scope of the Discussion.

Duties of men to men are numberless. The principles which underlie them are few, but diversified relationships and circumstances cause the applications of those principles to ramify without limit. To give an exhaustive account of duties is impossible, for an account which should be complete to-day, would cease to-morrow to be complete; new conditions would give rise to new forms of duty till then unthought of and impossible. All that can be attempted here, is to illustrate by certain radical duties the application of moral principles to human conduct.

553. The Duty of Non-interference.

Perhaps the most generalized form of duty between man and man is the duty of non-interference with the rights of others. Every human being must be left in the full possession and enjoyment of all his natural rights. Violations of this principle constitute the crimes of men. In the universal brotherhood of the human race, and in the unity of relationship to the one Creator, we find an immutable basis of equality in respect to natural rights. The principle of benevolence forbids interference with the rights of another. Every human being is a distinct and separate personality, having his own separate and

peculiar destiny. Justice requires that this separateness of personality be respected. Between man and man there is ample place for influence and help, but no place for interfering with natural rights.

554. Interference with the Rights of Property.

The first form of interference with the rights of men which suggests itself is infringements upon the right to hold, use, and enjoy property. In its baldest, boldest form this interference is theft and robbery. It violates in the rudest way the command, "Thou shalt not steal." But there are forms of interference with the rights of property more subtle than theft and robbery. The crafty take advantage of the unwary; the strong crowd the weak to the wall; selfish men use the necessities of others as their opportunity for gain; a few by cunning and by might appropriate advantages for themselves, till no place is left for the many, and life becomes for them a strain scarce worth the living. Every form of greed by which one person appropriates for himself the products of another man's labor, without due exchange of benefits, is violence done to the rights of property. Every human being must be allowed a fair, even opportunity for livelihood, the best which the Creator has rendered possible. The principle of universal brotherhood demands this.

555. Interference to Corrupt Character.

There is one wrong greater than interference with rights of property—interference with the free personality for corrupting moral character. This is the greatest possible evil and injury. Here we find every possible

method of spreading moral defilement and of leading the will to wrong choices. This unclean and fiendish work is begun upon the minds and hearts of the young. Their minds are filled with vile pictures of evil ; sin is painted as pleasant, beautiful, and good ; every forbidden fruit is made to seem sweet and luscious ; virtue is pictured as repulsive and mean. Then follows personal solicitation to evil-doing, the pressure of personality upon personality. To those who are tempted there belongs indeed the power of choice and the possibility of resistance—but little chance have the young in this grapple with experienced fiends who seek the life of their souls. They run the gauntlet of temptations to form the drink habit ; seductive incitements to unchastity ; invitations to gambling and fraud for the sake of gain ; allurements to a life of lawlessness for the pleasure of its wild freedom. It is the high moral right of every human being to meet evil and work out his own destiny under the most favorable conditions, with no added difficulties beyond those which the Creator has appointed. Those who corrupt the young ought to be counted and branded and punished as the basest and most guilty of mankind.

556. Interference with the Rights of Reputation.

Every man has a right to whatever good name he deserves. Nothing can be more absolutely a man's own than the good reputation which he has won by a life of integrity and goodness. To destroy such a name is robbery indeed. As a personal damage and affront, few wrongs could be greater. If a man is true, honest, and able, it is no more than justice to accord to him the

recognition of these qualities. The loss of reputation may be the loss of livelihood, the loss of social recognition, the loss of power to do good in the world. All this is so manifest that interference with the rights of reputation is everywhere recognized as a crime.

557. Interference with the Rights of Conscience.

As has already been shown, freedom of conscience is the right to determine for one's self one's own attitude toward his Creator. It is the right to hold and profess such religious belief, and to offer such worship and service to God, as shall seem to each one to be true and in harmony with the divine will. Also, as has been shown, this freedom of the individual must not be so interpreted as to conflict with the equal rights of others. Non-interference with this liberty of the soul is a sacred duty. As the brotherhood of man and the equality of natural rights have become recognized, governments are learning the duty and the good policy of according to all men their religious rights. Fines, imprisonments, whippings, the rack, the stake, are falling into the past. But interference with the rights of conscience may be exercised in other ways; not only by pains and penalties, but by rewards for the profession of some certain faith; by governmental favoritism approximating the establishment of a State Church; by an intolerant public sentiment which goes quite beyond a due testimony for the truth; by the ostracism of a minority with an intensity of reprobation not deserved by any fault in the unhappy victim; by an extreme exercise of authority in the family. This interference may arise from sheer arrogance of disposition, or from mistaken zeal for that

which is counted the truth ; but from whatever source it springs, it violates natural rights and works evil. To draw the line, however, between legitimate testimony and influence, in behalf of the truth, on the one side, and that undue pressure and authority which trenches upon religious freedom, on the other, demands the greatest wisdom.

558. Interference with Personal Liberty.

Interference with personal liberty constitutes slavery in its many grades and forms. That the drift of the age is toward the extinction of slavery in all parts of the world is to be thankfully recognized. The disappearance of African slavery in the United States of America renders the discussion of this subject at this time more theoretical and less a practical necessity than before emancipation. But so bold an interference with natural rights, one that has so fortified itself by law and authority, and has so intrenched itself in indurated custom and social organization, and is moreover so slow to pass away, demands some notice.

559. Origin of Slavery.

With servitude as the just penalty of crime we have here nothing to do. Men who use their freedom for the injury of others, compel organized society in self-defense to restrain that ill-used freedom. Involuntary servitude as penalty for crime, if wisely and benevolently administered, is perhaps the best form of penalty. But such servitude is not called slavery. One chief source of slavery has been war. Prisoners of war have been sold into bondage ; the defenseless population of

conquered districts, women and children, have been swept into servitude. But the slavery with which America has had most to do, had its origin in the mere lust of gain. If tribal wars originated slavery on African soil, the foreign trade in slaves stimulated those wars to supply the demand for slaves. The spread of slavery when once planted on American soil was assured by the principle that the child inherits the condition of the mother. The Afro-American slave trade stood therefore chiefly as man-stealing, and was properly stigmatized by the law of the great republic as piracy. There are none to defend the justice of the Afro-American slavery in respect to its origin.

560. Grades of Slavery.

Some forms of slavery originating in war, have been little more than enforced change of country, an involuntary colonization. The captives have been incorporated into the social life of the captors; marriage alliances have been formed, and the people have blended. Or the victors have colonized the conquered country, and have held the former possessors as inferior laborers. In this case the conquerors and the serfs have at length coalesced. In this manner Saxon conquerors and subject Britons became one; Norman rulers and Anglo-Saxon serfs were blended. Sometimes, as with Daniel and his friends, the captive was advanced to place and power. These are the milder forms of bondage. At the other extreme the slave is counted an article of merchandise, to be bought and sold as a beast or a tool, without personal rights except as his owner should please to grant them, till in turn he should please to

take them away. This "chattel slavery" has in it the possibility of the utmost cruelty and debasement. Whether this opportunity shall be used to the utmost depends upon the individual master and upon the sentiments of the people among whom the slavery exists. In one place it allows the slave girl to be killed for a cannibal feast; in another it permits the king to slaughter a hundred slaves to mix with blood the cement for his palace; in a third place it may forbid, as a general rule, any severity beyond what is deemed needful for the security of the system of slavery. With this latter form, chattel slavery guarded and limited to a considerable degree by the kindness of the master and by public opinion, America is most familiar. The system admitted the utmost abuse and cruelty, but public sentiment condemned wantonness of cruelty, or approved that severity only which profit and safety were supposed to require.

561. Slavery is Robbery.

Slavery has this invariable element, that the labor of the slave is taken without his consent, and of course, without due remuneration fixed and accepted by mutual agreement. If in the place of labor, we say money or the products of labor, it will appear at once that slavery signifies robbery. He who exacts by compulsion the labor of a lifetime, takes by force the products of a lifetime of labor. If it be said that the master renders to the slave an equivalent for his service, as large a return as he could secure by his labor in freedom, this scarcely disguises the violence and injustice; even exchange is robbery if enforced upon a man against his will. But in fact slavery does not render to the slave a just return

for his labor. When slavery ceases to be gainful to the master, the system begins to crumble.

562. The Propagation of Slavery Works no Justification.

Propagated slavery is based on the principle that the child inherits the status of the slave mother. But why does the child inherit the status of the mother and not that of the father? Why reverse the current principle of free life that the father confers rank? The original enslavement of the mother is man-stealing and piracy; how does it become just to hold her child, the child perhaps of unwilling motherhood, in life-long bondage? If it were landed estate of which the mother had been despoiled, justice and law would restore it to her heirs, though generations had intervened. The mere statement of the case makes its own appeal to reason and conscience. That slavery which begins in violence and robbery, is no less robbery in the second generation, and in the third, and forever.

563. Attempted Justification of Slavery.

In the presence of the Christian religion slavery must justify itself, or else stand condemned as the colossal wrong and crime of the ages.

First comes the biblical defense. Slavery is said to be the carrying out of the penal purpose of the Creator against a people which had fallen under his frown. This defense breaks down, because that "Cursed be Canaan," whatever it may mean, does not lie against the Negro race, but against another branch of the progeny of Ham. Still further, a governmental purpose of the Creator justifies no evil doing of men. Slavery, like any other

human conduct, must stand or fall by the Golden Rule, and not by a curse.

With more audacity, but with less subtlety, African slavery has undertaken to justify itself upon the plea that the Negro is not a human being. In the presence of science and religion this defense has become ashamed to declare itself, and needs no consideration. The history and achievements of the Cushite race, the principles of psychology, the experiences of the Christian faith, the sporadic talent seen here and there even in slave life, and the fertile progeny of mixed blood, all show the true humanity of the Negro.

Similar to the preceding defense and yet unlike it, is the claim that the Negro race is abject and incapable of improvement, fit only for a life in bondage, in fact that in subordination to a master the race finds its most congenial life. To this it is sufficient to say that the entire history of the race, and especially its history since emancipation, disproves the allegation. And most of all upon the basis of its own premises, it forgets the duty of the strong to help the weak, and not to oppress them. It is abhorrent to the principle of human brotherhood and to Christian charity, as well as to eternal justice, to reduce a people to slavery because they are feeble.

564. Pleas for the Continuance of Slavery.

For the continuance of slavery, as an institution already existing, very plausible pleas have been presented. These pleas demand a little notice because that lamentation is still sometimes heard for the untimely extinction of the institution. The wrong of emancipa-

tion is counted greater than the wrong of the bondage. A man inherits the ownership of slaves. By no choice of his own the legal mastery of slaves comes to him as a legal and a moral responsibility. It is urged that the slave was so unfitted for freedom that the gift of freedom was a curse and not a blessing. Admitting servitude to be an abnormal condition, it is still affirmed that under conditions as they existed, it was better that slavery continue. The condition of affairs has been illustrated by this parable. An eagle swooped and snatched a lamb from the fold and was soaring with it to his mountain eyrie. But in his flight the eagle began to reflect upon the wrong he had done; he saw that he had no right to hold the lamb, no, not for an instant; he therefore let go his hold, and the lamb was dashed in pieces upon the rocks below. This parable teaches that there may be a condition of slavery such that it is less cruel or unjust to continue the old relationship for a time, than to thrust out the slave instantly to perish without help or kindness. But this does not correctly represent the alternative of the parable. The eagle is not shut up to the choice between carrying the lamb to his bloody eyrie to be devoured and letting him fall upon the rocks. He can return him to the fold whence he was taken. The parable signifies that the master ought to make haste and prepare the slave for freedom.

565. Duties of the Master.

A child is not prepared for independence and self-support, and for this reason is placed under the authority of parents. Shall the father therefore hold his child

in subjection forever for the sake of gain? Parental authority exists that it may speedily render itself unnecessary and come to a natural end. After this analogy, if a man finds himself providentially the legal owner of a slave unfit for instant manumission, it is manifest that three imperative duties rest upon him.

First, he ought at once to put the slave into the legal ownership of himself, and thus guard him against perpetual bondage. There is surely no moral objection to the instant renunciation of all right of ownership in the bodies and souls of men. Secondly, he ought to put the slave in training to fit him for freedom, to the end that he may assume the responsibilities of a free man as soon as possible. And thirdly, it is the master's duty to put him into the actual possession of freedom as soon and as fast as fitness to use freedom is acquired.

566. Renunciation of Ownership, not Abandonment.

To renounce ownership in the slave and to put him into the legal ownership of himself, does not signify that the master must thrust the slave out of all care and help. The gift of legal freedom makes the former master at once a trusted friend. As a friend he guides their unpractised steps in caring for themselves. He throws them step by step, as they are able to bear it, upon their own responsibility. Soon the former slave is able to walk alone. But to the end of his life he will look to the old master as a friend and counselor. If a master of slaves should take this course, would it not be just and benevolent? Would not this course accord with the ethics of the Golden Rule? Would it not be Christlike? And that which is Christlike is duty.

567. Slavery Nullifies Marriage.

Having in mind chattel slavery of the American type, we find inherent in the system a wonderful combination of wrongs and evils. To count the man a thing, to be owned and bought and sold, has in itself the possibility of all evils. In the first place it nullifies the marriage bond and renders stable families and virtuous domestic life impossible. In the system lies the legal right to sell husband or wife from the other forever; to sell the child from its mother; slaves are "raised" for the market, as sheep and mules are raised. And the marriage bond which the master can treat so lightly, becomes in the mind of the slave a transient relationship. It is impossible to "raise" slaves as beasts for sale, without making marriage bestial.

568. Slavery Nullifies Parental Obligations.

It is impossible for slave parents to perform the duties which belong to fathers and mothers toward their children. When parents have not so much as the ownership of their bodies, when they cannot control their time, and cannot save the child from the slave trader, how can they train their children in virtue, industry, and the fear of the Lord? In the weariness of incessant labor, and in the ignorance which slavery requires, the parents cannot instruct their children. The mother can bring children into the world, but cannot perform the duties of a mother. This condition inheres in the system of chattel slavery. The privilege of doing well the duties of parents toward their children accorded freely to the slave, would be the death of slavery.

569. Slavery and Chastity.

Slavery renders it impossible for the female slave to defend her own virtue. In the destruction of family life, esteem for virtue is not nurtured; the moral barriers built against sin are slight; the loss of virtue is counted no great matter; and the female slave in the hand of her master, to be tempted, to be punished or rewarded, to be sold at his will, could not be expected to save herself. That which might be expected to happen under such conditions of slave life, has taken place, and the record is written in the mixture of races.

570. Slavery Necessitates Ignorance.

Slavery compels the master to keep the slave in ignorance. To educate a slave and give him free access to the current knowledge of the world is to train him for freedom. This would be the suicide of slavery. This necessity of ignorance is so imperative that the system could not take the risk of allowing individual masters to instruct their slaves. Occasional or sporadic intelligence even, in a community of slave life is a contagious disease—no one can tell to what extent it will spread. Intelligence makes an uneasy slave, and uneasy intelligence with the needful daring, is ready to head a stampede or a rebellion.

571. Slavery and Moral Character.

The cultus of slavery cannot develop moral character in the slave. Slavery can secure a habit of seeming obedience, a cringing, hypocritical obedience. "Deception is the defense of the weak." The sanctity of marriage, the immeasurable value of womanly virtue,

the rights of property, the sacredness of truth, the manly self-respect which belongs to intelligence and virtue, cannot be inculcated by that system which tramples upon them all. How can the conscience be trained by that system which violates every principle of obligation which conscience recognizes? High moral character demands freedom to follow one's own convictions of duty. Slavery can, in a certain way, develop religious sentiment, for in shutting out all earthly hope, it shuts up the soul to the one outlook above ; but religious sentiment unmixed with intelligence runs to superstition, and does not ensure good morals.

572. Slavery Gives no Place for Aspiration.

One great advantage of free life is the opportunity which it gives for aspiration and personal development ; a man is hindered and held down by nothing except by the limitations of his own personality. By chattel slavery the possibility of aspiration and free growth is annihilated. With whatever largeness of mental gifts the slave is born, he is doomed to live and die a slave, to pine and perish in ignorance, conscious that he is a man and might act the part of a man among men, yet doomed to be counted a thing. With whatever possibilities of gracious womanhood the female slave may be endowed, she is held to ignorant, servile toil, if not humbled for vice. What greater wrong can be done than this, to hold conscious manhood in a brutish place ?

573. The Christian Religion and Slavery.

The New Testament lays down such principles and gives such injunctions as, if followed, would bring to the

slave the reality of freedom at once and would speedily bring the form. Obedience to the second great command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," and to the Golden Rule, would render the holding of men in unwilling bondage impossible. Standing together, the master and the slave, with uncovered heads before their common Master in heaven, the supreme law of love in their hearts, it is impossible that they should continue the one a master, the other a slave. If the names remain they are emptied of meaning. While the formal relation of master and slave continues, the injunction to the master is, Be just and kind ; to the slave, Be obedient and faithful, as unto the Lord.

574. Caste.

The word caste is used with great indefiniteness of meaning. Its most conspicuous application is to the hereditary ranks or grades of Hindu society. In addition to the idea of fixed hereditary classes, the word carries the notion of a certain inherent inferiority, a taint of uncleanness in the lower caste. For the higher castes it is social rank dependent upon birth and not upon merit ; for the lowest it means confinement to menial occupations with no possibility of rising above them, with the added ban or stigma of social dishonor. A Sudra is vile because he is a Sudra, and he is a Sudra because his father was a Sudra, and his descendants will be Sudras forever.

575. The Injustice of Caste.

Caste violates the fundamental principles of equal rights before God and of human brotherhood. In its

origin it represents the imperious rule of the strong over the weak. In its continuance the helpless inferior comes to accept his despised inferiority as the necessary condition of his existence. At length the whole social life of the people crystallizes around this principle of social grades. The organization then perpetuates itself; the individual is powerless to resist it. If a man of the higher class attempts to disregard the principle of caste, it is a battle of all against one; he sinks helpless into the most despised class, having accomplished nothing except his own degradation. And no individual of the lower caste can lift himself; the taint of inferiority and uncleanness is upon him forever. The fact that this is done by an indurated social custom does not render it less unjust to those who suffer. It does render it difficult, however, to fix and estimate the individual and personal responsibility.

576. Truthfulness ; Its Nature.

Truthfulness is intentional conformity in expression or affirmation to that which is real. This definition indicates two elements : first, sincerity or truthfulness in the expression of the subjective self; secondly, veracity or truthfulness in affirmations touching objective reality. These two elements are closely interwoven. Sincerity is seen in the expression of one's thoughts, sentiments, feelings. The opposite of sincerity is pretense and hypocrisy—and hypocrisy may be either distinctly intentional or more or less unconscious. Veracity is truth-telling. Truthfulness, as a quality of character, has special reference to the subjective intention. Truthfulness is an essential element of moral excellence.

577. Prevalence of Falsehood.

The prevalence of falsehood is startling and terrible. In pagan and in Christian lands alike, among savages and among civilized people, this vice greatly prevails. In social life and in methods of business insincerity meets one everywhere. In business deception is practised for gain ; in politics the demagogue cheats the people for the sake of office ; in society men and women stalk to and fro posing in robes of pretense, expressing sentiments without sincerity and living lives of hollow exaggeration. But to this prevalent life of insincerity and pretense many exceptions, noble examples of sincerity and truth, are found.

578. Truth and Concealment.

Truthfulness does not signify the absence of all concealment, the telling of all that is known, thought, or felt. We enter our houses and shut the doors ; we shut out all the world from what we do in secret. We do not tell ; we do not pretend to tell ; there is no obligation to tell. Much of every man's subjective life is, and ought to be, a closet with door shut and blinds closed. In the houses of our friends we see that which we ought to give no sign of seeing. We form judgments of our associates in life which we ought not to express. Of some things which we know, and are known to know and confess that we know, we refuse to speak. In these things there is concealment but no falsehood.

579. Figures of Speech Not Falsehood.

Language abounds in figures of speech. There is hyperbole beyond all possible reality. There are irony

and sarcasm in which that is affirmed which the words deny. There are mockery and banter and jest in which the subtle elements of manner and tone and not the bare words express the real meaning. This style of speech may be wise or it may be foolish, but within due limits it is not false.

580. Mere Evasions Not Falsehoods.

Mere evasions cannot properly be accounted untruthful. They are contests of wit against wit, in which there is no pretense of affirming or revealing. On the other hand, it is understood that all appearances are intended to be illusive. Children play "Hide and Seek"; they undertake to mislead one another in their hiding, and without this there would be no game. In a way intensely serious enemies in war make feints and evade; appearances do not profess to be true revealings of the situation. This is not counted treachery. In the sphere where no false professions or pretensions are made no falsehood can be charged. But it is easy to pass beyond the bounds of mere evasion and fall into blank lying.

581. The Obligation to be Truthful Imperative.

The obligation to speak the truth is full and absolute. It is lawful to refuse to speak; but to speak falsely, to clothe the soul with false pretenses and lies, the law of God absolutely forbids. This obligation is not based upon the right of others to know the truth, for it may be that they have no such right. Nor is it based upon the paramount worldly advantage which would accrue from uniform veracity, for truth-telling often brings dan-

ger and the utmost loss. But God is a God of truth. There can be no real likeness or harmony with him except by likeness in the element of veracity. The divine law commands truthfulness and gives no suggestion of a rightful time or place for lying. The soul of man was created in deep harmony with truth, and under normal conditions feels keenly the shame and degradation of falsehood. The welfare of men is based upon truth. In believing and "doing the truth" they come to everlasting good. There is no evil which is not promoted by insincerity and falsehood.

582. Defense of Falsehood.

The common method of defending falsehood is to present imaginary cases in which adherence to truth would bring extremest danger from which falsehood seems to offer a ready way of escape. For example, a patient in critical sickness demands of his physician his opinion of his condition. To tell him the simple truth would be likely to agitate his mind and diminish the chances of his recovery; to refuse to speak would be understood to mean the worst; an assurance that the patient is in no danger will quiet his mind and do him good. Or again, enemies are pursuing a man to his death. They come to his house and command his wife to reveal the place of his concealment. She knows the place, but if she reveals it she gives her husband up to death; if she refuses to speak she subjects herself to the direst fate. A falsehood will mislead his enemies and give him and her an opportunity to escape. The only limit to this kind of argument is found in the exhausted imagination of the disputant.

583. Replies to the Above.

There is no high virtue which may not cost a man the loss of all things. Liberty has been won and must be defended with precious blood. There is that which high womanhood counts worth more than life. Christian martyrs might have saved their lives by giving up fidelity. Truthfulness ranks with the highest virtues. If the former great virtues must not be surrendered, no more must the soul give up her spotless robe of sincerity and truth. If the principle of veracity were abandoned, the very benefits which falsehood are supposed to bring would disappear. The imaginary advantages arise from the fact that falsehood is an exception and is supposed to be truth. Still further, the same method of argument may be used against every other element of heroic character. Shall a man hold himself ready to surrender whatever is good and great when danger may be escaped thereby? Truthfulness is the very queen of the virtues and is worthy of our utmost self-sacrifice. Truthfulness is fidelity to the noblest attributes of the soul and to God without respect to consequences.

584. An Illustration.

President Robinson says, "One of the older citizens of Lawrence, Kansas, said to the writer a few years ago : I never in all my life was in so tight a place as when one of Quantrell's band in the great raid of 1863, with the muzzle of a cocked pistol close to my head, demanded to know if I was an abolitionist. The raiders were shooting down my neighbors all about me ; but the thought flashed through my mind, if I say No, I shall ever afterward be ashamed to look any one in the face ;

so I answered, 'Yes.' An officer in command, standing near, for some reason, I never knew what, shouted, 'Don't shoot him.' The pistol was removed. I assure you I took a long breath of relief, and have ever since been thankful that I was enabled to tell the truth."

This may stand as an illustration, not only of brave truthfulness, but also of Divine Providence protecting the truth-teller.

585. Subjective Influence of Sincerity.

The subjective influences of sincerity are unspeakably good. Sincerity tends strongly to dissipate vices of thought and sensibility. It tends to a clear self-consciousness; the mind beholds itself in clear light without disguises. If false thought and vicious sensibilities arise, they are not cloaked with excuses and false pretenses, but are seen as they are in reality. This leads to a real knowledge of one's self, and a just estimate of one's own imperfections. Sincere expression of thought and feeling tends to the same result. The subjective condition is seen in its outward expression. A man sees himself with the same clearness and impartiality as if he were beholding another man. In this clear self-knowledge the conscience acts with power. Thus it comes to pass that love of truth is followed by a train of other virtues, and whatever faults are found in connection with sincerity and truthfulness, it is possible to correct them.

586. Subjective Effects of Falsehood.

As sincerity and love of truth work mightily to clear the soul of faults and to elevate the character, so on the

other side, insincerity and falsehood produce the most disastrous subjective effects. Hardly any vice brings a man into a more hopeless moral state. His mind moves in the murky air of pretenses. He sees nothing as it is in reality, but everything as cloaked and posed and prinked for effect. His mind is always struggling to see itself as it undertakes to appear to others. This insincerity covers his vices of character from his own sight, even more than from the eyes of others. Under such conditions there can be no sincere effort to cast off imperfections. The mind loses the power of sharp discrimination between reality and unreality, between truth and pretense. The liar comes at length to believe his own lie. In this confusion of reality and pretense, conscience is stupefied and shows little life. This moral condition is almost beyond hope. The moral nature has become a bottomless quicksand. And if by any means the soul is brought to renounce that life of vicious thought and feeling, that apparent change is likely to prove only a new posing of insincerity and hypocrisy. The soul that cultivates insincerity bids adieu to hope.

587. Why so Important?

Why are sincerity and truthfulness so important? In what does this unspeakable importance find its ground? They are the chosen harmony of the soul with reality, with the realities of the divine nature, with the realities of human nature, and with all the realities of the universe. All possible welfare is bound up in this harmony with reality. By a generic act of the will a man makes reality or unreality his choice; the choice of falsehood is therefore the refusal of all good.

588. Training Children in Truthfulness.

The prevalence of insincerity and falsehood is not surprising ; it would be a marvel indeed if they did not abound. The training of children is often little less than a careful education in deception. They are teased with little bewildering falsehoods and deceitful tricks, just for fun. Thus in the very beginning all sense of the sacredness of truth is destroyed. When the habit of falsehood has been well learned, then it is railed at, and perhaps punished ; but this reprobation has no effect to reshape the soul in the mold of sincerity. Then the hollow forms of social life, and the white lies of society continue the education in falsehood. In addition to this the opening intelligence of the child is fed on fiction. The most popular literature for children is largely composed of curious and grotesque falsehood, reality and unreality curiously blended. It is not strange that the line between the true and the false is blurred. From the dawn of intelligence reality and sincerity should be the child's daily bread. It should hear words of pure sincerity, and of nothing else. It should live, move, and have its being in an atmosphere of truth. If fiction is used in education, it should be used as recognized fiction, and not at all till the mind is able to distinguish between reality and fancy. Sincere forms of social life should be inculcated, and that life which is hollow and heartless should be entirely rejected. Better be angular and sometimes give offense, than be insincere and false.

589. Duties in Family Relationships. Principles.

As we have already seen, the family is organized upon the informing principles of fidelity, love, and reverence.

Such obligations are assumed as involve perfect trust in each other, and trust is the correlative of trustworthiness and fidelity.

Love represents community of life and welfare, the consecration of one to another and of each to all, to live for them, to practise self-denial for them. Reverence represents the recognition of the grades or ranks which inhere in the family organization. For the children there is the joint supremacy of the parents. For the entire family there is the headship of the father. And the self-consecration of love distinguishes headship in the family from mere authority. The duties which belong to this family organization must be briefly noticed.

590. Fidelity.

The ultimate breach of fidelity between husband and wife is the overt violation of the seventh commandment. Law, civil and divine, counts this as the actual sundering of the marriage bond. When this takes place, it remains only for the civil law to declare the termination, inflict upon the guilty party whatever penalty the law provides, and adjust the relationships of the fragments of the sundered family for the future. The first duty of husband and wife is fidelity. This must be real, not merely formal and outward. It must be that complete inward consecration of each to the other, which furnishes a sure basis of perfect trust. This means fidelity in all the family relationships. The responsibilities of motherhood could not be assumed except in perfect confidence that the father would do whatever man can do to provide a home and means for the care of mother and children. The responsibilities of building a family could

not be undertaken by the husband, except in confidence that the mother would do whatever woman can do to make the home a place of happiness and blessing for all. Fidelity is the basis of all.

591. Love.

Love is the primary informing principle of the family organization. This is the vital energy which gives the family its being. This does not signify freshness of sentimental sensibility; much less does it mean sexual hunger. The self-consecration of life with which husband and wife gave themselves to each other in the beginning, "even as Christ loved the church and gave himself for it," to live and to suffer for one another, this is the love which is to be maintained. The maintenance of this altar-flame of devotion will secure the performance of all active duties.

592. Reverence.

If family life is to approximate its ideal, the normal position of each constituent element must be recognized by each and all. The husband holds his own place, which cannot be held by another; the place of the wife and mother is unique; the children have their own place and relationships. To the husband the Scriptures say, "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church and gave himself for it." To the wife the divine word is, "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands as unto the Lord." "Let the wife see that she reverence her husband." To the children the command is, "Honour thy father and thy mother." "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is

right." It is the duty of each to recognize with respectful honor the rank and authority of those members of the family who hold places of headship and leadership. These three principles, love, fidelity, reverence, will be seen, when deeply apprehended, to cover the circle of family duties.

593. Bread-winning.

Bread-winning may stand for every kind of provision for the needs of the family. Food, raiment, and shelter, means of culture and of enjoyment, must be provided. The duty of making this provision rests primarily and mainly upon the man, and not upon the woman. When the same burden of toil for bread falls on both alike, the home must suffer; when the wife becomes the bread-winner, it is by calamity or cruelty. When war drains off the strong men and standing armies are filled with those who should be workers in field and shop, unnatural burdens are thrown upon the mother, and family life is largely destroyed. In what is this duty of the man to make provision for the family grounded? In the first place, it belongs to the family headship to bear the responsibility of making the fortunes of the family. Headship is not for the purpose of domineering, but for breasting the waves of circumstance and carving out fortune with manly daring. In the second place, the greater physical strength of man, the bony frame and heavier muscles, determine the duty of man to perform the heavier work of the world. In the third place, the duties of maternity and all that physical life which pertains thereto render the heavy work of the world impossible for the woman. Heavy labor destroys the mother

and the child. The finer sensibilities of woman indicate that her work is something else than warring with the hard, fierce elements of nature. The care of the home and the training of children is a burden heavy enough without the other burden of winning bread.

This does not signify more of idleness, frivolity, and folly for the woman, nor does it mean that she is a fragile toy to be educated for ornament and pleasure. But if the woman build the house and win the bread, she cannot make the home and confer greatness upon the generations to come.

594. The Submission of the Wife.

The due attitude of the wife toward her husband is expressed by such words as *subject*, *submit*, *reverence*, *obey*. These words do not signify servitude. Submission is put correlative to love and protecting care, and that love is compared to the self-sacrificing and saving love of Christ. In the presence of such love servitude is impossible. It is a reverent recognition of the headship of the family. In the oneness of the family life the husband is the executive. But if unity should be lacking no advantage would arise from a divided headship, with its inefficiency and endless strife. But the injunctions of holy Scripture have reference to the ideal life of the family.

595. Duties of Parents in Respect to Their Children.

These duties are important beyond conception. We cannot estimate the greatness of this obligation except through an outlook upon the life to come. When parents have done well their duties toward their chil-

dren to give them due preparation for a worthy and happy life and for a good destiny, their weightiest obligation has been met. The great duty of each generation is to prepare the next generation for the issues of an endless life. Having given existence to their children, with all its tremendous possibilities, they must needs be under limitless obligations to do their utmost to render that existence a blessing forever.

596. Obligations Under the Principles of Heredity.

The principle of heredity is broad and deep and subtle. Parents give themselves to their children. This bequest of themselves includes their physical, their intellectual, and their moral nature. It includes their modes of thought and peculiarities of disposition. Their diseases and their sins are propagated in a tendency to repeat the same. The first great duty of parents is to make themselves, for their children's sake, what their children ought to be. In this heritage of natural endowment the virtues and the sins of the parents come to the children through all the generations. This is no place for details, but in the deepest sense parents are debtors to their children to give them such natural endowments as shall render all good possible for them.

597. Care in Childhood

The duty of parents to provide food, clothing, and comforts for their young children is everywhere recognized. This should continue till the children are able without harm or strain to care for themselves. This provision should include opportunities for education. In strong and strange contrast with this obligation stands

the conduct of those parents who count every expenditure for their children as an investment drawing interest, a debt to be repaid by the labor of their children. They force their children in tender years to undertake wearisome toil which checks and stunts their growth. They exact from their children, instead of doing for them. The relationship between parents and children is made mercenary. In their old age, when the parents cannot pay their way, they go to the almshouse. They reap as they sow. No love is wasted on either side. Between parent and children, on both sides, love ought to stand in the place of money.

598. Care for the Education of Children.

Ignorance is a greater evil than hunger. It is the duty of parents to prepare their children for self-support, for in due time the children must stand alone. This ought to include preparation for influence and usefulness in that sphere of life to which the children ought to aspire. The rich are almost as likely to neglect this training as are the poor. Necessity does not compel it ; the children are less willing to drudge in order to win skill by patient application. When the care of business and property comes to them, it finds them unprepared. They cannot create wealth by skilled labor ; they do not understand the making of investments ; they cannot even spend money wisely and economically. They are candidates for poverty. The trades unions have made the colossal blunder of shutting out even their own sons from the opportunity of learning trades and acquiring their fathers' skill, forcing thus their own children into the overcrowded ranks of unskilled labor.

Parents should prepare their children to succeed them in all the work of the world.

599. Moral and Religious Training.

The most important education has reference to character and faith. Failures in life, even the failure to win bread, arise chiefly from moral causes. Parents should train their children to know the right, to choose the right, to do the right. To this end it is necessary to train children to obedience, to happy obedience, to love obedience. To be successful, this training must begin early. It cannot begin too early. This is not "breaking the will," but strengthening the will. The erratic, wayward will is the weak will. Perhaps the most difficult part of moral training is the introduction of the young to the knowledge of evil and the touch of temptation, without contamination. To hold them in deep seclusion from temptation till necessity forces them suddenly unprepared to meet it, is to insure their ruin. To leave them to drift without care and untimely into the rushing tide of temptation, is ruin on the other side. Little by little, under wise guidance, children should be introduced to the knowledge of evil and trained to reject it, voluntarily reject it, and at the same time taught to know the good and to choose it. That this training may be successful, the spiritual elements of life must be emphasized. Faith must be nurtured to recognize the unseen world and feel its power.

600. Parental Rights.

Correlative to parental obligations are the rights of parents. Whence the right to give this training and to

require obedience? The fact that children are weak and cannot resist, can give no right. The parental relationship itself furnishes a ground in human nature for parental rights and duties. The life and being of the child are of and from the parents. There is in this a shadow of the creative acts of "the Father of spirits." In the child there is a continuation of the stream of life that is in the parents, a new branch in the current of being. This relationship of life represents the divine will. Within due limits it is the will of God that the parental life control the young life, for the purpose of preparing the new life for independence. For this new life the parents have a measure of responsibility and hence a measure of right to govern. The teaching of holy Scripture touching the authority and the duty of parents to teach and to restrain the child is clear. The neglect of this duty is followed by corruption and calamities.

601. Limits of Parental Authority.

The authority of parents is by no means absolute and limitless. In the first place, a limit is set by the rule of right. Parents have no right to require that which God has made to be wrong. Such requirements are made invalid by the constitution of the universe. In the second place, a limit is set by love. Parental government is not for the gain of the parent, but for the benefit of the child. Any rule or discipline which does not express love, is abnormal. In the third place, wisdom sets a limit. Whatever ought to be done, ought to be done wisely and well. That which is right, if wisely done, may be wrong when done unwisely. And there is a

limit which is set by the progressive development of the child. That government which is suitable and right toward the child of five years, becomes wrong toward the child of ten. As independent thought and responsibility are developed, parental government must be continually modified. The approximate maturity of the child sets a natural bound to parental authority. The parental relation has accomplished its purpose ; the child has been cared for, guarded, guided, and prepared to take up the work of life, and to repeat the benefit for the next generation.

602. The Duties of Children.

The primary duty of children, as children, toward their parents, is obedience. This does not signify a yielding to the hard necessity of force, but a willing subordination, the real acceptance of the parental will. The Scripture injunction says, "Obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right." The limits to this obligation of obedience, are in respect to general principles essentially the same as the limitations set to parental control. The first is suggested by the phrase, "in the Lord." The parental rule may be so wrong and unjust that obedience to God shall require disobedience to the father. Growth out of childhood gradually puts an end to authority and obedience alike. When the son goes out from his father's house to become the head of a new family, then obedience, as such, must needs terminate.

603. Honor toward Parents.

A second more generalized duty of children is expressed in the words, "Honour thy father and thy

mother." This word "honor" signifies respectful deference and reverence. It implies, of course, that the parents shall by virtue and worth make honor possible. When obedience is a duty, honor includes obedience. The duty of honoring is not limited like the duty of obeying. If the parents become weak and the children strong; if the parents fall into second childhood, there remains still a place for honor. If parents are wicked, so that obedience must needs be absolutely refused, still that refusal may be made respectfully. The duty of honor includes also the care of parents when they fall into a condition of need. This duty finds its limitation in the limit of need on the one side and the limit of ability on the other.

604. Grounds of Filial Duty.

The obligations of children find their ground, correlatively, like the rights of parents, in the nature of the parental relationship. They have derived their being from their parents; at the first they are dependent upon their parents for all things; from them they receive that training which fits them for independent life, and parental love follows them to the end. And finally they inherit the products of a lifetime of parental toil. These relationships and benefits are realities which demand filial recognition. They weave a bond which it is a sin to break. These things have their ground in the nature of man, and the nature of man represents the will of God.

CHAPTER XXI

CONCERNING DUTIES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT

605. Taxes.

Taxes are assessments levied upon persons or upon property to defray the expenses of civil government, or to carry on public works. Civil government must needs cost much money. Public improvements and provision for the defense and welfare of all must be made at the expense of all. These benefits cannot be gotten except by paying for them. There is the same justice in levying taxes for the payment of these expenses as in any other fair exchange of the products of labor. In these studies nothing is attempted beyond the application of certain general moral principles to the levying of taxes and their payment.

606. Justice in Taxation.

In studying the principles of society, we found justice to be the primary formative principle of that civil organization which is called the State. In all civil concerns justice is fundamental. Justice must be lacking in nothing. This signifies that taxes must be levied on principles of justice. In analyzing this general proposition, we find three principles of practical justice: First. Taxes should be levied for matters which concern the general welfare, and not for merely individual advantage, and taxes should not be levied for any purpose so that

the burden of the tax shall be greater than the advantage to be gained. There is a tendency toward disregarding this principle in both its parts. Secondly. The principle of even or fair exchange must be regarded. Taxes should be levied in proportion to the benefits to be received by the taxpayer. The protection of life and personal welfare may be counted as of equal worth to every individual; it is just, therefore, that some assessment be made upon all. But in the protection of property and in the administration of justice touching property rights, the difference is immense. One citizen has absolutely no property to be protected; another has his humble cottage; a third has lands, storehouses, and merchandise, railroads and ships, property scattered over the world, and the protection of his interests may require diplomacy or war. This principle of taxation in proportion to benefits received has found no better expression than taxation in the ratio of property and of valuable franchises. It is just to lay taxes upon property, because public expenses are largely for the protection of property. The third principle of practical justice is that taxes should be laid in proportion to the ability to bear them. "It is required of a man according as he hath, and not according as he hath not." In civil society there is a community of welfare. It is an organized body in which the welfare of each is needful for the welfare of all. Equality of contribution to the common weal is impossible. Equality of contribution would be injustice. Property held in possession commonly signifies ability to pay, consideration being had of the greater or less productiveness of different properties, and exceptions being made to meet special cases.

607. Community and Brotherhood in Taxation.

In the human race there is a brotherhood of individuals and a community of welfare. In the payment of taxes a man cannot say, I will pay for that particular benefit which accrues to myself, and for nothing more. There is no such particular item and amount of benefit. Welfare is to a large extent common. From that common welfare each one appropriates that which he is able by the largeness of his life to utilize for himself; and the amplitude of the welfare of one does not detract from the welfare of the rest, but rather promotes it. With all possible emphasis, the doctrine of extreme and isolated individualism must be denied. The principle of brotherhood and community of welfare is fundamental in life, and is an element of justice. The individual citizen may not be able to isolate and segregate his own particular moiety of benefit, but the tax is none the less just. But no man can be just and say, I can take care of myself, let others take care of themselves; let those who have children support the public schools; let those who sail the sea pay for the lighthouses. Public safety, prosperity, and welfare constitute a common good shared by all.

608. Public Charities.

Christian civilization is strongly distinguished from pagan by public charities. The poor and the unfortunate are cared for; asylums are established for the relief of sufferers from almost every kind of infirmity. These works of charity are maintained in part by the appropriation of public funds. A State which should not do this would be counted as little less than barbar-

ous. Upon what principle is this taxation for benevolence to be justified? Is it upon the principle of mutual insurance, that all are liable to come to want and that therefore all should share the burden of caring for the needy? Or shall it be said that this is a matter of mutual consent and agreement, that apart from this consent such taxation would be robbing some to give to others? Moral philosophy permits no such answers. Under charity as a right and a duty of the State lies the principle of brotherhood and the principle of benevolence, which is the second formative principle of the State. The purpose of civil government is benevolent; it is the welfare of the people; and the obligation of benevolence is as absolute as the obligation of justice. In promoting the welfare of the people it is as needful to care for the infirm and the unfortunate as to open avenues for trade or provide for the public defense. The principle is clear; the application of the principle is difficult. The experience of Christian governments is slowly feeling its way between that public charity which is truly helpful and that civil aid which weakens the sense of individual responsibility and encourages sloth.

609. Honesty in the Payment of Taxes.

The duty of dealing honestly with the government in the payment of taxes, as an abstract proposition, is doubtless generally admitted. But there is a subtle temptation and a noteworthy drift in the direction of dishonesty. The government is not a person and the loss will fall on no one citizen; the evasion of taxes is commonly made by concealment, by silence instead of perjury; unequal and unfair valuations and double taxations

lead men to feel that evasions are right ; such considerations lead many to feel that dishonesty in the matter of taxes is a very pardonable wrong. There are difficult questions connected with the subject of taxation, some of which belong to public policy and some to casuistry. The principle here laid down is that truth and honesty must control the citizen in dealing with the government no less than in his dealing with his fellow-citizens. He has received from the government certain immense values ; for these values payment is justly due. And that payment which one man unjustly evades must needs fall upon others, and probably upon those less able to bear the burden.

610. Obedience to Law.

The duty of the citizen is not exhausted in the honest payment of taxes. If the civil law is legitimate and right, personal obedience to the law is a personal obligation. A good conscience cannot fail to recognize this obligation. Obedience to civil authority is binding and necessary for various reasons. In the first place, obedience to right civil authority is included in the moral law. This is the plain teaching of holy Scripture. "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers ; for there is no power but of God ; the powers that be are ordained of God." "Wherefore ye must needs be subject not only for wrath but also for conscience' sake."

In the second place, obedience is necessary in order to support the government in the work of repressing violence and crime and administering justice. There is no power in abstract law to administer and enforce itself. And the magistrate acting alone, unsupported by good

men, can do nothing. If good men set an example of disobedience in things not immoral, it must be expected that bad men will despise law in concerns that are criminal. In the third place, good men ought to respect civil law, because, even if none were vicious, the blessings of well-ordered civil society cannot otherwise be secured. In the fourth place, respect for authority is a fundamental element in the highest moral character. The ultimate principle of virtue is obedience, the obedience of love, and good citizenship discredits itself when it takes an attitude of disrespect toward civil authority.

611. Standing with the Magistrate.

Some men who count themselves good citizens, go as far as a man can go, without the commission of crime, to render good government impossible. They do this by practically covering up the crime which they know to be committed. They know, but they will not "tell." They seem to count it dishonorable to reveal the lawbreaker. They will not "betray" their neighbors. They say, let the magistrate himself find out the crime; that is his business. They act as if they counted the magistrate the common enemy of all citizens, and that all citizens should make common cause against him. They stand between the criminal and the law to shield him from just punishment. They do not deserve to enjoy the protection of well-administered law. In the face of this easy public sentiment the magistrate sees no reason for sacrificing himself to secure the punishment of crime. It is the part of good men to love law and authority. As equal partners in a free government, it belongs to every good citizen to stand with the magistrate; to be willing

to be known as standing on the side of law ; to dare to take risks in the performance of civil duty.

612. Railing at Rulers.

There is no more potent influence for dishonoring law and weakening the moral power of civil authority, than the almost universal habit of railing at the civil ruler. This mockery begins when the future legislator or magistrate becomes a candidate for the votes of his fellow-citizens. His faults are magnified ; his virtues are denied ; his motives are maligned ; his reputation is blackened by slander. He is held before the eyes of the people as little better than a criminal. The direst consequences are predicted as the result of his election to office. He comes to his official place under this cloud of obloquy. This evil-speaking continues with little less of asperity after his election. The opposition party undertakes in every way to embarrass the administration of the government. They teach the people to dishonor their chosen rulers ; they teach the young to do this ; they teach the criminal classes to do this, and it is no wonder that the lesson is learned. The Scripture injunction is, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." Between railing at the ruler and disobeying law there is but a step. When reverence for law ceases, government by the people is ready to crumble, and no man can foresee what accident may precipitate the crisis and the end.

613. Responsibility of the Citizen.

Under governments of absolute despotism the civil influence of the citizen is reduced to the minimum. He

has no vote ; he cannot advise ; he cannot criticise ; he may count himself blessed indeed if he is suffered to live righteously in silence. Under such conditions the responsibility of the citizen for the administration of the government is well-nigh extinguished. But in a republic it is not so. Every citizen exerts an influence upon the government, and no one can escape a measure of responsibility. By casting his vote or withholding it ; by active partisan work or by standing aloof from political parties ; by criticism, by advice, by advocacy with tongue and pen, he helps to shape public sentiment, to determine legislation and the administration of law. The citizen is responsible to God and to men for the right use of his civil influence and power. He cannot "wash his hands" of duty and responsibility. He cannot sink himself in a party and thus escape individual responsibility. His duty may be to stand alone and bear testimony against an evil which inheres in all parties. Love of country and obedience to God may alike demand this.

614. The Higher Law.

Having accepted the divine will as the law and standard of right, it follows, as a matter of course, that the obligation to obey the civil authority is not supreme. The civil authority may perhaps stand for rebellion against God. It may represent, not a benevolent intent for the welfare of the people, but imperious selfishness and cruelty. Under such conditions the higher law, the law of God, must be counted supreme. Then it belongs to him who is willing to suffer for the right, to obey the divine law and take the consequences. In the presence of God's authority all other authorities fall to the ground.

CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING RIGHTS

615. Self-defense. General View.

Self-defense signifies the use of force, by and for one's self, to defend one's self from injury in person, property, or rights. *Self-defense* stands over against defense of the individual by the officers and the regular processes of government and law. Self-defense is liable to many abuses. It may be passionate and unreasonable ; it may inflict injury beyond the intention ; it may become revenge and not merely defense. In its hot haste it may inflict injury upon the innocent. But on the other hand, in many cases self-defense is the only defense which is possible. The individual is assailed when alone. Before the law can speak, or the officers of government bring help, the injury has been wrought and the injurer has fled. Self-defense may be merely opposing force to force to ward off injury, or it may involve the utmost damage to the injurer. There are diverse opinions touching the moral right of self-defense. It belongs to moral philosophy to determine the moral principles involved in the case.

616. Non-resistance in the New Testament.

The words of Christ which are understood by some as forbidding self-defense, are these : "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth :

but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil : but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain." In examining these words, we notice, first, that the injunction, "Resist not him that is evil," stands opposed to the traditional proverb, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'" and that proverb signifies not self-defense, but personal revenge. In the second place, we notice that the word smite (rap) indicates an insult to be resented, rather than an attack to be resisted. The injunction as a whole seems directed against the *lex talionis*, the law of revenge, rather than against defense against a dangerous assault. The language has an epigrammatic and paradoxical form, and signifies in plain words : Put love in place of revenge ; meet and overcome insults, injuries, and exactions, with patience, kindness, and compliance. The teaching of Christ seems, therefore, to touch the subject of self-defense in this respect only ; it purifies self-defense of the element of revenge, and renders it purely self-protective ; all taking vengeance for injuries inflicted is forbidden. We are left therefore to consider the question of self-defense upon general principles.

617. Defense by the Magistrate.

The right and duty of the *magistrate* to defend the weak and to administer justice is plainly taught in holy Scripture. He is "God's minister attending continually upon this very thing." It belongs to his duty to meet violence with force. "He bears not the sword in vain."

His sword is meant for use. This establishes the principle of force against force. In cases where the magistrate can render no help, it would seem that the right of defense must revert to the individual. Where officers of the law cannot help, if the individual has no right to defend himself, the right of defense exists nowhere; it has utterly lapsed. But that the right of resisting violence exists nowhere cannot be admitted.

618. The Defense of the Helpless.

If a man has not the right of self-defense, it is not easy to find a place for the duty or the right to defend another, a wife or child, placed in his care. If it is the duty of the one to suffer violence without resistance, it must be the duty of the other to accept the same suffering. Without the right of self-defense a man cannot help the weak. A ruffian assails the wife; the husband springs to her defense and with might and main hurls him back. The assailant turns from the woman and attacks the man; at once the man's arms fall to his side, for he has no right to defend himself. The ruffian binds him and the wife no longer has a protector. The duty of defending another carries with it the right of self-defense.

619. The Element of Justice in Self-defense.

In order that the case may be one of true self-defense, the assault must be more than an insult; there must be an assault by force, for the infliction of serious injury, which cannot be resisted except by force. In repelling such an assault there is an element of justice. The person and the life of the innocent party are, at the least, as

precious as the person and the life of the assailant. One or the other must suffer damage. If the party of defense does not disable the assailant, he himself must take the injury. When the alternative lies between the guilty assailant suffering for his crime and the innocent party suffering by the assault, justice is better satisfied by the suffering of the guilty.

620. The Law of Love and Self-defense.

The Golden Rule is based upon the principle that the rights and the welfare of one are as precious as those of another, and that every man ought to have the same regard for the welfare of another man as for his own. This is the second great law of love, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." What relation has this law of love to the right of self-defense? In the first place, the law of love does not, cannot, abrogate the law of justice, and it must not be so interpreted as to antagonize the principle of justice. Law and government punish crime, and this is not contrary to the principle of love. Punishment does not signify malice against the subject of punishment. When either the guilty or the innocent must suffer, it is not contrary to love to let the injury fall on the one that deserves it.

621. Limit of the Injury which may be Inflicted in Self-defense.

That self-defense may be justified, it is manifest that there must be some reasonable ratio between the injury threatened and the damage inflicted in the defense. To kill a man, or to inflict serious injury, for an insult cannot be justified. That would be revenge. Where there

is no danger, there is no place for self-defense. As soon as the danger ceases, the demand for self-defense ceases. Also to inflict a measureless damage to ward off a slight loss, to take life in order to save a dime or a dollar, is unjustifiable. A man who duly values human life and considers what life and death signify, will not be in haste to shed blood for a slight cause. The evil man as well as the good is our "neighbor" and comes within the scope of the law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

622. Denial of the Right of Self-defense.

The denial of the right of self-defense is followed by logical consequences which may well give one pause. If the word of the Lord does indeed forbid self-defense, consequences must not be considered. But if there is no prohibition, then we may look at possible consequences. First, there comes the logical conclusion that the personal immunity of the assailant is more precious than that of the good and the innocent. Why otherwise should the good man of the house stand and see wrong inflicted upon those whom God has put under his care, more solicitous not to harm the assailant than to protect the helpless. Secondly, the denial of the right of self-defense renders assault and robbery safe. This gives the thief, the robber, the assassin, the ravisher, to understand that he is safe in attempting any crime; if he fails, he simply fails, but runs no risks. Under such conditions it is virtue only that is unsafe.

623. The Instinct of Self-preservation.

The impulse of self-love never sleeps. When danger threatens, at the instant call of this instinct, every power

springs to action to ward off danger and defend the citadel of life. The movement seems almost independent of the will. This indicates that the principle of self-defense is grounded in the nature of man, and in the physical nature as well as in the spiritual. This instinct of self-preservation is so strong and persistent that it needs little re-enforcement from reason or argument.

624. Revenge.

A clear distinction must be made between revenge on the one side and self-defense and penalty on the other. Revenge is not a blow for self-protection. Revenge is not, like penalty, the testimony of conscience against wrong-doing. Revenge expresses hatred; it gratifies the worst passions and awakens the same passions in return. Revenge cannot take the place of legal penalties, for it represents no authority and makes no appeal to conscience. The avenger assumes the place of magistrate, judge, and executioner. As toward God, he arrogates to himself the prerogatives of the Supreme Judge. Revenge is not one of the natural rights of man. The practice of "lynching" is a flagrant example of private vengeance. It does not accomplish the high ends of penalty and justice; it is a disgrace to Christian civilization.

625. War. Classes of Wars.

We may divide wars into four classes, quite radically distinct in principle and motive:

I. Wars of conquest or subjugation. These wars correspond to the violence of the robber, the man-stealer, and the pirate. Kings and nations send out armies to

subdue and despoil weaker nations. That the robbery and murder are committed by great aggregations of individuals does not change their character nor mitigate their wickedness.

2. Wars of revenge, to pay back insults and injuries. These wars correspond to private revenge in respect to both motive and consequences. They perpetuate animosities, bloodshed, and misery ; they do this on a gigantic scale on the vast stage of the world on which nations play their parts. The immensity of the vengeance does not mitigate the enormity of the crime. And yet a war waged to avenge a wrong already committed may perhaps in some cases partake of the nature of penalty, inflicted in the only way in which penalty can be inflicted upon nations, and may prevent aggressions in the future.

3. Wars of self-defense, to resist spoliation and subjugation, or to achieve independence of a tyranny which wrongs, robs, and oppresses the people. Such wars stand upon the same basis as individual self-defense, with this added element of justification, that nations cannot appeal to a government over the nations for protection ; nations must defend themselves, or suffer whatever damage other and aggressive nations may please to inflict.

4. Wars waged in behalf of the weak and helpless. A strong people may take up arms in defense of another nation too weak to resist spoliation, or to help them throw off a cruel tyranny. If this be done in very truth from justice and benevolence, it stands upon the same ground as individual defense of the weak. This principle may justify the interference of strong and just governments in the affairs of savage tribes or oppressive rulers. The pretense of benevolence may cloak the purpose of conquest.

626. Justification of War.

The same moral principles underlie the conduct of aggregations of men as of individuals. The vast corporate body, the nation, may do evil and suffer for it, or may work righteousness and be justified. Wars for conquest find their condemnation in the equality of all men in respect to natural rights, and in the principles of universal brotherhood, and of benevolence and love. War for national defense, or for the relief of the oppressed, is justified on the same principles as individual self-defense.

627. War must be Justified by Expediency.

A justifiable war must needs have a two-fold justification. War, even if right in principle, carries with it such unspeakable miseries and horrors, and inflicts suffering so promiscuously upon the innocent and the guilty, that it is always a grave question whether it is not better for a people to bear the ills they have rather than try the calamities and the risks of war. That a just war may be justified, it must be expedient, and expedient in view of the miseries which it will bring as well as in respect to the troubles it will relieve, and with respect to the risk of defeat as well as the prospect of success. Only a good prospect of success can justify a just war.

628. Dueling.

As the name indicates, a duel is a combat between two persons. The characteristics of the modern duel are first, that it is not fought in self-defense, but by formal pre-arrangement; secondly, that it is fought to avenge an affront or insult. This avenging has two elements, to inflict injury in return for the affront, and to

show one's self to be not a coward, but a brave man, spirited, ready to face danger, and one who will not bear an insult. Dueling is less common now than formerly, but the practice is by no means obsolete, and men who advocate and defend it are not lacking.

629. Dueling not Self-defense.

The duel cannot be justified on the ground that it is of the nature of self-defense. It represents in the beginning, not an assault, but an affront. The details are carefully pre-arranged. The principal parties do not even meet in these preparations; they are represented by their friends. Neither party is in danger, and hence there is no place for self-defense.

630. Dueling Unchristian.

The spirit from which dueling springs is essentially unchristian. The modern duel comes of arrogant, imperious pride, which refuses to brook the appearance of an insult, and from a selfish hatred which counts wounded honor as healed by revenge. It is a spirit which belongs to savage life. It is the direct negation of meekness, humility, benevolence, and love. As respects the civil law, the challenger assumes to take life without authority. And the vengeance of the duelist is deeply unjust; for a mere insult he seeks to inflict mortal damage. In proportion as the Christian spirit prevails this remnant of barbarism disappears.

631. Suicide.

There are manifestly certain differences between suicide and that murder which is chiefly intended by the

command, "Thou shalt not kill." In the one case the murderer takes the life of an unwilling victim ; the suicide ends the life of one who is willing to die. The murderer commits the supreme robbery ; the suicide terminates a life which is chiefly his own. Suicide, therefore, cannot be treated as a case of simple murder. It must be judged, and justified or condemned, upon its own peculiar elements. Suicide may be considered under three aspects : (1) As related to the Creator ; (2) As related to the friends of the suicide who have an interest in his life ; (3) As related to the suicide himself.

632. Suicide as Related to God.

God is the giver of life. As God only can give life, so it belongs to him to terminate it. Every human life has a purpose. Only God knows when the supreme ends of any life have been accomplished. From this point of view a man has no more right over his own life to destroy it untimely than to terminate the life of another man. To take one's own life expresses lack of faith in God, and of submission to his appointments. If God appoint trouble and suffering for a man, it is the duty of a good man to bear them patiently, in the profoundest confidence that God's allotments are wise and good. There is untold moral and spiritual advantage in bearing with cheerful trust that which the Supreme Ruler appoints. Under this divine discipline character of supreme elevation and strength is nurtured and matured. Suicide expresses weakness of moral character. It is faithlessness and unfaithfulness toward the Creator. As toward God suicide must then be counted impiety and crime.

633. Suicide as Related to Men.

As toward men, suicide is commonly a great wrong done, a betrayal of sacred trusts, an unworthy abandonment of helpless dependents. Suicide is desertion and a breach of trust as truly as would be a running away to parts unknown. And this is done from lack of faithfulness and fortitude to bear burdens and face adverse fortune.

634. Suicide as Related to the Actor.

Without pressing the popular notion of former days, that by suicide a man dooms his soul forever, it is sure that a suicide ends his probation untimely, and cuts himself off from whatever good a longer life and a fuller moral discipline might bring. The act of suicide is a crime the temptation to which and the tendency to which ought to be strenuously resisted. To finish one's life in the commission of a great crime is surely a sad ending of probation. Sometimes insanity finds its issue in suicide. Often, however, the suicide shows no more mental aberration than is signified by false views of life, by lack of faith or a false faith touching the life to come, by discouragement and despondency, or by shame and remorse for the commission of crime.

635. Is it Right by Force to Prevent Suicide?

Is the commission of suicide a right which a man may claim for himself, if he please to exercise it, or have other men the right to interfere and prevent the infliction of this supreme damage upon himself? Public opinion answers without hesitation that the infliction of bodily injury upon himself is not one of man's rights. Men

count it a duty to save a man by force, if need be, from inflicting serious bodily injury upon himself. Is this a wanton interference with personal liberty, or is the popular sentiment founded upon true principles?

636. Individualism in the Extreme.

The doctrine of individualism is sometimes pushed to the extreme of denying any necessary relationship between man and man, and hence any right to interfere or duty to help. President Wayland says : "If the individual use his powers in such a manner as not to interfere with the use of the same powers which God has bestowed upon his neighbor, he is, as it respects his neighbor, whether that neighbor be an individual or the community, to be held guiltless. So long as he uses them within this limit he has a right, so far as his fellow-men are concerned, to use them in the most unlimited sense, *suo arbitrio*, at his own discretion. His will is his sufficient and ultimate reason. He need assign no other reason for his conduct than his own free choice. Within this limit he is still responsible to God ; but within this limit he is not responsible to man, *nor is man responsible for him.*" "A man has an entire right to use his own body as he will, provided he does not so use it as to interfere with the rights of his neighbor. He may go where he will, and stay where he pleases ; he may work or be idle ; he may pursue one occupation or another, or no occupation at all ; and it is the concern of no one else, if he leave inviolate the rights of every one else ; that is, if he leave every one else in the undisturbed enjoyment of those means of happiness bestowed upon him by the Creator." "While the law of reciprocity frees

him from the control of society, it discharges society from any responsibility for the results of his actions upon himself. I know that society sometimes undertakes to support the indigent and helpless, and to relieve men in extreme necessity. This, however, is a conventional arrangement, into which men who choose have a right to enter; and, having entered into it, they are bound by its provisions."¹ This extreme individualism sharply contradicts the principles of universal brotherhood and benevolence, and all the principles which underlie civil society. The duties and responsibilities which pertain to the brotherhood of man are not conventional and optional. If one human being find another human being, till that hour a stranger unknown and from that hour to be unknown forever, he is under obligation to him. If that stranger shall that hour attempt self-destruction, it is his duty, if possible, to save him from himself. Self-preservation is a primary instinct of human nature, and by the fact that a man seeks his own destruction he shows that he is not in a normal state. It is according to the Golden Rule to save such a man from doing himself damage, in the hope that his better normal state will return. When the would-be suicide comes to himself, he is grateful for the interference which saved him from his reckless purpose.

637. Licensing Vice and Sin.

The wisest and best method, under a democratic form of government, of dealing with certain vices, is a question of extreme difficulty. This is notably the case with the manufacture, sale, and use of intoxicating liquors.

¹ "Moral Science," pp. 201, 202, 203.

In some communities the same difficulty is found in dealing with violations of the seventh commandment. On the one side it is true that every man ought, by self-control and abstinence, to render civil restraint needless. On the other side, the straightforward application of legal authority is the unequivocal prohibition of that which is evil. But that which ought to be, has not been found possible on either side. Those who need the legal restraint, and those who are willing that others should indulge their vices, are the actual legislators, and without their influence prohibitory laws cannot be well administered. But the evils and miseries which unchecked drunkenness bring upon society soon force some attempt at restraint. Under the conflicting influences legislation has chiefly attempted the curtailment of excesses, without suppressing the use of intoxicants. Or with no reference to suppression or curtailment, the drink habit has been treated as a source of revenue for the government. Permits for the sale of intoxicants have been sold to a limited number of persons, and thus the profits of the business have been shared between the seller and the government. The government assures the sellers a monopoly of the business ; the sellers give the government due payment for this monopoly. What are the moral principles which underlie this governmental policy of dealing with the liquor traffic ?

638. License and Partial Prohibition.

License, in this case, signifies a permit to trade granted to a limited number, and not to all. The limitation is essential to the idea of license. License carries with it also the idea of legal approval. For this monopoly and

approval a price is paid to the government. There may be a partial prohibition which carries with it no appearance of approval and no license for that which is not prohibited. When the sale of intoxicants is absolutely prohibited on the Sabbath Day, or upon election days, or between the hours of ten P. M. and six A. M., or within three hundred feet of a schoolhouse, or in any place where one-half the householders in the same block protest against it, there is involved in these partial prohibitions no approval of that which is not prohibited, but rather a tacit and suggested disapproval. This distinction between license and partial prohibition ought to be kept in mind.

639. License and Taxation.

A second distinction should be noted, the difference between a license and a tax. A license is a permit granted to some and not to all. A license creates a legal monopoly. If the permit be granted to all who please to pay the fee it ceases to be a license and becomes a tax; there is no monopoly. A tax levied upon a business, whether the business be good or evil, carries with it neither approval nor disapproval. So far is taxation from expressing a tacit approval, that taxation is sometimes made burdensome in order to discourage a bad business. This distinction between taxation and license should be kept in mind.

640. The Attitude of Civil Law toward Evil.

Civil law cannot attempt to suppress all wrong-doing. There are moral evils which the civil law cannot touch. These evils are not matters of "personal liberty," but the

law cannot reach them. On the other hand, there is wrong-doing which is clearly within the reach of law. All the people agree that such evils must be treated for extermination. What shall be the attitude of civil law toward these two classes of transgressions? First, toward the evils which the law can attempt to suppress, the attitude of the law must be total prohibition. Any other attitude would be futile as a policy, and morally and logically absurd. Secondly, toward those immoralities which *under the existing conditions* the law cannot undertake to eradicate, the attitude of the law must not under any circumstances be that of tacit encouragement or of indifference. Civil government is an agency of the Supreme Ruler for the benefit of mankind. Its ends cannot righteously be anything which God disapproves. For the government to foster any wrong, to permit it, to ally itself with it, is to turn against the power which ordained civil authority. Civil government itself becomes then, in this and so far, a power that works against God's government, and against which divine providence must needs work. The evil which civil law cannot reach it may rightly leave for moral agencies to correct, but it must not promote or sanction or protect the evil.

641. Is a License of the Liquor Traffic a Partnership?

In licensing the sale of intoxicants the government guarantees to the licensees, so far as it can, a monopoly of the traffic. The license fee is fixed according to some ratio with the profits of the business. As the fee is increased the monopoly becomes closer and the business more profitable. Does this system make the government a partner in the liquor traffic? The govern-

ment grants a permit to engage in the business, undertakes to make it a practical monopoly, and receives payment upon this condition. The government thus becomes a silent partner in the business, the moiety of capital which it furnishes being the monopoly which it guarantees. No element seems to be lacking to render this combination a moral partnership.

642. Evils of the License System.

Besides and beyond the moral evil, the sin and guilt, the license system of dealing with the liquor traffic is followed by a train of practical evils.

In the first place, the monopoly given renders the business more profitable, and thus operates to promote and not suppress it. It raises up a body of men whose business it is to stimulate the drink habit to the utmost, a class of skilled tempters of the young, their zeal stimulated by greed of gain. In the second place, by the quasi patronage and protection of the government the moral opprobrium which naturally shadows the traffic is dissipated, and the force of the protest of good men is not a little broken. In the third place, the license fee operates as a bribe, and the larger the fee the greater the bribe, to induce the voter, the legislator, and the magistrate to suffer, to wink at, or to promote the pernicious trade. The result is that the attitude of the government very much weakens the moral agencies which can be used against the drink traffic and intemperance.

643. "Personal Liberty" and Intemperance.

The most popular plea now made against legislation prohibitive of the liquor traffic is urged in the name of

"personal liberty." To drink or not to drink is said to be a personal matter with which neither the government nor one's neighbor has anything to do. Is this appeal grounded in right principles, or is it the cry of a demagogue? We must hold that the use of intoxicants, and consequently the traffic in the same, belongs to public welfare and comes well within the governmental control.

644. The Right to Save a Man from Self-destruction.

The right to interfere to save a man from wantonly destroying himself is generally admitted. Men wrench from the hands of another the vial of poison, they snatch the pistol or knife which the owner turns against himself as they would if directed against the life of another man. This right is a duty. The brotherhood of man and the principle of benevolence require this. The same principle applies to self-destruction by the drink habit. To put the tempting drink beyond the reach of men too weak to resist the temptation is both just and benevolent.

645. Personal Liberty Subject to Limitations.

Personal liberty has a certain natural limit. It is admitted by all that a man's personal freedom must not be so used as to endanger the welfare of others. A person affected by a contagious disease is isolated or removed, willing or unwilling. In his own yard or in his own house a man is not suffered so to use his liberty as to poison the air and endanger the health of his neighbors. A druggist is not permitted to sell poisons except under safe restrictions. The adulteration of food is counted a fit subject for prohibitive legislation. This principle of

limiting personal freedom is well established in law and in common sense.

646. The Drink Habit a Menace to All.

The drink habit is, first, destructive to the individual, and then a menace and a damage to the entire public. Beginning with the family of the drinker, it brings loss, burden, and misery upon all, in proportion to the closeness of their relation to him. It stimulates crime and lays burdens upon the State. This injury touches most potently the generations to come. And no man can tell when, how, or where this injury will strike him or his. And no man can by the extremest watchfulness guard himself securely against this danger. If a man cruelly beat his child the law interferes; if he abuse his horse the law steps in to shield the brute. If a man inflict upon his family perpetual poverty, disgrace, and brutality, has the law no right to give protection? If the stream of life is in danger of being poisoned and polluted at the fountain head, is it unlawful interference to undertake to purify the stream?

647. Heredity.

As already suggested, the drink habit is a menace, and a grievous injustice and wrong to the generations to come. A hunger for intoxication is planted in the nature of the children that are born. It is a copious spring of imbecility and idiocy. A deep, dark tendency to the commission of crime is propagated. Is there no right anywhere to dam or dry up this stream of evil, and to turn away this blight and curse from unborn generations?

648. The Drink Traffic a Conspiracy.

The drink traffic is a conspiracy. This is not a figure of speech. The traffic must nurture and propagate the drink habit, or it must cease. The supply of patrons must somehow be maintained. To do this the business uses every allurement and artifice to draw men to the habit of drinking. Every saloon becomes, and is purposely made, a pest-house of temptation. The recruits for the army of drunkards must needs come from the young ; for them the saloonist spreads his net.

He sitteth in the lurking places of the villages ;
In the secret places doth he murder the innocent ;
His eyes are privily set against the helpless.
He lurketh in the covert as a lion in his den ;
He lieth in wait to catch the poor ;
He doth catch the poor when he draweth him in his net.
He croucheth, he boweth down, and the helpless fall by his
strong ones.
He saith in his heart, God hath forgotten ; he hideth his face ;
he will never see it.

Upon whom these seductive temptations shall take effect no man can tell. No community is safe. No family is safe. Thus the drink traffic is a conspiracy against every happy, virtuous household. Surely it belongs to the just and benevolent intent of government to afford protection from this ever-present threat and danger.

CHAPTER XXIII

CONCERNING CASUISTRY

649. The Nature of Casuistry.

Casuistry is that department of moral science which treats of "cases of conscience"—that is, the solution of difficult problems of right and duty. In this better sense it is the application of moral principles to difficult cases of moral conduct in actual life. But casuistry has been so much abused, it has been made so much the consideration of invented puzzles, and this with jesuitical methods of reasoning, that it has acquired an evil odor, and is sometimes used to signify mere jesuitical sophistry applied to morals. Mere quibbles and puzzles are unworthy of moral science. Even with real cases of conscience in actual life, moral science can do no more than furnish the general principles which underlie the solution. The facts in the case and the relationship of the facts to which the principles must be applied, must be found elsewhere. Indeed, the special difficulties in problems of right and duty are found outside this science.

650. Conflict of Obligation.

In treating cases of conscience much account is made of apparent conflict of duties. But cases are cited in this connection which show no real conflict. That is counted a duty which has not the nature of obligation, or an alternative is found where no alternative exists.

We may find illustrations of this in Paul Janet's "Theory of Morals" ("*La Morale*"). He says: "The alternative is placed before me whether I will betray the truth, will be false to my convictions and my faith, or whether I will give up my life."¹ This is presented as a conflict of duties. There is in the case no conflict of obligation. The alternative lies between doing right and suffering for it and doing wrong to escape the consequences of right doing. Janet supposes another case. He says: "Let us take a more difficult case. Suppose the soul is forced to choose between conscience and chastity. This is the case with the virgin Theodora in Corneille's tragedy—either she must betray her faith, or she must lose her honor and her virginity." In this case again there is no alternative of obligation and no proper alternative of any kind. Between one sin and another sin there is no true alternative. The question whether Theodora should betray her faith stood alone and was to be decided by itself. The question of surrendering her chastity stood by itself. Two wrongs were presented, both of which were to be rejected, the one by the confession of her faith and the other as she would resist the violence of a robber. The due answer would be to spurn the alternative and refuse to do either.

651. Conflict of Obligation Impossible.

The notion of a conflict of duties arises from a false and confused theory of morals. When the idea of right doing is reduced to the notion of seeking for certain "goods," and duty is counted as multiform and many as there are "goods" to be desired, there must needs seem

¹ P. 246.

to be numerous conflicts of duty. And if duty signify self-pleasing, there may be diverse and mutually destructive gratifications. But obligation is one. The rule of duty is the will of God, and the will of God is one, unless indeed the will of God is divided against itself. The only problem in any case is to determine what is the will of God. This is often difficult in the extreme, but the difficulty in the case is very unlike the balancing of alternative goods or advantages. The one supreme will of God stands as the true alternative of whatever is inconsistent with that will.

652. The Chief Difficulty.

The absolute rule and the unity of moral obligation is found in the one divine will. But this divine will lays down as a general principle the duty of submission to certain subordinate authorities, as the authority of parents or of civil government. There are also certain rights and privileges which God wills that each individual shall enjoy. Now it sometimes happens that the lower, human authority denies to the individual the rights which God has given, or lays down laws contrary to the divine law. The lower authority is opposed, or seems to be opposed, to the higher and the supreme, and yet the divine law enjoins reverent regard for the lower. In this conflict of authorities, what is the divine will? Here is found the chief difficulty. We find here two more or less distinct cases.

653. The First Case.

In the first case there is an absolute contradiction between the divine will and the human commandment.

For example, the divine law forbids idolatry; Nebuchadnezzar commands the young Jews—Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego—to fall down and worship his colossal image in the presence of all the people. The divine law requires worship and the confession of the true God; Darius forbids prayer to any being except himself on pain of being thrown instantly into a cage of lions. The word of Christ said, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature"; the Jewish council forbade Peter and John to preach in the name of Christ. In these illustrations the conflict of authority is sharp and decisive. In this case there is no problem of duty. There is merely a question of obedience or of disobedience to God under conditions of strenuous temptation. When the divine will is understood beyond a doubt, nothing remains but obedience.

654. The Second Case.

In the second case the conditions are such that the real will of God is a matter of uncertainty. A child has become a believer in Christ. He reads the words, "He that believeth and is baptized" and desires to make the public profession, but an unbelieving father absolutely forbids it. Apart from the prohibition of the father, the duty of the child would be plain. But the divine command says also, "Honour thy father." How far ought the will of the father to be taken as defining for the child the will of God? The civil law lays its hand upon a man and makes him, willing or unwilling, a soldier. The one rule of military service is obedience, unquestioning obedience, with no responsibility for consequences.

Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.

It is impossible to commit military affairs to the separate judgment of ten thousand private soldiers. The command goes from Herod to the keeper of the castle to behead his prisoner, John the Baptist. As toward men the keeper had no responsibility, he was merely an instrument in the hand of his superior officer. What was his responsibility toward God? Pilate bids a centurion take a squad of men and crucify Jesus of Nazareth. The centurion questioned in his own mind whether Jesus were worthy of death. Before the transaction was finished, the centurion found reason to cry out, "Truly this man was the Son of God." But he could not traverse and review the judgment of the Sanhedrin and the order of Pilate. What was his obligation and responsibility, under the circumstances, toward the Lord? These difficulties present themselves in endless variety. It is not a conflict of duty, but a problem to determine what is duty for persons under such conditions.

655. A General Answer Impossible.

Conformity to the will of God is always the right to be sought. Right is one, but the ways of doing the right and working out righteousness are many. To-day, Elijah flouts the authority of Ahab, braves the wrath of Jezebel, and slays the priests and prophets of Baal; the next, he flees for his life into the fastnesses of Arabia, and the one was doubtless as right as the other. At one time Jesus would not teach in Judea because the Jews were intent to kill him; afterward he went up to Jerusalem, though

he knew that he would be immediately seized and crucified. Paul escaped out of Damascus through a window in the city wall to avoid capture; afterward he put himself into the hands of his enemies at Jerusalem, though he knew that he was endangering his life. There is no rule for all cases. If it is wisely right for the child, above referred to, to defer awhile the doing of some duty, awaiting a possible change in her father's mind, the next year or the next week that duty of waiting may have ceased. Individual duty for the moment in many concerns must depend upon questions of objective or subjective detail.

656. What do General Principles Determine?

General principles do not, cannot, determine the details of duty, and yet they furnish the outline and framework of all duty. But what is the exact service of general principles and commands? The general principle of justice determines that wherever there is a place for justice, justice shall not be lacking, and that nothing shall be done at any time or anywhere contrary to justice. The principle of truth and honesty determines that whatever a man shall do, it shall not be contrary to truth. The general principle of love affirms that wherever there is opportunity for love, love shall be exercised, and that nothing shall be done contrary to love. General principles determine that whatever the form or the fortunes of a man's life, the ultimate spring of that life shall be love to God, and hence obedience to him. It is a general principle that a secondary, or derivative, obligation cannot dominate or negative the primary obligation. Man's authority cannot stand against the authority of God. The

general principle is the permanent and invariable element of moral conduct; the *expression* of the invariable principle is found in variable elements and circumstances.

657. A Neglected Element.

Many cases occur in which a man looks in vain for a sure objective clue to the path of duty. The general principle is certain, but the exact duty seems hopelessly uncertain. The only guiding element appears to be the consequences of the chosen course of conduct, and these consequences only a prophet can foresee. A poor clergyman, under the strain of work and solicitude, finds his health broken down. His physician tells him that he must give up all mental labor or run the risk of utter and final mental prostration. He prescribes change of scene and freedom from care for twelve months. To follow this advice means for the poor man the loss of his daily bread, and he knows of no way of meeting the expense. Moreover there is very great doubt whether a change of scene and rest will bring permanent advantage—and on the other side rest at home may bring relief, while he still keeps a hold upon the means of livelihood. It seems to be a question of consequences, and the consequences can be known only by the experiment. When the decision has been made and the consequences have proven disastrous, how can the good man help reproaching himself for having done an unwise thing? The neglected element, neglected in psychology and in philosophy, and commonly neglected in practice, is a subjective spiritual guidance which can lead a man to the discernment and conviction of absolute right. This is a matter of experimental religion, but if it is a fact,

it is not for this reason the less a matter of science and philosophy. There are many persons who believe this spiritual guidance to be a fact. They believe that through the normal action of their own faculties *in touch with the divine Spirit*, they are led to discern what is God's will. This discernment of duty stands in their minds, not as a doubtful conjecture concerning consequences, but as a calm conviction of the divine will, whatever the consequences may prove to be. If painful consequences follow, the soul remains peaceful under the assurance that the divine will has been done.

658. Considerations to be Noted.

Touching this neglected element in determining the application of general principles to concrete life, two considerations need to be noted. First, this subjective spiritual guidance has the advantage of bringing calmness of conviction and tranquillity of mind under the most painful experiences, as nothing else can do. Secondly, if this subjective guidance be not a reality, but the phantom of a diseased mind, then there is no method of reaching an absolute right in the application of general principles to the details of conduct. In that case, if only the general principle be not violated, there is no further obligation. With this conclusion men of high moral purpose can never be content.

659. Cases of Conscience.

As illustrating the application of general principles to special cases, we may consider a few imaginary examples.

1. A man is journeying across the country. His

wagon breaks and he can go no farther. A few nails would repair the damage and enable him to resume his journey. He goes to a neighboring farmhouse to get the needed help. He finds the family absent and the house closed. But in the open shed he finds a box of nails and a hammer. Is it right, in the absence of the owner, to use such nails as he needs? If the owner were present it would be his duty to render the needed assistance. On the principles of brotherhood and benevolence this would be his duty. It is just to assume that if he were present he would gladly respond to this obligation. To impute to a worthy man unwillingness to do such a kindness would be doing him a great wrong. To use needed nails would accord with the Golden Rule; it would be doing as he would wish another to do toward him under like conditions. On the other side, in the presence of the owner he would offer to make remuneration. We say, therefore, let the man use such nails as he needs, leaving sufficient payment for the same.

2. A young man and a maiden are betrothed, but after a time the young woman comes to see that a great mistake has been made. She discovers that the young man is not the kind of person whom she in her ignorance, or in her fancy, took him to be. She recoils from the promised union. She sees that marriage would bring unhappiness to her and to him. But her promise has been given, and the man refuses to release her from the engagement. Is it right for the young woman to break her promise? We notice, first, that betrothal is not marriage; it carries with it none of the proper obligations or rights of marriage. To break a betrothal is not

a breach of the marriage covenant. In the second place, the promise ought not have been made. It was made under a misapprehension of the real facts in the case, or else the facts upon which the promise was based have changed or passed away. The making of the promise may have been wrong; to keep it would be adding to the wrong. To keep the promise would perpetuate the wrong into the limitless future, and inflict it upon a widening circle. Neither party has the right to consummate such a wrong, no matter what promises have been made. The young woman ought therefore to repent of the making of the engagement, and ought not to hesitate to annul it.

This signifies that the substance of a promise may be so wrong that to keep the promise would not be right, and this may be true, even if the wrong of the promise was not understood at the making of it. It signifies also that the conditions which underlie a promise may be so changed that to fulfill the promise would be wrong.

3. A father is drunken and cruel; the mother is vile. The daughter has learned the sacred command, "Honour thy father and thy mother." Is it possible for the daughter to do this? Is it her duty? The duty of the child is correlative to the parental relationship, and to the duties which inhere in parentage. It implies the fulfillment of parental obligations, and presupposes the character which befits parents. The honor which the child is commanded to accord, is plainly intended to be the recognition of a relationship and of a character worthy of honor. It was not intended to be an unjust imposition upon the child, nor a shallow formality on the part of the child, the cast skin of a reverence which

has ceased to be possible in the soul. The command is given to sons and daughters of the ripest years, and they are not bidden by this to be blind to the realities of things. When therefore only the bare fact of the parental relation remains, exhausted of all which that relationship ought to signify, the fullness of filial honor becomes impossible. But if there be no place for honor in response to worth and love, the fact of fatherhood and motherhood remains, a fact and a reality forever, and that must be reverently recognized. Thus the child renders the honor which is due. If there is also a personal self-sacrificing devotion to worthless and vicious parents, this goes beyond the command to honor father and mother. The self-sacrifice of supreme love is limitless.

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